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Abstract 
My thesis demonstrates that, despite a number of impossibility results, a satisfactory and coherent 
theory of population ethics is possible. It achieves this by exposing and undermining certain key 
assumptions that relate to the nature of welfare and personal identity. 
I analyse a range of arguments against the possibility of producing a satisfactory population 
axiology that have been proposed by Derek Parfit, Larry Temkin, Tyler Cowen and Gustaf 
Arrhenius. I conclude that these results pose a real and significant challenge. However, in the 
absence of further evidence I reject the conclusion that they imply that the value of populations is 
either not precise or not transitive. 
Instead, I expose some fundamental assumptions behind these results. One key assumption is 
that something can only make a life better or worse if it makes that life better or worse for the 
person living it, i.e. it raises or lowers the ‘welfare level’ of that life. Although intuitively highly 
plausible, this assumption ignores the possibility that perspectives other than that of the person 
living a life may be relevant for evaluating the components of that life and that these should be 
incorporated into our all things considered judgements. 
I argue that episodes within a person’s life that are strongly psychologically connected may have a 
special normative significance, particularly if these episodes involve such things as the enjoyment 
of ‘the best things in life’ or the experience of great suffering. We have reason to assign an all 
things considered value to such strongly psychologically connected phases of a person’s life, where 
this value is not exhausted by the contributions these make to the welfare level of that person’s life 
as a whole. It follows that our all things considered evaluations of populations are often 
underdetermined by information about the welfare levels of the lives they contain. However, in 
certain cases, most notably in that of ‘the Repugnant Conclusion’, there is nevertheless sufficient 
information provided by the welfare levels of persons’ lives to allow us to infer facts about these 
components that make an all things considered difference to these evaluations. I argue that a 
failure to acknowledge these facts is the cause of the aforementioned impossibility results and that 
once they are taken into account it is possible to produce a satisfactory theory of population 
ethics.  
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Introduction 
Population axiology can be either simple or non-simple but only non-simple population axiologies can be 
satisfactory. I explain these terms, specify key assumptions of my work and then provide a brief outline of 
the thesis as a whole. 
A satisfactory population axiology is possible, but it is not a simple axiology. In this work, I shall 
defend this thesis against two alternative challenges. The first of these comes from arguments that 
attempt to prove the impossibility of producing any satisfactory population axiology. These 
include Larry Temkin’s argument against the transitivity of the ‘all things considered better than’ 
relation and Gustaf Arrhenius’ ‘proof’ of the impossibility of any satisfactory population ethics 
that includes a coherent axiology as one of its component parts. The second challenge comes from 
arguments that some simple population axiologies are satisfactory. Apart from rejecting these two 
opposing views, I will also offer additional arguments for accepting a non-simple population 
axiology. 
In this introduction, I shall briefly explain what I mean by key terms such as a ‘satisfactory 
population axiology’ and a ‘simple population axiology’. I will then explain one of the key 
implications of a non-simple population axiology, namely that it might, under certain conditions, 
value a set of lower welfare lives more than an equivalent set of higher welfare lives. 
A ‘satisfactory’ population axiology is an ordering of populations using the relationship ‘all things 
considered better than’ that can accommodate our pretheoretical intuitions regarding the relative 
value of such populations. I will primarily consider populations that are distinct from one another. 
This means that whilst these populations may contain lives at the same welfare levels, the people 
who live these lives will be different for each population. Although satisfactory population 
axiologies will need to order populations where at least one person has a life in multiple 
populations, it is a precondition for doing this that they can order populations where everybody 
has only one possible life. I therefore treat the challenge of ordering populations based solely on 
the value of their lives, without considering their modal features such as the relationships between 
different possible lives, as prior to other concerns. 
I interpret the idea of betterness to be the sum of all the reasons for preferring one outcome to 
another. Hence, if A is better than B then we have, in total, more reason to prefer A than B, whilst 
if A is no better than B then we have, in total, no reason to prefer A to B. Betterness can be 
determined from multiple perspectives and points of view. A perspective is a subset of reasons 
based on how they present themselves in an outcome. So, for instance, the value of a life for the 
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person living it is the sum of the reasons for preferring an outcome that are present in the 
individual person’s perspective on their own life, i.e. the reasons that we perceive if we consider 
only the parts of the outcome that present reasons for that person to value their own life. To say 
that one life is better than another is, on this interpretation, to say that the reasons we have to 
prefer an outcome viewed from the perspective of a person living one life are stronger than the 
reasons we have to prefer an outcome viewed from the perspective of a person living the other life. 
A point of view, on the other hand, is a richer conception about what reasons count for 
determining the value of an outcome, and how they should be compared to one another. Examples 
of points of view are the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ points of view. When we make all things 
considered evaluations, we combine all relevant points of view and perspectives in order to 
provide an overall judgement about the strength of all the reasons for preferring each of the two 
outcomes. 
The primary assumption of this work is that we can produce at least one satisfactory axiology of 
lives, an evaluative ordering of possible lives, using the relationship ‘better than’, that 
accommodates our pretheoretical intuitions. I do not assume that this implies that there is only 
one axiology of lives, and avoid referring to a single ‘all things considered better than’ relation for 
lives. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the facts that determine the value of individual lives as a 
whole may only be a subset of the facts that determine the value of populations, i.e. sets of lives. 
Secondly, there may be no ‘all things considered better than’ relation for individual lives since it is 
appropriate to value individual lives from distinct points of view which cannot be easily 
reconciled. For instance, it is appropriate to value individual lives from either a first-person or a 
third-person point of view. However, it is only appropriate to value an entire population from an 
impartial third-person point of view - what Sidgwick refers to as the Point of View of the Universe. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that the value a life contributes to the all things considered value 
of a population (its contributory value) is not merely the evaluation of that life from the third-
person point of view. It is, rather, the contribution that life makes to the, all things considered, 
third person evaluation of that population as a whole, i.e. the value which that life confers to a 
population of which it is a member. 
To say that a ‘better than’ relation is ‘all things considered’ implies that it is possible to reconcile 
all the relevant perspectives from which we might determine betterness into a single point of view. 
For an individual life, however, it may be impossible to reconcile the features that are relevant to 
considering its value from a first-person and a third-person point of view. Hence, no ‘all things 
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considered better than’ relation may be possible for individual lives.  
One perspective from which one life can be better than another is that of the person living that 
life. The value of a life from this perspective is that life’s welfare level, so that when we say that A 
has more welfare than B we mean that A’s life is better for A than B’s is for B. This perspective 
could be incorporated into a number of points of view, both objective and subjective, and 
therefore could play a variety of roles in our axiology. 
In this thesis, I will investigate the nature of the axiology that we should use to evaluate a 
population, as a whole, based solely on features of the lives that it contains. 
One standard approach to producing such a population axiology is as follows. We use a utility 
function to determine the welfare level of each life and transform each outcome into a vector of 
these welfare levels. Our axiology then ranks each outcome as a function of its welfare level vector, 
and nothing else. This is known as the Social Welfare Function approach (Adler (2011) 61-78). The 
Social Welfare Function approach is very flexible in its ability to incorporate different moral 
ideals, so long as these can be translated into functions for determining the value of a population 
from its welfare vector. However, I choose not to take this approach, since I believe that it rests on 
assumptions about the value of lives that are harder to support than they first appear. Instead, I 
will simply note that we can evaluate lives according to their value for the people living them, and 
I will refer to this as their welfare level. However, this does not mean that this kind of evaluation 
provides everything that we need to establish the value of a population containing these lives. 
For this reason, I will distinguish between ‘simple’ and ‘non-simple’ population axiologies. A 
simple axiology, like the Social Welfare Function approach, values a population based solely upon 
the number of people in that population and the welfare level of each individual’s life. According 
to a simple population axiology, one needs no further information beyond the welfare level of each 
life in a population in order to determine its value – in particular one does not need to know 
anything about the people who live each of these lives. As I have noted, it is possible to construct a 
very wide range of population axiologies in this way (Broome (2004) 43–48), for instance, it is 
possible to value the distribution of welfare in a population or to give lives at some welfare levels a 
value that is lexically superior to those at other welfare levels. Nevertheless, the principal claim of 
this thesis will be that no simple population axiology is satisfactory but that a non-simple 
population axiology that took into account other features of a population as well as the welfare 
levels of the lives it contains could be satisfactory. Some of the features of lives that population 
axiologies should take into account include the presence of things that are bad for people (such as 
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suffering or frustration) and of ‘the best things in life’. 
My argument for this thesis is based on two key claims. The first of these, which I discuss in 
chapter 1, is that there are sets of conditions about the value of populations, which are expressed 
in terms of the welfare level of their lives, that are all intuitively very hard to reject but that 
collectively imply a contradiction. I take this claim to show the impossibility of producing a 
satisfactory simple population axiology. The second claim, which I discuss in chapters 3 and 4, is 
that once we accept that there are certain valuable features of populations other than the welfare 
levels of their lives then these conditions will each be underdescribed because they make no claim 
about these other goods. I will argue that in completing the description of these conditions we can 
either reformulate them in ways such that they continue to imply contradictions or we can 
reformulate them in ways that continue to make all of them intuitively very hard to reject, but we 
cannot do both of these things. Nor can we always escape this result by arguing that, rather than 
completing the description of these conditions we should hold the value of all other features of a 
population equal. 
A population axiology can be non-simple in one of two ways. Firstly, it might not involve an 
axiology of lives that assigns a single value to each life based on the welfare level of that life as a 
whole. Secondly, although such an axiology might give each life a value based on the level of 
welfare of that life as a whole, it may also consider additional information that is not contained in 
these values when determining the value of a population. At present, I favour the first formulation 
of a non-simple axiology. However, I also believe that it should be possible to transform any 
axiology of the second type into one of the first type and vice versa. Therefore, I do not think that 
the approach we take to producing a non-simple axiology matters. 
So long as welfare has a positive value, any simple population axiology will have the following 
implication. For any two equal-sized populations where each life in the first population is at a 
higher welfare level than every life in the second population and where there are no reasons to 
prefer the distribution of welfare in the second population, the first population will necessarily be 
better than the second population1. With a non-simple axiology, however, this is not necessarily 
the case. There may be cases in which x and y are the same size, every life in x has more welfare 
than every life in y and we have no reason to prefer the distribution of welfare in y to x (e.g. the 
                                                             
 
1 If welfare had a negative value then simple axiologies would imply the exact opposite. 
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distribution of welfare in y is no more equal than in x), but y is better than x. If I can prove that 
there is at least one such comparison, then this would rule out any simple population axiology. I 
shall argue for this conclusion at several points in this work. 
List of key assumptions 
Having set out my aims for this thesis, I will now list my key assumptions. 
1 – That the value of populations matters to moral philosophy, i.e. we can assume that our moral 
intuitions have a bearing on this subject. 
2 – That the value of populations is sufficiently separate from other ethical and axiological 
considerations for us to consider it in isolation. 
3 – That it is possible to value populations without considering the relationship between different 
possible lives – the modal features of these lives, such as whether a particular person might have 
had a better or worse life – and that this value is independent of and prior to their value 
considering these relationships. 
4 – That it is possible to produce a satisfactory axiology of lives for the relation ‘better than for the 
person living that life’, establishing the welfare level of each life, which covers a range from some 
‘very good’ lives to some lives that are ‘bad’. Furthermore, that this range will include some lives 
that have very low positive welfare and could be described as ‘barely worth living’, and some lives 
that have negative welfare and could be described as ‘worse than nothing’. Finally, that lives in 
this range may be only ‘slightly’ better or worse than other lives. 
5 – That the position of lives on such an ordering is a function of certain features of these lives, 
their ‘welfare components’, that it is possible to produce a wide range of lives by combining these 
components in different ways and that there is no arbitrary limit to how this can be done. 
6 – That it is possible to produce a wide range of populations by combining sets of lives in 
different ways and that there is no arbitrary limit to how this can be done. 
Summary of this work 
This work has five chapters. 
In chapter 1, I argue that no satisfactory simple population axiology is possible. A simple yet 
powerful puzzle appears to imply an inconsistency in our intuitions about the value of 
populations. This puzzle poses a significant challenge to both moral theory and practical 
 
 
11 
 
 
policymaking. If these intuitions about the value of populations are formalised into conditions for 
a satisfactory population axiology, we can prove that no simple axiology can possibly satisfy them 
all. Moreover, this proof does not rely on any single condition but can be generalised across many 
plausible sets of conditions. I illustrate three such proofs. Firstly, a contradiction in our intuitions 
about quality of life and quantity of lives can be formally described using two conditions, the 
Quality and Quantity Conditions. Secondly, similar results can be formulated without referring to 
the Quantity Condition, since it is logically implied by other conditions that are harder to reject. 
Thirdly, other results can be formulated that replace the Quality Condition with a different 
condition that is even harder to reject, without having to replace the other conditions with 
conditions that are much easier to reject. These three results imply that in order to produce a 
satisfactory population axiology we must reject at least two out of a list of intuitively plausible 
conditions. Tyler Cohen has put forward a further argument against the possibility of certain 
population axiologies ever being satisfactory, using very different axioms to those already 
described. I argue that this argument complements the impossibility results I have set out. Given 
these results, and the crucial role that population axiology plays in consequentialist ethics, Gustaf 
Arrhenius has argued that population ethics fundamentally challenges our concept of morality. 
However, I end this chapter by arguing against this conclusion on the grounds that there remain 
potentially fruitful avenues for developing solutions to these puzzles within our existing 
consequentialist ethics. 
In chapter 2, I argue that whilst there does appear to be an inconsistency in our intuitions about 
the relative value of populations, there is no reason to believe that this reflects any deeper 
incoherence in their value. I consider two key arguments that imply we have some reason to 
believe that the value of populations is not transitive. Larry Temkin has proposed that the 
apparent inconsistency in our intuitions about the relative value of populations illustrates the 
essential comparability of these judgements. Whilst this is one explanation for this inconsistency, 
I conclude that this radical view is not supported by Temkin’s arguments. Temkin argues that the 
entire relation ‘all things considered better than’ is intransitive. However, this claim is compatible 
with the relation ‘all things considered better than’ applied to distinct populations remaining 
transitive. In fact, we have good reason to believe that the relation ‘all things considered better 
than’ applied to distinct populations is transitive. Temkin’s strongest argument for the non-
transitivity of the ‘all things considered better than’ relation applied to distinct populations is 
based upon a particular reading of the Mere Addition Paradox. However, I argue that this 
interpretation of the paradox has morally unacceptable implications of its own and that Temkin’s 
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argument therefore fails. Temkin’s only other argument for the non-transitivity of the ‘all things 
considered better than’ relation applied to distinct populations is based upon the implications of 
his own ‘capped model’ for comparing moral ideals. I find that whilst his arguments do support 
the view that the relations between lives in different populations affect their value, this does not 
mean that their value is intransitive. Finally, I set out two further reasons for thinking that the 
value of distinct populations is transitive: evaluating these populations does not invoke the 
Narrow Person-Affecting View and does not show the appropriate degree of context sensitivity. 
Derek Parfit has argued that our judgements about the relative value of populations may not be 
transitive because they are imprecise. I argue that even if this is correct it does not stem from 
genuine normative imprecision as Parfit suggests, but may be the result of epistemic uncertainty. 
Parfit’s argument for the non-transitive value of populations is that we cannot always make 
precise judgements about the relative value of populations of different sizes. Whilst Parfit makes a 
strong case that our evaluation of populations is imprecise, it does not follow that this is a result of 
differences in their size. Furthermore, if the imprecision in our evaluation of populations were the 
result of differences in population size then this would not help us to escape all of the results from 
chapter 1. Parfit proposes two alternative sources of imprecision in our evaluation of populations, 
imprecision in the value of individual lives and imprecision in our comparison of moral ideals. I 
believe that it is plausible that both of these kinds of imprecision can be found in our intuitive 
evaluation of populations, but that this stems from epistemic uncertainty rather than any deeper 
normative imprecision. I conclude by presenting Gustaf Arrhenius’s argument that even the non-
transitivity of value, on its own, does not allow us to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
In chapter 3, I argue that population axiology might consider facts about lives other than their 
welfare levels. In particular, I argue that certain facts about lives imply morally important features 
of the people who live them, such as whether they have complaints or realise their objectives, and 
about the relationships between these people. I argue that it is reasonable to accept a non-simple 
population axiology that considers such facts. I argue that, just as population axiology values 
individual lives and the relationships between them, so it should be sensitive to the value of 
individual life stages, and the relationships between them. I argue that lives are defined by both 
the causal connections between people and the world around them and between the person stages 
that make up these people. The value of a life therefor does not depend only on the interaction 
between a person and the world, but also on the constitution of this person and this creates the 
possibility that the parts of a life may take on different values when viewed from different 
perspectives. I contrast my position with that of John Broome, who has argued that people’s 
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psychological connections are not axiologically significant for the value of their lives, although this 
is an argument he does not complete. I accept this argument and attempt to complete it by 
appealing to the distinctions between people and their lives that I have developed in this chapter. 
However, since I believe that psychological connections are axiologically relevant for populations 
as a whole, I conclude that they are a source of impersonal value. In particular, I argue that they 
are a source of value that does not appear in the perspective of the person who lives each life, but 
only from other perspectives. These values are closely connected to, and in some cases determined 
by, the welfare level of lives. On this basis, I argue that these values are not included in any simple 
population axiology, but that it would not be appropriate to exclude them from population 
axiology. The value of lives from perspectives other than those of the people living these lives has a 
significant bearing on the value of three types of goods that play an important role in population 
axiology: ‘the best things in life’, ‘bad things’ such as suffering or frustration, and communitarian 
goods such as those associated with equality (these are all examples of ‘welfare components’, but I 
will argue that they all have a value that goes beyond their contribution to individual welfare). The 
badness of bad things in life, such as suffering and frustration, cannot be accounted for by their 
badness for the person living the life that contains them, because the presence of these things can 
create complaints from perspectives other than those of a person as a whole and these must be 
accounted for in our all things considered evaluation of the lives in a population. The, 
perfectionists, value of the best things in life is based upon the special value certain life stages may 
obtain when viewed from a perspective that can make objective value judgements about these 
stages. Finally, the value of equality may in part rest on the individual lives from a collective 
perspective of groups or communities. I argue that this offers an account of equality that matches 
our intuitions regarding the the Dominance Addition Condition, the Non-Anti-Egalitarian 
Condition and the Levelling Down Objection. 
In chapter 4, I argue that if we accept a non-simple population axiology and therefore believe that 
the value of a population is underdetermined by facts about the welfare level of its lives, it is 
possible to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1 and produce a satisfactory population 
axiology. I begin by considering the standard response to the impossibility results of population 
axiology: that one set of conditions for a satisfactory population axiology should be retained whilst 
another set should be rejected. I contrast this with the alternative response of a non-simple 
population axiology: retaining all the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology subject to 
additional facts about the populations involved and I argue that this response better reflects our 
intuitions about population axiology. In order to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1 a 
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non-simple population axiology must also make some additional claims about how we should 
value welfare. It will have to place an upper bound on the value of welfare relative to other goods. 
There are a number of ways in which this might be done, each of which is a defensible position for 
a non-simple population axiology to take. Any non-simple population axiology that attributes 
additional value to egalitarian goods, enjoyment of the best things in life, and the avoidance of bad 
things, and that accepts one of these views about the value of positive welfare, can escape the 
impossibility results of chapter 1. This result builds on the work of others and I argue that its main 
contribution to solving the puzzles of population ethics is to provide a normative justificiation for 
certain axiological models that have been formulated by Teru Thomas and Eric Carlson, and to 
show how they can be extended. I conclude by demonstrating that this is the case for one of these 
results, the Three-Way Paradox. 
In chapter 5, I argue that a non-simple population axiology provides the best explanation for the 
strength of our moral intuitions about the Repugnant Conclusion. I establish this by 
systematically considering different kinds of possible explanation. One possible explanation for 
the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is that we have a specific intuition against that 
judgement, and nothing else. I reject this response on the grounds that, if we can find no better 
explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion then, we seem to have insufficient 
reason to retain such an intuition. Another possible explanation of the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is that we intuitively hold some form of axiology that provides a contrary 
judgement. The simplest such axiology would be a version of Average Utilitarianism. However, if 
our sense of repugnance were based on Average Utilitarianism then we should find many other 
judgements equally repugnant, even though these are not hard to accept. There are many other 
possible explanations for our sense of repugnance based on our supposed intuitive support for a 
simple axiology that produce a contradictory judgement, all of which share the same flaw. I 
examine explanations based on our intuitive support for critical level theories, value pluralism and 
lexical superiority. Each of these possible explanations suggests that we should find certain 
judgements repugnant that we actually find acceptable and vice versa. Whilst sophisticated 
explanations of our sense of repugnance are better able to pick out only judgements that we find 
hardest to accept, they are also less compatible with simple population axiologies. Finally, I argue 
that if our intuitions reflected a non-simple population axiology of the kind I set out in the 
previous chapter then we can explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion without 
implying that any unrepugnant judgements should be equally hard to accept. 
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This work contains three appendixes. In the first of these I briefly sketch Gustaf Arrhenius’ ‘result 
6’, which I mention in chapters 1 and 2. In appendix B I discuss how to extend population axiology 
to deal with cases where populations are not distinct, by developing an account of fairness in 
response to my objections to Temkin’s arguments as presented in chapter 2. In appendix C, I 
consider how my non-simple population axiology relates to certain non-western worldviews.  
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Chapter 1 – The Puzzle of Population Axiology 
No satisfactory simple population axiology is possible. 
― [I]f we foresee as possible that an increase in number [of people] will be accompanied by a 
decrease in average happiness or vice versa, a point arises which has not only never been 
formally noticed, but which seems to have been substantially overlooked by many Utilitarians. 
(Sidgwick (1907) 415) 
― So far, no consensus has emerged about the value of population. Yet climate change policies 
are expected to affect the size of the world’s population, and different theories of value imply 
very different conclusions about the value of these policies. This is a serious difficulty for 
evaluating policies aimed at mitigating climate change. (IPCC (2014) 223) 
Even if Sidgwick was not the first to notice the difficulty in valuing populations of different sizes 
he has not been the last. Despite this, and despite the substantial literature that has emerged 
following Derek Parfit’s presentation of the Repugnant Conclusion in 1984, the problems with 
valuing populations remain unsolved up until the present day. As we will see, some philosophers 
now even claim that there may be no solution to these puzzles or that they undermine some of the 
key principles of moral philosophy. In this chapter, I will set out the nature and complexity of 
some of these problems. However, I will begin by briefly considering their historical origin and 
some of their implications for contemporary policy debates. 
Let us start with Sidgwick’s solution to the challenge of population axiology: 
― if we take Utilitarianism to prescribe, as the ultimate end of action, happiness on the whole, 
and not any individual’s happiness ... it would follow that, if the additional population enjoy on 
the whole positive happiness, we ought to weigh the amount of happiness gained by the extra 
number against the amount lost by the remainder. So that, strictly conceived, the point up to 
which, on Utilitarian principles, population ought to be encouraged to increase, is not that at 
which average happiness is the greatest possible, as appears to be often assumed by political 
economists of the school of Malthus – but that at which the product formed by multiplying the 
number of persons living into the amount of average happiness reaches its maximum. (Sidgwick 
(1907) 415–416) 
Here Sidgwick notes his disagreement with the economists of his day, who assumed that there 
could be no conflict between maximising ‘happiness as a whole’ and the ‘average happiness’ – i.e. 
between making people as happy as possible and making the greatest total sum of happiness. This 
disagreement begins with two of the most obvious statements in consequentialist ethics. 
1 – Things can be better or worse for individuals, such as myself, and 
2 – Things can be better or worse in general, all things considered. 
The Malthusian economists who Sidgwick disagreed with believed that if and only if it were 
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generally true for each person that things were better for them, or at least not worse, then it would 
be true that things in general were better, and if the converse were true then things would be 
worse. Hence, their concern was in maximising the average happiness of the members of a 
population, and hence making the members of that population as happy as possible. 
In opposition to this view, Sidgwick pointed out that there could be a greater quantity of welfare in 
a larger population than in a smaller one, even if the people in the larger population each had lives 
with less welfare than those of the people in the smaller population. The Malthusians, on the other 
hand, were concerned that rising populations would lead to poverty and suffering and were thus 
unwilling to consider that population size might be a good thing in itself. 
However, Sidgwick’s argument only shows that we should value the product of people living and 
average happiness if we accept ‘happiness on the whole’ as our ultimate value. Against this view, 
Derek Parfit has argued that Sidgwick actually provides us with a strong argument against taking 
‘happiness on the whole’ as our ultimate value. He pointed to the following potential populations. 
Population A A very large population of people at a very high welfare level 
Population B A larger population of people at a slightly lower welfare level 
Population C A still larger population of people at a still lower welfare level 
Population Z  A population very much larger than C, but at a very low welfare level. 
It is common in the field of population axiology to illustrate a set of populations like this using the 
following conventions. A set of lives can be expressed as a histogram, whose width represents the 
size of that set (relative to the other sets being shown) and whose height at each point represents 
the welfare level of each life – usually arranged from the best life in that population to the worst. 
When describing populations like these, with an equal distribution of welfare across lives, these 
histograms are rectangular. Parfit uses this convention to represent the four populations 
described above as follows, and I shall do likewise throughout this work. 
 
Figure 1: The populations of the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit (1986) 9) 
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Parfit points out that accepting something like Sidgwick’s method of valuing populations would 
imply that, so long Z is large enough, relative to A, it will be the best population in this set, despite 
consisting of lives that are ‘barely worth living’. Parfit goes on to describe Z in the following terms: 
― There is nothing bad in each of these lives; but there is little happiness, and little else that is 
good. The people in Z never suffer; but all they have is muzak and potatoes. Though there is little 
happiness in each life in Z, because there are so many of these lives Z is the outcome in which 
there would be the greatest total sum of happiness. Similarly, Z is the outcome in which there 
would be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. (Parfit (1986) 9) 
Parfit finds it very hard to accept any moral theory that implies that a population containing only 
these lives could be better than a very large population of lives at a very high welfare level, like A. 
He therefore labels this the Repugnant Conclusion. 
This is a compelling argument against taking happiness as a whole as our ultimate value. 
However, many of us may want to agree with Sidgwick that the size of a population does affect its 
value. It seems reasonable to believe that when comparing two populations such as A and B, 
where the difference in the welfare levels is small, the fact that population B is twice the size of 
population A goes some way to make up for the fact that the people in B are all worse off than the 
people in A. To dismiss the possibility that any increase in the size of a population, no matter how 
great, is never worth any reduction in the average welfare of the people in that population, no 
matter how small, seems unreasonable.  
However, if we believe that such judgements are transitive then this contradicts the Repugnant 
Conclusion. If B is better than A and C is better than B then there seems like a possible spectrum 
of populations between A and Z, where each is better than the last. Yet, we find it very hard to 
accept that Z could be any better than A. This suggests a deep and troubling inconsistency in our 
judgements regarding the value of populations. How much should this concern us? 
How we aggregate welfare across populations makes a significant difference to our evaluation of 
different policies regarding global issues such as climate change. For instance, one analysis of 
different social welfare functions found that the question of whether or not we should weigh the 
value of lives according to principles of equity will “lead to significantly higher global damage 
figures … about 25%–75% higher than those reported by IPCC” (Fankhauser, Tol and Pearce 
(1997) 262–263). There has been no analysis of the effect on policy evaluations of changing 
population size; however, it is undeniable that it will make a significant difference. For instance, 
John Broome argues that: 
― Growth in the world’s population causes global warming. Reciprocally, global warming will 
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affect the world’s population … If we are to evaluate climate change adequately, and assess 
policies that respond to climate change, we shall have to take account of changes in the world’s 
population. (Broome (2013) 169–170) 
How can we begin to take account of these changes when our most fundamental intuitions seem 
to be in opposition to one another? 
This implies an even deeper problem. What should we believe if we cannot accept any of the 
possible ways of valuing populations? As we will see, the appearance of a contradiction within our 
intuitions about the value of certain populations is far from superficial and it appears that no 
coherent satisfactory ordering of populations such as A to Z may be possible. In this case, the fear 
is that we may conclude that there is no fact of the matter about which populations are better and 
worse.  
We can reasonably evaluate policy choices, such as those relating to climate change, no matter 
which of the many plausible approaches to population axiology we take. However, if we find that 
all of these approaches are very hard to accept then such evaluations become unjustifiable. Even if 
every conceivable aggregation mechanism indicates that we have a duty to tackle climate change, 
how can we justify the costs of doing so if we find that all of these mechanisms are morally 
unacceptable? 
This work therefore aims to address two challenges. Firstly, how should we evaluate populations? 
Secondly, and more importantly, how can we make the case that there is any satisfactory answer 
to this question at all?  
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1.1 Three imposing impossibility results 
If our intuitions about the value of populations are formalised into conditions for a satisfactory population 
axiology, we can prove that no simple axiology can possibly satisfy them all. Moreover, this proof does not 
rely on any single condition but can be generalised across many plausible sets of conditions. 
The intuitive appeal of the puzzle outlined in the previous section should be evident enough. 
However, it is worth formalising it. Furthermore, this is not the only case of an apparent 
contradiction in our intuitive evaluation of populations. Some philosophers have even claimed 
that these contradictions render any satisfactory population axiology impossible. I will first 
present three impossibility results, each of which presents a different contradiction amongst our 
pretheoretical intuitions regarding the value of populations, and then go on to show how these 
results pervade our practical reasoning in dramatic ways. 
Each of the impossibility results I present arise when we attempt to produce an ordering of 
populations from best to worst that respects certain intuitively plausible conditions about the 
relative value of two populations. In this chapter, I will assume that any ordering of populations 
from best to worst must be reflexive and transitive. This means that any two populations 
containing the same lives must have the same value and that if A is better than B and B is better 
than C then A must be better than C. I will further assume that the ordering must be complete, at 
least to the extent that it includes all the populations covered by these conditions. 
My first impossibility result involves the contradiction noted in the previous section between 
allowing some trade-offs between quality of life and quantity of lives. My second result focuses on 
the impossibility of simultaneously avoiding three unattractive conclusions in population ethics. 
My third result shows that even if we are tempted to reject Parfit’s view about the Repugnant 
Conclusion, it can be equally hard to avoid cases that are just as hard to accept. 
1.1.1 Result 1 – Quality and Quantity 
We can formally describe the contradiction in our intuitions about quality of life and quantity of lives using 
two conditions, the Quality and Quantity Conditions.  
The first, and in many ways the most powerful, of the impossibility results I will consider here is 
merely a formalisation of the disagreement presented in the previous section. We might assume 
that the difficulty I presented in the preceding section represents a conflict between two separate 
intuitions.  
Many of us may want to agree, at least partially, with Sidgwick that the fact that a population is 
larger can make it better, even when compared to a, perfectly equal, population at a higher welfare 
level. Sidgwick argued that this is because happiness ‘as a whole’ is the ultimate good. However, 
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even if we do not accept this, we may still accept the following condition: 
The Quantity Condition:2 For any population of n1 people at welfare level a (where a is both 
positive and not the lowest positive welfare level), there exists a population size n2 (where n2>n1) 
and a positive welfare level b (where b<a) such that a population of n2 people at welfare level b is 
at least as good. 
This does not imply that such trade-offs between welfare levels and population size are 
proportionate. It merely expresses our intuition that, when n2 is significantly larger than n1 and b 
is only slightly worse than a, the population of n2 people at b is at least as good as the population 
of n1 people at a. 
On the other hand, many of us would also agree with Parfit that his Repugnant Conclusion is very 
hard to accept. I will consider why we find the Repugnant Conclusion so hard to accept in chapter 
5. For now, it is sufficient that we are willing to accept the following condition: 
The Quality Condition: For some population of n1 people all at a very high positive welfare level a, 
there is a very low positive welfare level z such that no population of any number of people at z 
would be at least as good. 
However, assuming that there are not an infinite number of welfare levels, or that we do not 
believe that these conditions should hold for any finite fine-grained subset of welfare levels, it is 
not possible to hold the Quantity and Quality Conditions without violating the transitivity of the 
betterness relation ‘at least as good as’. This can be proven by the fact that the contrary 
assumption implies a contradiction. To see this let us reconsider the populations from section 1.1. 
 
Figure 2: Quality and Quantity 
                                                             
 
2  There are many names for these conditions; in most cases, I shall follow Arrhenius (Forthcoming). Gustaf 
Arrhenius is largely responsible for expanding the range of impossibility results in this field and his 
taxonomy of conditions is especially exhaustive. Larry Temkin refers to the two conditions in this result, 
construed more broadly, as the First Standard View and the Second Standard View about value. 
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Here I assume that A is a population of n1 people at a. B is a population twice the size of A with 
people whose lives are at a welfare level 80% that of A. However, B could be a population 
hundreds of times larger than A with people whose lives are all at a welfare level only just 
distinguishably worse. It follows from the Quantity Condition that there must be some population 
B that is at least as good as A. Similarly, applying the same principles to population B, there must 
be some population C that is at least as good as B. Now it follows via the transitivity of the 
relationship ‘at least as good as’ that if C is at least as good as B and B is at least as good as A then 
C must be at least as good as A3. 
This chain of reasoning can be applied multiple times, each successive population being larger 
than the last, but at a lower welfare level, until we reach a population Z, with very many people all 
at the very low positive welfare level z, which must be at least as good as A. However, the Quality 
Condition states that compared to n1 people at a there can be no number of people at z such that 
this population would be at least as good. Therefore, via the Quantity Condition and the 
transitivity of the relation ‘at least as good as’, Z must be at least as good as A, whilst via the 
Quality Condition Z must not be at least as good as A. Hence, these conditions cannot all hold.4 
The reason that we must assume that there are not an infinite number of welfare levels, or at least 
that these conditions should hold for at least some finite fine-grained subset of welfare levels, is 
that for an infinite set of welfare levels it is possible that between any two welfare levels there will 
always be another intermediate welfare level. We can therefore imagine an infinite series of 
welfare levels below welfare level a, where, for each level in this series there is some lower welfare 
level that would satisfy the quantity condition, but where this infinite set does not include welfare 
level z. As we progress down the welfare levels in this set, we will be able to produce populations 
that are of equal or greater value to any population at welfare level a. However, all of these 
                                                             
 
3  To be ‘at least as good as’ implies being precisely equal to or better than. Some people believe that there is 
another kind of relation, being ‘imprecisely equal to’ and that whilst being at least as good as does not 
imply the possibility of being imprecisely equal to, being ‘not worse than’ can imply being imprecisely 
equal to. Imprecise equality if not a transitive relation, and hence being ‘not worse than’ may not be 
transitive either, so it is important that each of these conditions has been expressed in terms of one 
population being ‘at least as good as’ another. I will consider this view further in section 2.2. 
4  The transitivity of the relation ‘at least as good as’ is implied by the transitivity of the relation ‘better than’ 
since ‘A is not better than B’ is equivalent to ‘B is at least as good as A’. I will tend to refer simply to the 
transitivity of ‘better than’ or of betterness. Furthermore, I shall assume that all conditions refer to all 
things considered value, so that their inconsistency violates the transitivity of the relation ‘all things 
considered better than’ rather than any other betterness relation. Since any coherent ordering of 
populations must be transitive, I will interpret the incompatibility of these conditions with the transitivity 
of the all things considered better than relation as implying that any attempt to produce a satisfactory 
axiology that respects these conditions is impossible. 
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populations could still be more valuable than the largest possible population at welfare level z. 
One reason why we might think that there is not an infinite number of welfare levels is if we 
believed that two lives that were indistinguishable from the perspective of the person living those 
lives should be judged to be at the same welfare level. This would produce a finite set of welfare 
levels so long as we believed that there was a lower limit to the degree of difference between lives 
that a person could distinguish, both in terms of the quality of their welfare components and their 
duration. Such an assumption seems highly plausible for people of human psychology, but it may 
be argued that other kinds of person would be able to distinguish infinitely small differences 
between the value of different lives. However we might still believe that this is irrelevant to 
whether conditions such as the Quality and Quantity condition should hold, because we believe 
that these conditions hold for the different kinds of life that we can imagine, which present only a 
finite subset of all the lives that might be possible.  
Eric Calson has proposed a different kind of argument for why the Quality and Quntity conditions 
might not come into conflict, which I will consider in section 4.4. 
If we take the Quantity and Quality Conditions, the transitivity of betterness and the applicability 
of these conditions to finite fine-grained sets of welfare levels as necessary conditions for a 
satisfactory population axiology, it follows that no such axiology is possible. 
1.1.2 Result 2 – the Three-Way Paradox 
It is possible to formulate similar results without referring to the Quantity Condition, since it is logically 
implied by other conditions that are intuitively harder to reject. Here I offer my own version of such a 
puzzle (the classic version is the ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ – which I discuss later). 
The preceding result appears to highlight a simple inconsistency in our moral thinking. We apply 
one kind of moral ideal, consistent with the Quality Condition but not the Quantity Condition, in 
cases involving populations at similar welfare levels, and another kind of moral ideal, consistent 
with the Quantity Condition but not the Quality Condition, in cases involving populations at very 
different welfare levels. Using a spectrum argument indicates the incompatibility between these 
two moral ideals and forces us to choose between them.  
However, other results show that it is also impossible to simultaneously respect a broader set of 
conditions where there is no such incompatibility. The classic result of this kind, going back to 
Derek Parfit, is the so-called ‘Mere Addition Paradox’. I will discuss this result in the next chapter. 
Here I intend to present a similar result of my own creation. 
The Three-Way Paradox 
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Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion is not the only conclusion people find very hard to accept. Here are 
two more. 
Firstly, some theories imply the ‘Sadistic Conclusion’ that it is sometimes better to ‘add’ people 
with negative welfare to a population than it would be to add people with positive welfare. This 
description, though standard, is slightly misleading since we are concerned here with populations 
that are entirely distinct from each other. Instead, we should consider two populations that are 
the same in all respects except that where one contains a group of people with positive welfare the 
other contains a group of people with negative welfare. Many people would find it very hard to 
accept that in such cases the second population could be better than the first. 
One example of The Repugnant Conclusion is illustrated in the following case, where it seems very 
hard to accept that population A is not at least as good as (≥) population B. 
 
Figure 3: The Sadistic Conclusion 
One theory that implies conclusions of this sort is the theory that the value of a population is 
determined by the average welfare level of its members, not their total quantity of welfare. This is 
because the large number of people at a low welfare level in the first population may reduce the 
average welfare by more than the relatively smaller number of people with negative welfare in the 
second population. However, this does not imply that we need to be Total Utilitarians in order to 
avoid such a conclusion. We need only accept something like the following much weaker 
condition: 
The Non-Sadism Condition: An addition of any number of people with positive welfare is at least 
as good as an addition of any number of people with negative welfare. 
Secondly, some theories (such as some forms of perfectionism) imply the Anti-Egalitarian 
Conclusion, that a population with perfect equality could be worse than a population of the same 
size and less welfare, both in total and on average, but with an unequal distribution of this welfare.  
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Take the following case, illustrated below. Let us consider any triplet of welfare levels, a, b and c, 
where a is better than b and b is better than c. Now consider two possible populations. In 
population A there are n1 people at a and n2 people at c. Population B is the same size as 
population A, but all its members are at b. For any value of n1 there will be some value of n2 such 
that B will have more welfare than A, and it would seem to follow that in this case B is better than 
A. However, theories that imply the Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion might still imply that population 
A is better than population B. 
 
Figure 4: The Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion 
Note that it is not necessary to be an egalitarian to avoid the Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion. If we are 
egalitarians then we would not only reject this conclusion, but also believe that B would/could still 
be better than A if A had an average welfare level higher than that of B. If we are ambivalent about 
the value of equality then we might believe that so long as A’s average welfare level is no lower 
than B’s then B will be better than A. Even if we view equality as bad for some reason, we may still 
believe that B is better than A so long as n2 is sufficiently large, no matter what the three welfare 
levels of the populations. This is because as n2 increases in size B will increasingly have more total 
welfare than A so that eventually we might conclude that it is better, despite its equality. Only an 
extreme anti-egalitarian would hold that, no matter how large n2 became, an unequal distribution 
of welfare, like that in A, would always be better than an equal distribution, like that in B. 
Several alternative theories to Average or Total Utilitarianism imply conclusions of this sort, most 
notably those forms of perfectionism which imply that lives at a very high welfare level have a 
value that is lexically superior to that of lives that are at much lower welfare levels. Again however, 
one need not accept either Total or Average Utilitarianism (or any sort of egalitarianism) to avoid 
this conclusion. One need simply accept the following condition: 
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The Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition5: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a > b and 
b > c, and for any group of (n1) people, there is a larger number n2 such that a population of 
n1+n2 people all at welfare level b would be at least as good as a population consisting of n1 
people at a and n2 people at welfare level c. 
It would be desirable to accept both of these conditions together with the Quality Condition. 
However, it is not possible to do this without rejecting a further condition: 
The Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition6: For any population of n1 people at welfare level a 
there is another population with more people at a higher welfare level and one single person at a 
negative welfare level that is at least as good.  
The motivation for a principle such as this is that, even when we consider a large population of 
people at a high welfare level, it seems there is some way we could make it better, in terms of its 
size, the welfare level of its people or both. Furthermore, in at least some of these cases this 
improvement would be sufficiently good that it would be a change for the better, even if combined 
with the addition of a single person with a life at a negative welfare level. For instance, consider 
the following case: 
 
Figure 5: The Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition 
Three things should be noted about this case. Firstly, that the difference between the better-off 
lives in the second population and those in the first may be greater than the difference between 
the single life not worth living and a neutral life. Secondly, that the individual bad life need only 
be at a slightly negative welfare level and may contain many things which are very good. Thirdly, 
since we are dealing with two distinct populations, this is not a case of making most people better 
                                                             
 
5  Note that this condition says nothing about the distribution of welfare across three or more groups or 
about improvements in equality that do not bring about a perfectly equal distribution of welfare. 
6  This condition is original to this work; however, its name was chosen to fit in with the taxonomy of 
Arrhenius (Forthcoming). 
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off at the cost of making one person worse off. Instead, this case involves making more, better-off, 
people at the cost of making one, badly off, person.  
For these reasons, accepting this condition does not imply any of the intuitive revulsion we feel at 
certain similar cases, such as Larry Temkin’s proposal that almost everybody in the universe 
receive a small benefit, equivalent to a single lick of a lollipop, whilst one single person is 
subjected to unimaginable torture (Temkin (2012) 34). In this case, the difference between the 
two groups of better-off lives may constitute many years’ enjoyment of the best things in life, the 
person with a life not worth living may only be one lollypop lick short of having a life worth living 
and the trade-off between these two values does not involve any person-affecting considerations.  
The case I am considering here is, I believe, much closer to one described by Jamie Mayerfeld. He 
invites us to consider all the suffering of human existence thus far. If the suffering of a single 
individual at a negative welfare level was worse than any increase in the welfare of others, then, 
regardless of how good human existence might become in some utopian future, it would be better 
if humanity had become extinct long ago and so escaped some of this suffering (Mayerfeld (1999) 
159). Faced with this implication, I think that we should reject the kind of highly asymmetrical 
view about the value of suffering, which would lead us to reject the Non-Extreme Priority Addition 
Condition. Furthermore, I find this condition intuitively plausible.7 
The following diagram illustrates the contradiction implied by trying to accept the Quality 
Condition, the Non-Sadism Condition, the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition and the Non-Extreme 
Priority Addition Condition. This illustration is only figurative; however, it will be sufficient to 
illustrate the impossibility of holding all four conditions simultaneously. 
 
                                                             
 
7  Note that I do not believe we should reject all asymmetrical views about the value of bad things. In fact, I 
will argue in favour of such a view in chapter 3. This condition merely places a limit on how much priority 
we can give to bad things compared to good things in a population. 
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Figure 6: The Three-Way Paradox 
Firstly, let us consider populations A and D. Population A consists of a perfectly equal population 
at a very high welfare level. Let us assume that population D consists of people at a sufficiently low 
welfare level such that the Quality Condition implies that, no matter how many people there are in 
D, D could not be as good as A. 
Now let us consider populations A and B. B is a population that is almost entirely made up of lives 
that are better than the lives in A and has a larger number of such lives. However, it also has one 
single person with negative welfare. The Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition would require 
us to conclude that, so long as the addition to the welfare and population size of B is sufficiently 
large, B must be at least as good as A. 
Now let us consider populations B and C. Both populations consist of a group of people of exactly 
the same size and at the same high welfare level. They differ only in the respect that population C 
also contains a group of people with positive welfare, whilst population B contains one person 
with negative welfare. The Non-Sadism Condition implies that C must be at least as good as B. 
Since C is at least as good as B and B is at least as good as A, it follows via transitivity that C is at 
least as good as A. 
Finally, let us consider populations C and D. Population D consists entirely of people at a welfare 
level between the best-off and worst-off groups in population C. Population D has the same 
number of people as population C, more welfare and an equal distribution of this welfare. The 
Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition implies that D is at least as good as C. Since D is at least as good 
as C, which is at least as good as A, it follows by transitivity that D is at least as good as A. 
However, we have already concluded that D could not be at least as good as A. 
This informal presentation of my result relies upon several assumptions. Firstly, everyone in 
population D must be sufficiently badly off to satisfy the Quality Condition, i.e. they must have 
lives that are ‘barely worth living’. Secondly, the better-off people in B must be at a welfare level 
sufficiently higher than that of the people in A in order to satisfy the Non-Extreme Priority 
Addition Condition. Finally, the number of the worst-off people in C must be large enough to 
satisfy the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition. One might object that these assumptions cannot all be 
correct, since they involve competing claims about the sizes of populations and the welfare levels 
they involve. I shall not attempt to prove that they can. However, even if these assumptions 
cannot be correct for such a small group of populations (e.g. if in order to make B at least as good 
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as A and D at least as good as C we cannot simultaneously satisfy the requirements of the Quality 
Condition such that D is definitely not as good as A) we can produce similar contradictions using 
larger groups. This is because we could repeat the process of applying all but the Quality 
Condition to a spectrum of similar populations. Each time, we would judge that a larger 
population at a lower welfare level is better than a smaller population at a higher level, until we 
met the requirements of the Quality Condition, implying that the final population in this spectrum 
is worse than the first population. 
The Mere Addition Paradox 
I have produced this impossibility result as a means of illustrating the problems of simultaneously 
avoiding three judgements that are hard to accept, namely the Repugnant, Sadistic and Anti-
Egalitarian Conclusions. However, as I have already noted, this is simply one of a family of very 
similar impossibility results. The most famous of these is the so-called ‘Mere Addition Paradox’. 
This result proves that it is not possible to accept the Quality and Non-Anti-Egalitarian Conditions 
together with the following intuitively plausible condition: 
The Dominance Addition Condition8: An addition of lives with positive welfare and an increase in 
the welfare in the rest of the population doesn’t make a population worse, other things being equal 
(Arrhenius (Forthcoming) 310).  
I shall discuss this result more in the next chapter. Gustaf Arrhenius has proven several other 
compelling results in this family (see for instance Arrhenius (2000) and Arrhenius (Forthcoming) 
311–338). 
1.1.3 Result 3 – avoiding the Very Repugnant Conclusion 
It is possible to formulate another result by replacing the Quality Condition with another condition that is 
intuitively even harder to reject without having to replace the other conditions with conditions that are 
intuitively much easier to reject. 
All the results so far have suggested that there is a deep inconsistency between the Quality 
Condition and our other pretheoretical conditions concerning the value of populations. For this 
reason, it might be tempting to conclude that we are mistaken in accepting the intuitions that lie 
behind the Quality Condition. However, even rejecting the Quality Condition does not allow us to 
                                                             
 
8  The Dominance Addition Condition makes this version of the Mere Addition Paradox slightly different to 
its standard formulation. In this version, the better-off people in population B better off than those in A, 
whilst in the standard presentation, discussed chapter 2, they are no better off. This version represents the 
stronger result, but I have found no argument to suggest that the difference in strength between the two 
results is a difference in kind, rather than degree. I will therefore proceed to treat the two versions of the 
paradox as essentially equivalent.  
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escape these results. 
In the following result the Quality Condition does not appear. Instead, it uses the ‘Weak Quality 
Condition’. The Weak Quality Condition is required for avoiding the following Very Repugnant 
Conclusion: for any population with very high positive welfare there is a population consisting of 
some lives with negative welfare and other lives with very low positive welfare that is at least as 
good. This is illustrated in the following diagram, where it is very hard to accept that population B 
is at least as good as population A. 
 
Figure 7: The Very Repugnant Conclusion 
As with the Repugnant Conclusion, any theory that takes ‘happiness as a whole’ as the chief value 
for populations will imply this conclusion. However, it may also be implied by some other 
theories. To avoid it we need to accept only a weaker form of the Quality Condition as follows: 
The Weak Quality Condition: For some population of n1 people all at a very high welfare level a, 
there is a negative welfare level z and a very low positive welfare level p such that there is no 
population consisting of some people with lives at z and other people at p that is at least as good. 
However, accepting this condition has consequences of its own. In particular, it is not possible to 
simultaneously respect the Weak Quality Condition and two further conditions, which closely 
related to the Quantity and Non-Extreme Priority Addition Conditions. These are the ‘General 
Quantity’ and ‘General Non-Extreme Priority’ conditions. This result represents a somewhat 
simplistic member of a family of results proven by Gustaf Arrhenius (see Arrhenius (Forthcoming) 
338–357). Although these particular conditions may not have such strong intuitive support, they 
are implied by other conditions that do. The main virtue of this particular result is its simplicity 
and I shall generally make use of a more sophisticated result, ‘Result 6’, which I shall briefly 
introduce at the end of this section. 
Let us now consider the two further conditions for this impossibility result. 
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The Non-Extreme Priority Condition: There is a number of lives, n, such that for any population 
X, a population consisting of the X-lives, n lives at a very high welfare level and a single life at a 
slightly negative welfare level is at least as good as a population consisting of the X-lives and n+1 
lives at a very low positive welfare level. 
This condition is similar to the Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition from my previous 
example. However, in this case both populations are of the same size and contain a subgroup, the 
‘X-lives’, that is identical in both populations. One population also has a subgroup of n+1 lives at a 
low positive welfare level, whilst the other has a subgroup containing n lives at a very high positive 
welfare level and a single life at a negative welfare level.9 It is my belief that the Non-Extreme 
Priority Condition is, if anything, somewhat more appealing than the Non-Extreme Priority 
Addition Condition, since it compares two populations of the same size. 
The General Quantity Condition10: For any group of lives X, if a and b are both positive welfare 
levels that are greater than the average welfare level of X, then for any population consisting of the 
X lives and some lives at a there will be a population consisting of the X lives and some lives at b 
that will be at least as good. 
This condition is similar to the Quantity Condition from Result 1. However, it differs in that it 
deals with groups within populations rather than populations as a whole. It implies that if two 
populations share a subgroup of lives but differ with respect to another subgroup, and if for both 
populations the subgroup with respect to which they differ are perfectly equal groups at a welfare 
level greater than the average of the populations as a whole, then the population with more people 
at a lower welfare level may be better than the population with fewer people at a higher level.  
Note that since welfare level b must be above the average level of population X, both these groups 
increase the average welfare level of the population, but since b is closer to the average level of X 
than A the addition of n2 people at b will create a more equal distribution of this welfare. Note 
also that the General Quantity Condition implies the Quantity Condition. 
Since both the Non-Extreme Priority Condition and the General Quantity Condition split 
populations into subgroups, it is possible to divide up populations and apply these conditions 
consecutively to different subgroups. 
For instance, the General Quantity Condition implies that it may not be bad to replace one 
                                                             
 
9  Another difference between these conditions is that the Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition 
compares a perfectly equal population with a population that is not equal, whilst the Non-Extreme 
Priority Condition allows both populations to be unequal. 
10  As with the Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition, this condition is original to this work, but has been 
given a name to fit in with the taxonomy from Arrhenius (Forthcoming). 
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perfectly equal subgroup within a population with another, larger, subgroup at a lower welfare 
level. It follows that for populations with some people at a high welfare level a, some people at a 
lower welfare level b and others at a still lower welfare level c, there is another population with 
many more people at a welfare level b and the same number at c that would be at least as good. 
 
Figure 8: The General Quantity Condition 
It is also possible to apply these conditions iteratively to multiple subsets of lives within a 
population. For instance, the Non-Extreme Priority Condition states that for any population that 
has a sufficiently large group of people at a very low positive welfare level, it would not be bad if 
that group were replaced by a group of the same size with one person at a negative welfare level 
and everyone else at a very high welfare level. Let us consider a population with a very large 
number of people at a very low welfare level. We could divide this up into a number of subgroups, 
each containing a much smaller number of people at a very low welfare level. Next, we could apply 
the Non-Extreme Priority Condition to each of these subgroups in turn. In this way, we can 
produce a population with n1 people at a very high positive welfare level and n2 people at a 
negative welfare level, whereas we started with a group of n1+n2 people all at a very low positive 
welfare level. See below: 
 
Figure 9: The Non-Extreme Priority Condition 
Noting both of these points, we can show that accepting all three of these conditions, together 
with the transitivity of betterness, implies a contradiction.  
Consider the following populations. As with the previous diagram, this is merely figurative and it 
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may be that some of the properties of the populations involved, and especially the relative sizes of 
various groups within them, must be larger if they are to satisfy the conditions we use here. 
Nevertheless, some group of populations of this pattern would satisfy all of these conditions. 
 
Figure 10: Avoiding the Very Repugnant Conclusion 
According to the General Quantity Condition (and the Quantity Condition), some population of 
the kind represented by B would be at least as good as population A. Note that this is simply the 
same as Result 1 and that it clearly violates the Quality Condition. However, this result assumes 
that we no longer accept the Quality Condition so this does not count against the view that B is at 
least as good as A. 
According to the Non-Extreme Priority Condition, applied through many iterations, a population 
of the kind represented by C would be at least as good as population B, since it involves (many) 
more people with lives at a very high welfare level than people with lives at a negative welfare 
level.  
Finally, according, once again, to the General Quantity Condition a population of the kind 
represented by D would be at least as good as population C. Here we have simply replaced the very 
high welfare lives in C with many more lives at a low positive welfare level. Note also that since the 
remainder of the population contains no lives above this level and some negative welfare lives, 
these extra lives are still above the average welfare level for this new population. 
It follows, via transitivity, that if D is at least as good as C, which is at least as good as B, which is 
at least as good as A, D must be at least as good as A. However, the Weak Quality Condition 
implies that D (or populations that are of the same kind as D), could not be at least as good as A. 
This conflict implies that we cannot hold all four conditions simultaneously, since they imply a 
contradiction. 
Result 6 
As already mentioned, this impossibility result is only a token member of a larger family of results 
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that have been proven by Gustaf Arrhenius. One result in particular deserves special mention at 
this point, since it represents the strongest result for the impossibility of producing a satisfactory 
population axiology. This result, which I shall refer to simply as ‘Result 6’, proves the impossibility 
of holding the following version of the Weak Quality Condition: 
The Weak Quality Addition Condition11: For any population X, the addition of a sufficiently large 
group with very high positive welfare to X would be better than the addition of any group of 
people at a low positive welfare level and some people at a negative welfare level. 
Together with the General Non-Extreme Priority Condition, the Non-Sadism Condition and the 
following plausible condition: 
The Non-Elitism Condition: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a is higher than b 
and b higher than c, and for any population A at welfare level a, there is some, sufficiently larger, 
population C at welfare level c, and a population B of the same size as A∪C at welfare level b, such 
that for any population X, B∪X is at least as good as A∪C∪X. 
The Non-Elitism Condition implies the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition from the Three-Way 
Paradox. It is a generalised version of that condition in that, like the General Quality Condition, it 
concerns populations that share one subgroup of lives but differ with respect of another. 
As with the Mere Addition Paradox, I will not attempt to prove Result 6 here (see Arrhenius 
(Forthcoming) 349–357). However, I offer an informal description of this result in appendix A. 
1.1.4 The implications of these results 
These three results imply that in order to produce a satisfactory population axiology we must reject at least 
two out of a list of intuitively plausible conditions. However, there remain at least three sets of conditions 
that would allow us to escape all these puzzles and which we might have some (independent) reason to 
reject. 
So far, I have presented three results informally and suggested others that make use of similar 
conditions. Since I will make use of two of these results in the next chapter, I have presented their 
conditions here, though I have not attempted to prove them. To summarise, the results that I have 
mentioned thus far, and that I will rely on in what follows, imply that we cannot simultaneously 
accept the following five groups of conditions. 
                                                             
 
11  This condition is a ‘generalised’ version of the Weak Quality Condition that applies to groups within a 
population, rather than populations as a whole, in the same way that the General Quantity Condition is a 
generalised version of the Quantity Condition. 
Condition Quality and 
Quantity 
Three-Way 
Paradox 
Mere Addition 
Paradox 
Avoiding the 
VRC 
Result 6 
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This table also illustrates the implications of holding any subset of these conditions. For instance, 
let us say we are only committed to accepting the Non-Sadism and Non-Anti-Egalitarian 
Conditions. It therefore follows that we would have to reject both: 1) either the Quality or Non-
Extreme Priority Condition, 2) either the Quality or Dominance Addition Condition and 3) either 
the Weak Quality Addition or Non-Extreme Priority Condition. It further follows that in this case, 
and for many other pairs of conditions, to accept two plausible conditions we must reject at least 
two other conditions. For instance, in order to accept both the Quality and Weak Quality 
Conditions it is necessary to reject at least three other conditions (the Quantity, Non-Extreme 
Priority and Non-Anti-Egalitarian Conditions). Finally, many conditions are included in two 
different impossibility results and it is more than likely that more could be produced to cover 
modified conditions of similar kinds.  
These impossibility results affect population axiology even if we reject both the Quality and the 
Quantity Condition. This suggests that the problem first noticed by Sidgwick is not an isolated 
one, but reflects a deep inconsistency within our intuitions regarding the value of populations. 
However, there are certain sets of conditions that one might still reasonably reject. In particular, 
certain moral theories imply the violation of particular conditions for principled reasons. Certain 
forms of perfectionism which give an extra value to lives that enjoy ‘the best things in life’ 
implicitly violate the Quantity, General Quantity, Non-Anti-Egalitarian and General Non-Elitism 
Conditions on the principle that lives at certain very high welfare levels have a value that is 
superior to that of any number of lives at lower welfare levels. On the other hand, some forms of 
egalitarian pluralism implicitly violate the Quantity, General Quantity, Non-Sadism and 
                                                             
 
12  Result 6 includes the Weak Quality Addition Condition rather than the Weak Quality Condition. 
Quality X X X   
Weak Quality    X X12 
Quantity X     
General Quantity    X  
Non-Sadism  X   X 
Non-Anti-Egalitarian  X X   
General Non-Elitism     X 
Non-Extreme Priority 
Addition 
 X    
Non-Extreme Priority    X X 
Dominance Addition   X   
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Dominance Addition Conditions on the principle that adding lives can make a population worse, 
even if they are at a positive welfare level. Finally, approaches such as Total Utilitarianism will 
violate the Quality and Weak Quality Conditions on the grounds that enough lives at a positive 
welfare level can have a cumulative value greater than any finite number of lives at a very high 
welfare level. I shall consider the viability of these theories later.   
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1.2 Other results 
We can get a different appreciation for the puzzle of population axiology by considering another kind of 
argument, first proposed by Tyler Cohen. This uses very different axioms and yet is a natural complement 
to the impossibility results of the previous section. 
These are not the only results that have emerged from the literature on the Repugnant 
Conclusion. Tyler Cohen has suggested a very different kind of argument for why we cannot 
produce a satisfactory population axiology, using conditions that represent our intuitions about 
more fundamental features of the value of populations. He shows that there is an apparent 
conflict between the following four axioms: 
Universal Domain: We can rank all possible populations according to their relative betterness. 
The value of Total Utility: The total quantity of welfare is a feature of populations, whose value 
matters in our evaluation of populations. 
Value Pluralism: More than one value should matter in our evaluation of populations. 
The Non-Vanishing Value Axiom: No value that matters in our evaluation of populations should 
become infinitely small in importance at the margin. 
The Axiom of Value Pluralism implies that there are multiple values that we use in evaluating 
outcomes and that it is not the case that the distribution of any one value across certain 
populations can imply that the distribution of all other values does not affect their relative 
betterness. As Cowen puts it: 
― First the world contains plural values 1 through N. Second, there is no value N such that 
whatever the distribution of other values from 1 through N-1 across social states A and B, there 
exists some distribution of N across A and B yielding the outcome that the social state containing 
more N is socially preferred. (Cowen (1996) 758) 
In this way, the Axiom of Value Pluralism places an upper bound on relative importance of any 
one feature of populations for our evaluation of populations, ruling out the possibility that any one 
value could ever be infinitely more important than the others. Cowen argues that our commitment 
to value pluralism is what makes the Repugnant Conclusion so hard to accept, since so long as 
there is enough welfare in the larger population Z, this population will be better than a very large 
population where each life exhibits any amount of the other things that we value13. 
                                                             
 
13  Gustaf Arrhenius has objected to Cowen’s axiom of value pluralism on the grounds that it violates his 
Egalitarian Dominance Condition, that ”If population A is a perfectly equal population of the same size as 
population B, and every person in A has higher welfare than every person in B, then A is better than B, 
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The Non-Vanishing Value Axiom, on the other hand, places a lower bound on the relative 
importance of any one feature of populations for our evaluation of populations. In particular, this 
axiom implies that, for any value, there exists no distribution of other values such that the 
addition of any amount of this value, no matter how large, would not make up for the removal of 
any finite amount of any other value. As Cowen puts it: 
― Consider a comparison of two social states, which differ with regard to several values, 1 
through N. For any distribution of values 1 through N-1, there should always exist a sufficiently 
large quantity of value N that is socially preferable to an increment of some other value or 
values. (Cowen (1996) 759) 
So long as there is only one feature of populations, whose value matters in our evaluation of 
populations, that lacks a theoretically possible maximum – such as the total quantity of welfare – 
then these two conditions cannot both be satisfied. This is because the value of this feature could 
always be so large as to dominate the value of any other features that could not exceed some 
theoretical maximum. If we value such a feature and still accept the Axiom of Value Pluralism, 
then we would have to do one of two things. Either we must place some upper bound on the 
maximum value of this feature relative to other values, for instance by arguing that its marginal 
value diminishes to zero as it increases, or we must believe that some other value could be greater 
than that of any amount of this particular feature. The first of these possibilities violates the Non-
Vanishing Value Axiom, since it implies that there are cases in which this value becomes infinitely 
small at the margin. The second possibility, on the other hand, violates the Axiom of Value 
Pluralism, by allowing a different value that can dominate our evaluation of populations, and 
hence leaves us no nearer to a solution.  
The total quantity of welfare is a feature without any theoretically possible maximum and there is 
a greater total quantity of welfare in population Z than in population A. Hence, what the 
Repugnant Conclusion shows us, according to Cowen, is that, if the total quantity of welfare is a 
feature of populations whose value matters in our evaluation of populations, then we may face a 
hard choice between the Axiom of Value Pluralism and the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom.  
Note that the role of the Axiom of Universal Domain in this result is simply to prevent us from 
trying to escape this result by arguing that cases such as the Repugnant Conclusion fall outside of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
other things being equal.” (Arrhenius (forthcoming) 61-2). I accept Arrhenius’ argument to this effect and 
believe that this was not an implication of his principle that Cowen likely intended. However, I do not 
accept the Egalitarian Dominance Condition, although I will not argue for this claim here, and therefore I 
do not see this as any reason on its own to reject this axiom.  
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the set of cases that we can rank in terms of their relative betterness, and thus technically escape 
the conflict between the other axioms. However, rejecting the axiom of completeness in order to 
permit this escape comes at the cost of surrendering the possibility of ever evaluating such cases, 
even though we have very strong intuitions about their value. 
It is important to note that Cowen’s argument is not an impossibility result. Whilst we cannot 
accept both the Axiom of Value Pluralism and the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom if we value only 
one features of a population that has no maximum upper limit, it is possible to accept both these 
axioms if we value two or more unlimited features of populations. If we do then it is always 
possible that, no matter how large one of these values became, the other value could always be 
larger, preserving value pluralism without violating the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom.  
However, Cowen’s result is still useful in population ethics, because it can help us to understand 
what makes the Repugnant Conclusion so hard to accept. When we compare the A lives and the Z 
lives we seem to accept that every single Z life makes the population containing it better, making 
the value of additional limitless, whilst all the features that might make the A lives better than the 
Z lives, such as the perfectionist value these lives contain, are finite and limited. 
I therefore believe that we should not dismiss Cowne’s argument. For one thing, it may be 
considerably harder to avoid than it first seems. For instance, in a recent paper Greaves and Ord 
point out that moral theories that uphold only one value without a theoretically possible 
maximum tend to swamp other theories under conditions of moral uncertainty (Greaves and Ord 
(forthcoming) 12-17).  
Their argument starts from the premise that when we are faced with moral uncertainty, i.e. when 
we are unwilling to have a credence of 100% in the truth of any one moral theory, we should seek 
to maximise the expected moral value of an outcome. This is the combination of the moral value 
each theory places on that outcome and the credence that we have in that theory. They argue that 
if we are willing to give any credence (no matter how small) to moral theories with a single 
unlimited value then the expected moral value of acts where this value tends to infinity will also 
tend to infinity. Hence, even if we have a very low credence in the total view (and remember that 
the Repugnant Conclusion is meant to be ‘very hard to accept’ and not ‘totally unacceptable’) we 
may still be forced into rejecting Cowen’s Axiom of Value Pluralism, even if we have more 
credence in other moral theories such as the Average or Variable Value views. For instance, if we 
have a credence of 1% that the total quantity of welfare in a population should contribute to its 
value in a non-diminishing way but a credence of 99% that it had no value or a value that 
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diminished at the margin, then we would be forced into accepting the view that there could be 
more expected moral value in population Z of the Repugnant Conclusion than Population A. 
Greaves and Ord call this ‘the Effective Repugnant Conclusion’ (Greaves and Ord (forthcoming) 
20-21). 
Greaves and Ord accept that this is an unattractive conclusion and that some people may view it 
as a reduction ad absurdum of the Expected Moral Value approach to reasoning under moral 
uncertainty (Greaves and Ord (forthcoming) 21-22). However, there are ways of avoiding this 
conclusion without abandoning its aproach. What Greaves and Ord show us is that placing a very 
low credence on the total quantity of utility as an unlimited moral value is not enough for us to 
avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. Instead, we must place a sufficiently high credence in the 
existence of one or more features, whether they are limited or not, that are worth at least as much 
as any amount of welfare is on the Total View and that are present in population A, but missing 
from population Z. We are therefore left in the difficult position that Cowen describes. Either we 
must have 0 credence in the value of the total quality of welfare or we must face a difficult choice 
between giving some feature of populations a value that could be more important than any 
amount of welfare, and thus violating the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom, or accepting the effective 
Repugnant Conclusion, and thus violating the Axiom of Value Pluralism.  
Despite not being an impossibility result itself, Cowen’s argument still bears some resemblance to 
the impossibility results I considered in the previous section. For instance, one reason we accept 
the Quality Condition is to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, which, Cowen argues, we wish to 
avoid because we accept Value Pluralism. Similarly, one reason we might accept the Quantity 
Condition is that we recognise that a much larger population, even at a lower welfare level, 
contains additional utility and that this value matters to our evaluation of populations in a non-
diminishing way. Furthermore, Cowen argues that one of the reasons we have for accepting the 
Non-Vanishing Value Axiom (applied to the value of total utility) is that theories which violate this 
axiom all imply conclusions that are very hard to accept, as the impossibility results show (Cowen 
(1996) 762). On the other hand, Cowen shows how his result is broader in scope than the 
impossibility results presented so far in this chapter and that it applies to a much wider range of 
cases, such as those involving the evaluation of single lives (Cowen (1996) 767).  
The impossibility results from the previous section also go further than Cowen’s result in some 
respects. Cowen’s result only works when we try to evaluate populations of potentially infinite size 
and relies upon the fact that only one value is unlimited for such populations, in this way it is 
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much like the Quality and Quantity paradox from section 1.1.1. However, some of the results from 
the previous section do not rely on such assumptions. These results involve purely finite values, 
although the conditions they rely on become stronger as the differences in size of these values 
increases. Instead, these results rely on inconsistencies between multiple competing moral ideals 
to generate their apparent contradictions. 
I therefore conclude that a satisfactory population axiology will need to escape all the 
impossibility results of the previous section and also respond to Cowen’s argument and avoid the 
Effective Repugnant Conclusion. However, I also believe that it is likely that a successful 
resolution to one of these challenges will lead us to resolving the other. For instance, if we can 
escape the impossibility results of chapter 1 then this will avoid Cowen’s strongest argument in 
favour of the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom. On the other hand, if we can show how to resolve the 
conflict between value pluralism and the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom this will make the 
Repugnant Conclusion much easier to avoid I will consider this further in section4.2. 
 
 
42 
 
 
1.3 The road to scepticism 
Given the impossibility results in population axiology, and the crucial role that population axiology plays 
in consequentialist ethics, Gustaf Arrhenius has argued that these results fundamentally undermine certain 
aspects of normative ethics. I disagree with this conclusion on the grounds that there remain potentially 
fruitful avenues to solving these puzzles within our existing consequentialist ethics. 
Given the many impossibility results presented in this chapter and elsewhere in the literature on 
population axiology,14 it seems tempting to conclude that no satisfactory population axiology is 
possible. However, there are many choices we make that can affect population size, often as an 
unintended consequence of our actions, and it seems irrational not to be concerned about the 
effect of our actions when considering their moral permissibility. This implies that population 
axiology forms an important part of moral theory, albeit one many people would rather ignore. 
Together, these two facts suggest that the problems with population ethics pose a substantial 
challenge to moral philosophy. Gustaf Arrhenius has argued that we have only three options in 
dealing with this threat. 
Firstly, we have the option of rejecting one or more of these conditions, so long as we reject 
enough conditions to avoid all of these impossibility results. As I pointed out earlier in this 
chapter, it would not be enough to reject only one condition, since no single condition appears in 
all of the results I have presented here, not to mention those presented elsewhere. However, we 
might plausible reject the following sets of conditions en bloc. 
The Quality and Weak Quality Conditions, together with their generalised forms and the Axiom of 
Value Pluralism: essentially denying that there is any moral ideal that cannot be trumped by what 
Sidgwick refers to as ‘happiness as a whole’. 
The Quantity, General Quantity, Non-Anti-Egalitarian and General Non-Elitism Conditions and 
the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom: essentially allowing for highly anti-egalitarian moral theories 
that see moral ideals such as utility, equality and beneficence as less important than the welfare of 
the best-off or the presence of ‘perfectionist’ goods. 
The Quantity, Non-Sadism and Dominance Addition Conditions and either the value of utility or 
the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom: essentially implying that the presence in a population of certain 
lives with positive welfare can reduce the value of that population. 
Personally, I am not attracted to any of these positions. However, others are attracted to one or 
                                                             
 
14  For other results, see Parfit (1986), Rachels (2004) and Temkin (2011) inter alia. 
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more of them and they roughly correspond to the three major avenues of axiological development 
in population ethics: Total Utilitarianism, Value Superiority and Capped Value Pluralism. 
Arrhenius also considers two possible reasons for rejecting all of the conditions we have 
mentioned. Firstly because they are methodologically irrelevant to how we should choose between 
moral theories since they depend on pretheoretical intuitions and secondly because, though 
methodologically relevant, the examples they raise are too extreme in nature and involve very rare 
cases, such as populations of very different sizes or with uniform equality. 
As far as the methodological relevance of the conditions I have considered here is concerned, I 
have simply assumed that the value of populations matters morally and that this value can be 
considered in isolation. I take these assumptions to be sufficient to imply the methodological 
relevance of the conditions under consideration so I will not consider this possibility further. 
As far as the nature and precision of the cases under consideration are concerned, the possibility 
that this may lead us into error has dogged population ethics since its earliest days. In response to 
similar concerns, Sidgwick wrote: 
― It may be well here to make a remark which has a wide application in Utilitarian discussion. 
The conclusion just given wears a certain air of absurdity to the view of Common Sense; because 
its show of exactness is grotesquely incongruous with our consciousness of the inevitable 
inexactness of all such calculations in actual practice. But, that our practical Utilitarian 
reasonings must necessarily be rough, is no reason for not making them as accurate as the case 
admits; and we shall be more likely to succeed in this if we keep before our mind as distinctly as 
possible the strict type of the calculation that we should have to make, if all the relevant 
considerations could be estimated with mathematical precision. (Sidgwick (1907) 416) 
I find that this response stands as well today as it ever did. After all, we are not considering precise 
or extreme cases here because they should turn out to be hard to assess according to these 
principles, but because they should be, on all accounts, the most straightforward. Nevertheless, I 
do believe that there may be issues relating to the fact that these cases offer very incomplete 
information about the kinds of lives and their relationships, which I believe may underdetermine 
the value of each population. Nevertheless, I do not believe that this indeterminacy undermines 
any of the conditions I have mentioned in this chapter. 
An appeal to intuitions in this case is not the same as intuitionism, it is merely an appeal to the 
idea that moral theory should not imply judgements that we find very hard to accept. Sidgwick is 
correct to point out that the place to test whether moral theory matches with our intuitions is 
precisely where we can be most precise and mathematical about the cases involved and that if we 
cannot trust our judgement in these cases we should be deeply concerned about our judgement in 
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the necessarily rougher cases of everyday practical reason. 
The second option Arrhenius thinks we have when confronted with these impossibility results is 
to deny that we must have coherent judgements about the relative value of populations. Arrhenius 
suggests that the most reasonable justification for this position would be if we did not believe that 
these judgements were based on beliefs about the way the world actually is. Moral non-
cognitivists have argued that what moral judgements actually consist in is a set of attitudes. One 
of the strongest objections to this view is precisely that such attitudes are not transitive and 
therefore lack coherence. As long as we have reason to believe that moral judgements must be 
coherent, this counts against moral non-cognitivism. However, Arrhenius argues, if we find that 
our judgements are not coherent then this feature counts in favour of moral non-cognitivism. 
Finally, Arrhenius argues that if we reject moral non-cognitivism but cannot escape the 
inconsistency in our beliefs about population axiology, the only option left to us is to deny that 
these beliefs are true. We therefore face a deep moral scepticism that would pervade not only 
population ethics, but also consequentialism more broadly. 
I think Arrhenius is right to point out that both moral non-cognitivism and moral scepticism 
might be legitimate responses to the puzzle of these impossibility results. Like him, I find both of 
these responses deeply unattractive. However, these results only require such radical responses if 
it can be shown that they represent a real and deep inconsistency in our moral beliefs. Despite the 
strength of some of these results, I do not accept that this has been proven. One reason for this is 
that there are three plausible kinds of moral theory that would give us reason to reject a sufficient 
set of conditions to escape these results. I think there are real problems with all three of these 
positions, but others continue to maintain that they are each morally justified and that the 
appearance of a contradiction with our intuitions merely represents the discovery that these 
intuitions were mistaken. I do not accept these positions because, whilst they might permit us to 
avoid impossibility results, they do not seem to explain the intuitions we have and are thus not 
truly in accordance with these intuitions. On the other hand, I agree with supporters of these 
positions that accepting these kinds of moral theory is preferable to rejecting consequentialism or 
embracing non-cognitivism 
However, there seems to me to be one other possible response to Arrhenius’ impossibility results 
that I will pursue in chapter 3. We might accept these conditions hold subject to further facts 
about the world, which are not directly implied by the populations as described in these results. It 
might then be the case that for each of the pair of populations we consider we have no reason to 
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believe that the condition concerning that pair does not hold. However, it might still be true that 
all the further facts required by these conditions cannot be true simultaneously, explaining why 
when we try to apply multiple conditions across a wide spectrum of populations we find that they 
are inconsistent with one another. Unfortunately, the lack of information makes it almost 
impossible for us to determine which of these conditions do not hold for the cases under 
consideration. When we know more about the populations under consideration, I believe that we 
may find that these contradictions dissolve.  
In order to escape the impossibility results presented in this chapter I will argue that whilst each 
condition is expressed in the terms of a ‘simple’ population axiology, they represent ‘all things 
considered’ judgements that rely upon an axiology that is not simple. I set out this proposed 
solution in chapter 3. 
Before I can develop this argument further, I must consider several arguments that would imply 
that the failure to find a satisfactory coherent population axiology reflects either incoherence or 
imprecision in our moral beliefs. These arguments, proposed by Larry Temkin and Derek Parfit, 
aim to show that the relation ‘all things considered better than’, or in Parfit’s case ‘all things 
considered not worse than’, is not transitive, i.e. that A may be not worse than B and B not worse 
than C, but A may be, all things considered, worse than C. I will reject Temkin’s arguments 
outright and find that Parfit’s arguments, though attractive, are faulty and underdeveloped. I will 
argue that any non-transitivity in our judgements about the relative value of populations is most 
likely to be a result of epistemological failure on our part, and that the oversimplification of the 
value of lives is the best explanation for this. This, I will argue, gives strong support to a non-
simple population axiology.  
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1.4 Conclusion of chapter 1 
My aim in this chapter has been to show that no simple satisfactory population axiology is 
possible. I have argued for this conclusion by appealing to a number of impossibility results that 
show the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying small numbers of intuitively compelling 
conditions about the relative value of populations, where these populations are described in terms 
of the number of people at different welfare levels.  
I have presented seven such results, five in some detail and two merely as extensions or family 
relations of these. I have also referred to other results produced by Gustaf Arrhenius, Larry 
Temkin, Derek Parfit and Stuart Rachels that rely on similar conditions. Some of these results 
date back to the 19th century whilst others are very recent, but all of them continue to trouble 
population axiology despite many years of research. I then considered Gustaf Arrhenius’ 
suggestion that these results imply that there are no objective axiological facts so that we should 
adopt either moral non-cognitivism or moral scepticism. 
My belief is that, within the confines of population axiology at least, neither of these responses is 
yet justified. At present there appear to me to remain several reasonable responses to these 
results. One response involves formulating a moral theory that violates only a small subset of the 
conditions I have considered, and does so for principled reasons. However, I do not accept this 
kind of response. Instead, I propose an alternative response where we accept all of these 
conditions subject to certain further facts, and where the value of each population cannot be fully 
determined without these facts, although they can still be determined under various reasonable 
assumptions. It is then an inconsistency between these assumptions that is the source of these 
impossibility results, rather than an inconsistency in the conditions themselves, or the intuitions 
that lie behind them. However, since we have no knowledge about these further facts we have no 
way of knowing which conditions do not strictly hold for this set of populations.  
Hence, it is my conclusion that whilst many people believe that the impossibility results of this 
chapter prove that no satisfactory population axiology is possible; this view is mistaken. The real 
implication of these results is merely that no satisfactory simple population axiology is possible. 
Before going on to show how a satisfactory non-simple population axiology is possible, however, I 
must deal with two arguments that go further than these impossibility results in undermining the 
possibility of any satisfactory population axiology. 
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Chapter 2 – Impossibility and Incoherence 
Whilst there does appear to be an inconsistency in our pretheoretical intuitions about the relative value of 
populations there is no further reason to believe that this reflects any deeper incoherence in their value. 
The transitivity of the relationship ‘all things considered better than’ plays a crucial role in the 
structure of the impossibility results that I presented in chapter 1. The structure of most of these 
results is as follows: 
We identify a spectrum of populations, A, B, C … Z, that have the following features: 
Z has a greater overall quantity of welfare than A, but other features about Z mean that it is clearly 
worse than A according to some intuitive condition, such as the Quality, Weak Quality or Weak 
Quality Addition Conditions. 
B has a greater overall quantity of welfare than A, and other features about B mean that it is 
clearly no worse than A according to other intuitive conditions, such as the Quantity, Non-Anti-
Egalitarian or Non-Sadism Conditions. The same is true for B and C and for all other consecutive 
pairs of populations in this spectrum, all the way to Z. 
This has the implication that, by transitivity, Z is no worse than A, since it is no worse than a 
population that is no worse than another population that is no worse than … A. However, this 
clearly contradicts our original judgement that, when compared directly, certain features about Z 
mean that it is worse than A. 
There would be no contradiction, however, if some of our evaluations were not transitive. For 
instance, if the judgement that one population was no better than another were not transitive then 
we could believe that A is no better than B, B is no better than C and C is no better than Z, without 
this implying that A is no better than Z and hence contradicting our belief that A is better than Z.15 
That the relationships ‘better than’ and ‘no worse than’ should be transitive follows naturally from 
a common conception about what it means for one population to be better than another. This is 
the view that there are certain features of the first population that imply that it has a value greater 
than that of the second population. Since we assume that the features of the two populations A 
and Z are unchanged in these cases, the idea that this betterness may not be transitive makes no 
                                                             
 
15  Note that in what follows I use the symbols > and ≤ to refer to the relations ‘better than’ and ‘no better 
than’, even though these relations do not carry the properties usually assigned to these symbols. 
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sense. In order to accept this potential explanation for the impossibility results of the previous 
chapter, therefore, it will be necessary to consider alternative conceptions of how the relation ‘all 
things considered better than’ applies to populations that might allow it to be an intransitive 
relation. 
In this chapter, I will present two different arguments for the non-transitivity of this relation. The 
first of these, proposed by Larry Temkin, is that our judgements about betterness are ‘essentially 
comparative’ in that the features of populations that we use to evaluate them include their 
relationships to the other populations being considered. If this were true, it would not be possible 
to abstract these judgements from the precise cases we are considering and so we could not 
produce one, transitive, ‘all things considered better than’ relationship. The second, proposed by 
Derek Parfit, is that the features of a population determine its value only imprecisely. This implies 
that whilst the relationship ‘all things considered better than’ is transitive, the relationship ‘all 
things considered not worse than’ (and ‘all things considered not better than’) is not. This is 
because the relationship ‘all things considered not worse than’ implies the possibility that one 
population may be better than or equal to another or that the two may be imprecisely equally as 
good. Parfit argues that this makes ‘not worse than’ an intransitive relation because the extent to 
which two populations are precisely comparable is determined by their features relative to one 
another. For instance, if A and B share a particular feature in common this may allow us to 
precisely compare their value relative to each other. However, if C lacks this particular feature 
then both A and B may be imprecisely equal to C in value. In particular, Parfit argues that when 
two populations are of different sizes, the extent to which they are precisely comparable decreases. 
I will reject both of these arguments. 
The fact that Temkin argues that the relationship ‘all things considered better than’ is not 
transitive whilst Parfit argues only that the relationship ‘all things considered not worse than’ is 
not transitive has the following implication. Whilst both Temkin and Parfit agree that the relation 
A ≤ B ≤ C ≤ Z may not contradict the relation Z < A, Temkin, but not Parfit, would also say that 
this might be the case for A < B < C < Z and Z < A, however I shall not discuss this further here. 
I will first consider Temkin’s view and then Parfit’s. Finally I will respond to the view that there 
may be some other reason to believe that the value of populations is not transitive. I will argue 
that whether or not we believe that the value of populations is transitive, this does not help us to 
escape the impossibility results of the previous chapter because these can be reframed in terms of 
morally permissable choices without referring to value at all.  
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2.1 Is population axiology ‘essentially comparative’? 
Larry Temkin has proposed that the apparent inconsistency in our intuitions about the relative value of 
populations illustrates the essential comparability of these judgements. Whilst this is one explanation for 
this inconsistency, I conclude that Temkin’s arguments give us no reason to believe that it is the correct 
explanation in this case. 
Larry Temkin has argued that impossibility results such as those illustrated in the previous 
chapter represent no mere inconsistency between certain of our pretheoretical intuitions. Instead, 
he argues that they provide a strong argument that the relation ‘all things considered better than’ 
is not a transitive relation, because it does not rely solely on the internal features of these 
populations but also their relations to each other (Temkin (2011) 162–163). Temkin primarily 
considers the result I have called Quality and Quantity, along with the Mere Addition Paradox. 
Temkin’s principal reason for dismissing the transitivity of our judgements in these cases is his 
belief that we sometimes engage in ‘essentially comparative’ reasoning when judging outcomes. 
Essentially comparative reasoning is opposed to ‘internal aspects’ reasoning, which is always 
transitive. The difference can be characterised as follows: internal aspect reasoning judges the 
value of an outcome based solely on the features of that outcome itself and the relationships 
between these features. It therefore excludes consideration of what the alternatives to that 
outcome might be. Hence, if A is better than B in a pairwise comparison then, so long as the 
internal features of these populations remain unchanged, A will be better than B in all other 
comparisons, no matter what other options are under consideration. This is because it is the 
features of these two outcomes, and nothing else, that determine their value, whilst their relative 
value, and nothing else, determines which is better.  
According to essentially comparative reasoning, however, the value of outcomes depends upon 
their features, the relationship between these features and the relationship between each outcome 
and those with which it is being compared. On this view, A may be better than B in a pairwise 
comparison, but adding other populations to the comparison may make B better than A. This is 
because the addition of C adds new relationships, between A and C and B and C, that may affect 
our judgements about the relative value of A and B. Since we can change the relative value of the 
populations being compared by adding or subtracting populations to a comparison, betterness 
will no longer be a transitive relation across comparisons.  
Thus, when we consider populations A and Z from Result 1, we may conclude that A > Z in a 
pairwise comparison, but when we consider a range of populations, A, B, C … Z, we can, just as 
correctly, conclude that A ≤ B ≤ C ≤ … ≤ Z. It does not follow, therefore, that our intuitions are 
 
 
50 
 
 
inconsistent with each other, but that different intuitions apply when we make comparisons 
between different outcomes. A is better than Z when they are compared on their own, but not 
better than Z when judged as part of a group of similar alternatives, each involving some small 
trade-off between quantity of welfare and population size. 
Whilst I accept that our judgements about relative betterness do show this kind of non-
transitivity, I do not share Temkin’s belief that this is because we engage in essentially 
comparative reasoning. I have three objections to this view. The first of these is that it is not 
enough for Temkin to show that transitivity is at the root of our inconsistent judgements in some 
cases. For the purpose of the problems we are considering in this essay, he must show that 
intransitivity is the root of our inconsistent intuitions regarding the value of populations in 
particular. Secondly, I shall reject Temkin’s arguments that, in the two cases of population 
axiology that he considers, essentially comparative reasoning represents a good explanation for 
our judgements about the value of populations. Finally, I shall show that Temkin’s other 
arguments imply that essentially comparative reasoning should not apply to population axiology 
and therefore that it cannot be the source of inconsistency between our intuitions.  
2.1.1 The nature of Temkin’s conclusions 
Temkin argues that the entire relation ‘all things considered better than’ is intransitive. It is compatible 
with this claim that some subdomain of this relation, e.g. the relation ‘all things considered better than’ 
applied to distinct populations, remains transitive. In fact, we have good reason to believe that the relation 
‘all things considered better than’ applied to distinct populations is transitive. 
Temkin’s fullest statement of his argument is in his recent work Rethinking the Good, where his 
target is the relationship ‘all things considered better than’ in what he calls the ‘wide reason 
implying sense’ (Temkin (2011) 13). He describes this relation as follows: ‘outcome A is better 
than outcome B, all things considered, if one would have more reason to prefer A to be realized 
than B, from an impartial perspective’. This has the appearance of a universal betterness relation, 
one that could evaluate any set of outcomes, regardless of the relationship between them. Temkin 
almost always uses the relation ‘all things considered better than’ to talk about the relation 
between things that are of similar types, but it would seem that the ‘all things considered better 
than’ relation he is considering could order any two things, no matter how different their features. 
However, the fact that the betterness relation is not transitive across all outcomes does not mean 
that it could not still be transitive for many kinds of things, including for the most morally 
important cases such as populations. It matters less if, as Temkin argues, certain sorts of 
reasonable-sounding affirmative action policies can create intransitive judgements concerning the 
relative value of job applicants (Temkin (2011) 197) if this intransitivity is confined to considering 
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such policies and does not extend, for instance, to the value of future populations.  
Temkin addresses this challenge towards the end of Rethinking the Good (Temkin (2011) 516–17). 
He argues that if we accept that we cannot transitively order some groups of outcomes, but 
attempt to preserve the transitive ordering of other groups of outcomes, we will have to reject the 
possibility of precise comparability between outcomes. This is because; precise comparability 
would allow us to construct larger sets of outcomes, including outcomes from both of these 
groups. These sets could not be transitively ordered themselves, since we might make intransitive 
comparisons between some of their elements, corresponding to the outcomes that belonged to 
groups that could not be transitively ordered. This fact undermines the claim that any subset of 
this larger set can be transitively ordered either.  
I do not accept his argument for two reasons.  
Firstly, it assumes that, to put it crudely, non-transitivity is transitive, i.e. it assumes that if 
betterness is non-transitive across a set containing outcomes A, B and C then it will also be non-
transitive across a set containing outcomes A, B, C, D and E. However, if we assume that the 
ultimate source of intransitivity is the Essentially Comparative View then this does not follow. Let 
us assume that the outcomes A, B and C are not transitive because we compare them using an 
essentially comparative view, whilst the outcomes D and E are transitive because we compare 
them using an Internal Aspects View. The fact that our judgements about D and E are transitive 
could not be affected by the inclusion of other outcomes in the comparison set, because the 
internal aspects view does not evaluate outcomes based on features of the other outcomes being 
compared. However, the fact that our judgements about the outcomes A, B and C are intransitive 
could be affected in this case, since these judgements are essentially comparative, and so do 
depend upon what other outcomes are included in the comparison set. This implies that it is quite 
possible that the transitivity of our judgements about D and E could fix the relations between the 
outcomes A, B and C into a transitive ordering. On the other hand, it is not possible for the 
intransitivity of our judgements about A, B and C to alter our judgements about the relative value 
of D and E. 
My second reason for rejecting this argument as showing that our intransitive judgements about 
some outcomes might undermine the transitivity of our judgements about the value of 
populations is that, even if it applied to the set of all possible outcomes, the set of distinct 
populations is not a subset of the set of all outcomes; it is a set of features that outcomes might 
contain. I do not think that when we make judgements in population axiology we are judging the 
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value of an outcome whose only valuable feature is the population it contains. Rather we are 
judging the value of populations that may be features of any number of possible outcomes. 
Therefore, even if we believed that the value of every single outcome is not transitive, because we 
evaluated all outcomes using the Essentially Comparative View, this would not imply that the 
intransitivity of this value is a result of the intransitivity of the value of the populations these 
outcomes contain. We would need to have some further reason for thinking that the value of 
populations, rather than the value of outcomes, should be essentially comparative. 
I therefore conclude that defenders of the transitivity of population axiology can resist Temkin’s 
arguments based on the non-transitivity of the relation ‘all things considered better than’ applied 
to certain outcomes - so long as they can defeat those of his arguments that apply directly to 
population axiology. I will consider these particular arguments in the next two sections and 
conclude that they can. 
2.1.2 Temkin’s first reason for thinking population axiology is essentially 
comparative 
Temkin’s strongest argument for the non-transitivity of the ‘all things considered better than’ relation 
applied to distinct populations depends upon a particular reading of the Mere Addition Paradox. However, 
I argue that this interpretation of the paradox has morally unacceptable implications of its own and that 
Temkin’s argument therefore fails. 
 In chapter 11 of Rethinking the Good, Temkin makes a sustained case that it would be 
appropriate to adopt an essentially comparative view with regard to some of the problems in 
population axiology. 
Temkin’s argument focuses on the Mere Addition Paradox, which I mentioned in the last chapter. 
Since I have not yet set out this result in detail, I will do so here. 
Consider the following three populations: 
 
Figure 11: The Mere Addition Paradox 
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Population A – a very large number of people all living at a very high welfare level (level a) 
Population B – the same number of people all living at level a and a much larger number of people 
all living at a very low welfare level (level z), a life that is ‘barely worth living’. These low welfare 
lives are the result of ‘mere addition’, i.e. they do not affect the better-off lives and their existence 
involves no social injustice. 
Population C – the same number of people as in population B, all at a welfare level slightly higher 
than level z but that represents a life that is still only barely worth living (level y), such that this 
population has more welfare overall than B 
Let us assume that populations A and C are such that the Quality Condition would imply that A is 
better than C, i.e. that populations A and C are equivalent to the populations in the Repugnant 
Conclusion. For this reason, we cannot accept any principle that implies that A ≤ C. 
Nevertheless, it also seems very hard to reject the claim that A ≤ B (the Dominance Addition 
Condition) and that B ≤ C (the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition). Temkin believes that the source 
of these apparently inconsistent judgements is the essentially comparative nature of the value of 
equality. 
Since both A and C are perfectly equal, equality gives us no reason to believe that C is better than 
A. Since C is more equal than B, however, we do have a reason to believe that C is no worse than B. 
The challenge to this theory is to explain why equality gives us no reason to believe that B is worse 
than A, since it is clearly less equal. 
Temkin argues that an egalitarian can solve this challenge if they take an essentially comparative 
view of the value of equality. Such a view implies that we should not judge a population’s value 
with respect to equality in isolation, but must also take account of the other populations with 
which it is being compared. Temkin summarises his view as follows: 
― Typically, when we say one outcome’s inequality is worse than another’s, the same people 
exist in both outcomes and the worse-off fare worse in the one outcome than the other. This, we 
may agree, is bad. However, comparing [B] to [A], the choice isn’t between an outcome where 
the worse-off fare poorly relative to the better-off and one where they fare better; rather, it is 
between one where they exist – with lives worth living – and one where they don’t. Here, it may 
seem, the inequality is not morally regrettable. (Temkin (2011) 368) 
This view seems very attractive at first glance; however, it appears to equivocate over the term 
‘fare worse’. There are two distinct ways in which a person may be said to fare better or worse. 
Firstly, a person may fare worse relative to somebody else. Secondly, a person may fare worse 
relative to how they would have fared in some other possible outcome. 
When Temkin writes that “the same people exist in both outcomes and the worse-off fare worse in 
the one outcome than the other”, this seems to imply that they are faring worse than they would 
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have done otherwise, and we might agree that this is always bad. On the other hand, when Temkin 
says that comparing B and A does not involve “an outcome where the worse-off fare poorly 
relative to the better-off and one where they fare better” he is clearly talking about the worse-off 
faring worse than the better-off. However, the force of this argument stems from the implication 
that it is the same moral ideal that implies that the inequality in B might be ‘always bad’ under 
some circumstances, but ‘not morally regrettable’ under others. If it were merely the case that it is 
always bad for individuals to be worse off than they might have been, but not always bad for them 
to be worse off than others, there would be no inconsistency here and hence no reason to assume 
an essentially comparative view. In order to support Temkin’s claim that the value of inequality 
depends upon the outcomes being compared we must therefore clarify which of the senses of 
‘worse off’ apply to these two claims. 
What if ‘worse off’ referred, in both cases, to a person being worse off than they might have been? 
As I have said, it is easy to agree with Temkin’s claim that this is always bad. However, 
interpreting ‘worse off’ in this way undermines Temkin argument.  
This is because being worse off than one might have been is not an egalitarian value. It implies 
that it is just as bad if the best-off fare worse than they might have done than if the worse-off do. 
This view would therefore give us no special reason to believe that population C is at least as good 
as population B. In C, the better-off fare worse and the worse-off fare better, so we are simply 
comparing the value of these two effects. Given that the best-off may be losing some of ‘the best 
things in life’, whilst the worse-off gain relatively little, it is not at all clear why a person-affecting 
view should give us a special reason to believe that C is at least as good as B in this case. That is 
not to say that a person-affecting view would not give us a reason to believe this; however, to claim 
that it does would require further argument, which Temkin does not supply16. 
In order to complete his argument I therefore believe that we must interpret both the uses of 
‘worse off’ in Temkin’s argument to mean worse off relative to other members of the same 
population. Temkin’s argument therefore rests on the following claims: 
1 – It is always bad when the same people exist in two outcomes and the worse-off fare worse, 
                                                             
 
16  Indeed the principle of Person Affecting Ethics that Temkin does most to advocate, the ‘Disbursed 
Additional Burden’s View’ implies entirely the opposite conclusion, that that B should be much better 
than C. This is because the ‘burden’ of selecting C instead of B is concentrated in a few people who would 
have been much better off in B than in C. On the other hand, the burden of selecting B instead of C is 
disbursed over very many people who would have been only very slightly better off in C than in B. 
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relative to the better-off, in one outcome than the other. 
2 – When some people exist in one outcome – with lives worth living – and don’t exist in another 
outcome, any resulting inequality in the first outcome is not morally regrettable. 
I reject this argument on the basis that it is hard to accept the first claim, and that arguments that 
support the first claim will tend to undermine the second claim. 
Let us consider a fourth population, D: 
Population D – the same number of people as population C all living at a very low welfare level 
(level z) 
 
Figure 12: Temkin’s view and the Levelling Down Objection 
Temkin’s first claim would imply that the inequality in B is bad when compared with D. This is 
because the same people exist in both populations, whilst the worse-off in D fare much better 
relative to the better-off than they do in B. This does not, of course, imply that D is better than B 
all things considered, since there are other respects in which B is better than D. However, many 
would not wish to say that D is better than B in any respect, since this is a case that involves 
‘levelling down’. B and D are identical except for the single fact that some people in B are much 
better off than anyone in D. 
Temkin does not accept this objection against egalitarianism. In his work on equality, Temkin has 
argued that there are in fact a number of problems with the Levelling Down Objection. However, 
his defence of equality carries certain implications about its value and these undermine the second 
claim of his argument for the essential comparability of equalitarianism.  
Although Temkin presents a number of arguments against the Levelling Down Objection in his 
work (see Temkin (1998) 137–146), these are based on two principal claims about why we should 
value equality in the case of levelling down. The first of these is that the force of the Levelling 
Down Objection rests on the ‘Person-Affecting Condition’, which has a restricted scope (Temkin 
(1998) 137–8). The second is the claim that levelling down is a good thing in at least one respect, 
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what Temkin terms ‘proportional justice’ (Temkin (1998) 138–146). 
One of the key reasons for believing that the Levelling Down Objection is fatal to egalitarian 
theories is the view that an outcome can be better, for a population, only if it is good, in some 
respect, for at least one member of that population (the Person-Affecting Condition). Since, in the 
case of levelling down, some people are made worse off and nobody is made better off, it is hard to 
see how, if we accept the Person-Affecting Condition, levelling down could be in any way good. 
However, Temkin argues that the Person-Affecting Condition implies that we can only make 
judgements about cases in which at least some people are made better or worse off by our choices. 
However, in some cases nobody exists in more than one outcome. If we are to be able to say 
anything about the relative value of these outcomes then we must accept moral principles which 
imply that one outcome can be better than another even if there is no one for whom it is better. 
Therefore, even if we accept the Person-Affecting Condition for some cases, it does not follow that 
the fact that a certain moral principle violates this condition means that we should reject that 
principle for all cases. 
However, the argument that Temkin is proposing here with regard to equality rests on something 
very similar to the Person-Affecting Condition. Temkin argues that the distribution of welfare in 
one population is more valuable than that in another population only if it is true that there are 
people for whom this distribution is more equal. This is precisely why, Temkin argues, the 
inequality in B does not make it worse than A. Since Temkin is claiming that the way in which we 
value equality depends on whether or not people are being made more equal, this value would not 
even apply in the kind of cases where the person affecting principle is problematic. The fact that in 
this case nobody in D is better off than anybody in B makes it much harder to claim that the 
equality involved in making some people worse off is a good thing. If, therefore, Temkin is to 
defend his view from the Levelling Down Objection, he must appeal to a value that applies in both 
person-affecting and non-person-affecting cases, i.e. he must defeat the Levelling Down Objection 
in all cases, and not merely limit its scope of application. 
Temkin’s remaining arguments against the Levelling Down Objection seek to motivate the claim 
that we have reasons to uphold principles of ‘proportional justice’ from which it follows that it is 
bad, in all cases, for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. 
Proportional injustice, Temkin claims, is bad whether or not it is bad for the people concerned.  
Temkin uses the term proportional justice in quite a vague sense, and it is not clear what exactly it 
is about proportional injustice that constitutes its badness. Proportional justice could represent 
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merely the badness of an unequal distribution of welfare, or it could reflect the badness of some 
further fact about inequality, such as social justice or desert. 
If proportional justice is a moral ideal concerning the distribution of welfare alone then it seems 
that it must count as a reason against accepting that A < B in relation to equality. This is because B 
contains a less equal distribution of welfare than A. However, Temkin sees nothing morally 
regrettable in the inequality in B when compared with A. This suggests that proportional justice 
must reflect some further fact about these cases beyond their distribution of welfare. 
If, on the other hand, proportional justice is a moral ideal that applies only in certain cases, for 
instance those involving exploitation or social injustice, then these do not include the cases under 
consideration. This is because the inequality in B is the result of ‘mere addition’ and hence, by 
definition, is not the result of social injustice or unequal treatment of any kind. If, however, there 
is nothing bad about B, then the move from B to C cannot involve a reduction in the level of 
injustice or any other bad feature of populations usually associated with inequality, since none of 
these features is present in B. 
To put this another way: if, on the one hand, proportional justice is the same thing as a certain 
pattern of lives at particular welfare levels, then it cannot make a difference to the level of 
proportional justice in an outcome whether it was the result of mere addition. If, on the other 
hand, if proportional justice stands for something else, so that it can take account of whether a 
distribution of welfare is the result of mere addition, then it seems that in this case population B 
can contain no proportional injustice so that B is not better than C with respect to its level of 
proportional justice. 
Therefore, if we invoke the existence of proportional justice as a justification for the claim that D 
is in any way better than C then this either gives us some reason to think that B might be worse 
than A or undermines our reason for thinking that C is no worse than B. However, if we do not 
invoke proportional justice, then we have no further defence against the Levelling Down Objection 
in this case. I suspect that Temkin may wish to bite the bullet on this issue.17 However, if Temkin’s 
argument for accepting an essentially comparative view of equality here rests on accepting the 
Levelling Down Objection without any further defence then I cannot accept this argument. I will 
                                                             
 
17  Whilst Temkin invokes these arguments to illustrate the essential comparability of our intuitive 
judgements, he does not actually endorse this view about equality itself, arguing instead for an impersonal 
value for equality. 
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however consider one possible defence in appendix B at the end of this work. 
2.1.3 Temkin’s second reason for thinking population axiology is essentially 
comparative 
Temkin’s second argument for the non-transitivity of the ‘all things considered better than’ relation applied 
to distinct populations follows from the implications of his own internal aspects axiology. I argue that his 
arguments support the view that the relations between lives in different populations affect their value, but 
not that this makes this value essentially comparative. 
Temkin gives one further reason for thinking that population axiology is essentially comparative. 
He argues that the Internal Aspects View has ‘certain morally unpalatable implications’ (Temkin 
(2011) 448). 
His argument begins from the premise that we must accept what Temkin calls a ‘capped model for 
comparing moral ideals’. This is the view that each moral ideal has a maximum possible value 
compared with that of other moral ideals. Temkin argues that accepting a view like this is 
necessary in order to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (Temkin (2011) 449). Accepting this view 
implies rejecting Cowen’s ‘non-vanishing value’ axiom, i.e. accepting that the marginal value of 
(some) moral ideals tends to zero as the size of these values increases. 
Temkin goes on to suggest that we adopt a particular kind of axiology that makes use of the 
capped model for comparing moral ideals. This involves accepting four values: the value of the 
total quantity of welfare (U), the value of an equal distribution of this welfare (E), the value of the 
life with the highest welfare level in a population (P) and the value of the life with the lowest 
welfare level in a population (M). He suggests that each of these values is capped to a range from 0 
to 100, and that we add the four values together to produce a final all things considered value for 
the population as a whole. I will consider this axiology, and its success as a response to the 
Repugnant Conclusion, in chapter 5. However, its details do not matter greatly to the present 
argument so I will not develop them further here. 
Temkin asks us to consider the following classic case, which he calls ‘how more than France 
exists’: 
Population X – a group (France) at welfare level b 
Population Y – a group (France) at higher welfare level, a, and another group at a lower welfare 
level, m 
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Figure 13: How more than France exists 
Temkin notes that his theory would almost certainly imply that population X is better than 
population Y. X is undoubtedly worse than Y with regards to U, but assuming that X is already 
very good with regards to the value of U this difference need not have a significant effect upon its 
overall value since the marginal value of U will be very small. Similarly, X is slightly worse than Y 
with regard to P. However, Y is much worse off with regard to both E and M, and since Y is clearly 
far from perfect in regards to both of these values, this difference should matter more to us than 
the difference in the values of U and P.18  
However, Temkin does not mean for this case to undermine just his capped model. Instead, he 
argues that it is plausible to believe that in some cases population X might be better than 
population Y, but that this cannot possibly be true for all cases. For instance, Temkin argues that 
if populations X and Y are two entirely distinct future populations then the existence of inequality 
and some worse-off people in Y may make it worse than X. However, he goes on to argue that  
― What seems deeply implausible is thinking that [X] would be better than [Y] if they were 
related in the manner described. If everyone in Y has lives that are well worth living, it is hard to 
believe that the outcome would have actually been better had half of the population never existed 
with the result that the remaining half were worse off. (Temkin (2011) 451) 
Temkin believes that this argument shows us that “Our assessment of outcomes like [X] and [Y] 
seems to depend crucially on the alternatives with which they are compared”. However, this is not 
so. Temkin’s argument shows us that it is the way in which two outcomes are ‘related’ that affects 
their relative value, not what outcomes they are being compared with. The moral significance of a 
                                                             
 
18  Temkin argues that we should not reply to this case by altering the relative weightings of these values, 
since the numbers involved can always be adjusted to compensate for such revisions (Temkin (2011) 451). 
He also considers and rejects several alternatives to summing as means of aggregating values (Temkin 
(2011) 356). 
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relationship between two outcomes persists even when we are not comparing them directly. In 
this case, the crucial fact is that some people in X also exist in Y and would be better off in Y than 
in X, whilst nobody in Y also exists in X and would have been better off in X than in Y and 
everybody in Y who does not exist in X has a life worth living. This is a fact about this outcome 
that is true irrespective of the outcomes under comparison. For instance, even if we were 
comparing population X with a third population Z, in which France did not exist, it would still be 
true of the people in France that they could have been better off than they in fact are in X, and this 
reduces the value of X relative to Z as well as its value relative to Y.  
There is another problem with Temkin’s reading of this case, which is that he fails to prove that it 
counts against the Internal Aspects View, rather than his particular axiology. Presumably, Temkin 
would argue that one of the reasons why X is no better than Y in this case is that the inequality in 
population Y is not morally regrettable. However, it is still plausible that in cases like this the fact 
that X is much better than Y with regards to the welfare of its worst-off member, Temkin’s value 
M, would still make X better than Y all things considered. If we can argue that X is always better 
than Y, then the Internal Aspects View ceases to have any troubling implications in this case. 
Temkin may respond that M is also an essentially comparative value so that when the worst-off 
individual in one population does not exist in another population then the fact that they are at a 
low welfare level is also not morally regrettable. However, I would find such an argument 
troubling. Should we not have a concern to maximise the welfare of the worst-off even if this does 
not involve making any individual better off? One reason for arguing that we do is that this is part 
of Temkin’s argument for why his theory does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. Temkin 
might respond that this is not important since both M and P work together to prevent the 
Repugnant Conclusion. However, it is not clear to me why, if we believe that M is only of value 
when the worst-off individual could be better off, something similar should not also be true for P. 
There are many alternative theories that Temkin does not consider and that may be able to save 
the Internal Aspects View from these troubling implications. For instance, it may be that rather 
than arguing that certain values like E and M do not apply in the case of ‘how only France exists’ 
we should actually increase the range of values we use to judge each case. These values might 
include whether or not the individuals in each population could be better off than they are, 
irrespective of whether they are better or worse off in any of the populations under comparison. It 
also seems that values such as M and P may not be the right way to capture our moral ideals about 
the welfare of the best and worst-off in a population. This is a point I will revisit when I consider 
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other problems with Temkin’s capped model axiology in chapter 5. For all these reasons, I do not 
accept that Temkin’s reading of this case counts in favour of the Essentially Comparative View. 
2.1.4 Is population axiology essentially comparative? 
There are other reasons for thinking that the value of distinct populations is not essentially comparative. 
Evaluating these populations does not invoke the Narrow Person-Affecting View and does not show the 
appropriate degree of context sensitivity. 
There are two further reasons for thinking that population axiology, of the kind that I am 
investigating here, does not involve essentially comparative reasoning and so should be transitive 
on Temkin’s view. Firstly, that the Narrow Person-Affecting View, on which Temkin bases much 
of his support for essentially comparative reasoning, does not properly apply to population 
axiology. Secondly, that our judgements in population axiology do not display the kind of context 
sensitivity that we would expect if they were indeed essentially comparative. 
Most of Temkin’s remaining arguments for accepting essentially comparative views are arguments 
in favour of the Narrow Person-Affecting View (Temkin (2011) 416–445). The first reason why the 
value of distinct populations is not essentially comparative is that the Narrow Person-Affecting 
View does not apply to such populations. The Narrow Person-Affecting View is the view that it 
matters whether particular individuals are better or worse off. The specific definition provided by 
Temkin is as follows: 
The Narrow Person-Affecting View: In assessing possible outcomes, one should (1) focus on the 
status of independently existing people, with the aim of wanting them to be as well off as possible, 
and (2) ignore the status of dependently existing people, except that one wants to avoid harming 
them as much as possible. (Temkin (2011) 417) 
An independently existing person is one who will exist no matter what we do, whilst a 
dependently existing person is one whose existence depends upon our decision. Thus, if we are 
considering whether a woman should have a baby, the mother is an independently existing person 
but the existence of the baby is dependent upon our decision. The Narrow Person-Affecting View 
holds that we should therefore want the mother to be as well off as possible, whilst we should 
ignore the child’s welfare, except insofar as we might harm it.19 Note that, as with previous 
examples, Temkin is only concerned here with pairwise comparisons of possible outcomes and he 
                                                             
 
19  Temkin uses ‘harm’ in a technical sense here. We harm a dependent person if and only if 1) this person 
exists in more than one possible outcome, 2) they are better off in some outcomes than others and 3) we 
choose one of the outcomes in which they exist and are worse off. We do not harm a person by choosing 
an outcome in which they do not exist or by choosing an outcome in which they do exist, but where their 
life is bad – so long as there are not outcomes in which their life is better. 
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believes that the only relationships we need to consider are those between the outcomes under 
comparison. 
Narrow person-affecting views lead to intransitive judgements. Consider three possible outcomes: 
A, where the woman is badly off and does conceive and her baby is well off; B, where the woman is 
badly off and does not conceive; and C, where the woman is well off and does conceive but her 
baby is very badly off. 
According to a narrow person-affecting view, when we compare B and C only the mother’s welfare 
matters  whilst the baby’s welfare does not matter because its existence is dependent upon our 
decision, so C will be better than B because the mother is better off in C. Similarly, B will be no 
better than A, because the mother is no better off and only her welfare matters. However, when we 
compare A and C, C is worse than A, because mother and baby exist in both A and C so the benefit 
to the mother in C must be weighed against the greater harm to the baby. Hence, according to a 
narrow person-affecting view, A ≤ B < C, but C < A, since the populations depend on which set of 
outcomes we are considering and the identity relations between them. If we take this view then we 
are clearly engaging in essentially comparative reasoning. 
However, narrow person-affecting views do not apply in many cases in population ethics, 
including those described in chapter 1. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, they rely upon 
modal facts about the existence of people, namely whether they could be any better or worse off 
than they are. They therefore do not apply to cases where everybody’s existence is dependent upon 
our choices. This is known as the ‘non-identity problem’. Derek Parfit has argued that this is the 
case for future generations, because our choices now will affect both the identity and welfare of 
people living in the far future (Parfit (1984) 351–364). However, for the purpose of this work my 
objection is more direct since it has simply been my intention to investigate whether a satisfactory 
axiology for distinct populations is possible, irrespective of whether this will form a significant 
part of our everyday moral judgements.20 
                                                             
 
20  Whilst narrow person-affecting views do not apply to most of the cases that I am considering, it is still 
possible that there are functionally equivalent views that do. For instance, it may be that even if people in 
different populations are not identical we can still regard them as ‘paired’ in some way that allows these 
 
 
 Outcome A Outcome B Outcome C 
Woman Badly off Badly off Well off 
Baby Well off * Very badly off 
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Thus, not only are most of the examples from chapter 12 of Rethinking the Good not about 
population axiology but they support arguments that do not even apply to population axiology, 
since they are arguments in favour of narrow person-affecting views, which do not apply to this 
kind of theory. If we accept a simple population axiology then it seems very hard to see what fact 
might lead us to accept that the value of populations is non-transitive. The fact that intuitively 
plausible conditions about the relative value of populations conflict with each other may give us 
some reason to believe this, but Temkin does not give us any further reason to believe it. Nor does 
he give us an adequate explanation for why we might engage in essentially comparative reasoning 
when considering distinct populations. 
However, it is possible to hold an essentially comparative view without holding a narrow person-
affecting view. For instance, we might believe that judgements between populations are 
essentially comparative because we make judgements using different moral ideals depending on 
the features of the populations we are comparing. Thus, we might believe that where two 
populations are very similar with respect to any one ideal then we do not need to take this small 
difference into account, even if it appears relevant to our value judgements. Similarly, we might 
believe that some ideals come into play only when we make comparisons between populations 
that share certain features. For instance, it might be that we only value equality, or priority, when 
comparing populations of the same size or that we only value increasing population size when 
comparing two populations that are at the same, or very similar, average welfare levels. 
Such views will produce the kinds of inconsistency I present in Result 1. This is because we have 
genuinely intransitive judgements about the relative betterness of populations since these 
judgements may depend upon very different features of the populations involved. 
There is another reason why the appearance of intransitivity in our judgements about the value of 
populations cannot be explained by their essentially comparative nature. If our judgements about 
the value of populations were essentially comparative then they should not only be intransitive, 
but also context-sensitive. That is to say, we should have examples in which our relative 
judgement of two populations actually changes when we add or remove alternatives from our set 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
kinds of considerations to apply. For instance, philosophers sometimes claim that people are merely 
instances of ‘wide people’ (e.g. I am my mother’s second son, but many other possible people are also my 
mother’s second son) or assume that the best-off people (or the worst-off people) in any two populations 
have some interest in common, even if they are distinct people. These views may explain the intransitivity 
of our judgements, although they are hard view to justify. 
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of comparators. However, in the results that I presented in the previous chapter, context does not 
seem to matter in this way. Our judgements about the relative value of populations remain 
constant in the face of such changes.  
Whilst it is true that when considering each of the populations in a pairwise comparison we 
produce intransitive preference orderings, it is also true that when considering all the populations 
together none of our pairwise comparisons is brought into question. However, if these were 
essentially comparative judgements then this should be what we see. This is my second reason for 
believing that population axiology cannot be essentially comparative in the way Temkin suggests. 
Instead, it seems that when comparing these sets of populations, either pairwise or as a whole 
group, we want to support multiple moral ideals and find that we cannot decide between them 
when they come into conflict. That this is troubling suggests that we do not wish to reject any of 
these conditions for comparing any of the cases involved. However, the Essentially Comparative 
View I have outlined above suggests that we would be willing to give up on any of our conditions 
under the right kind of comparison. It therefore provides the wrong kind of explanation for our 
intransitive judgements. 
However, Temkin’s is not the only explanation of how our judgements about the relative value of 
populations may not be transitive. I shall consider an alternative explanation in the next section.  
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2.2 Does population axiology involve ‘normative imprecision’? 
Parfit argues that our judgements about the relative value of populations may not be transitive because 
they are imprecise. I argue that this may be the case, but it is more likely to represent a lack of information 
than genuine normative imprecision. 
In the preceding section, I argued that population axiology does not involve essentially 
comparative moral judgements. My arguments, however, are specific to Temkin’s view about the 
source of population axiology’s non-transitivity. These arguments do not imply that population 
axiology is not transitive for other reasons.  
In this section, I will consider a very different argument for the non-transitivity of our judgements 
in population axiology. This is the view that many of our comparative concepts involve a degree of 
imprecision and that this imprecision undermines the transitivity of judgements that invoke 
them. In particular, I will consider Derek Parfit’s argument that amongst the set of possible 
relationships covered by the judgement that x is ‘not worse than’ y are not only the relations that x 
might be better than y or precisely equal to y, but also that x and y may be ‘imprecisely equal’ and 
that this implies that not worse than is not a transitive relation. 
Here is one example that Parfit gives of how this kind of imprecision leads to non-transitive 
judgements of value. Imagine three possible careers. One could be a very well-paid lawyer, a very, 
very well-paid lawyer or a well-paid academic. It is undeniable that it is better to be a very, very 
well-paid lawyer than to be a very well-paid lawyer. However, let us suppose that it is no worse to 
be a very well-paid lawyer as it is to be a well-paid academic. If the value of careers were precise 
then it would seem to follow that being a very, very well-paid lawyer must be better than being a 
well-paid academic. However, if there is imprecision in our evaluation of careers then this does 
not follow. It is possible that being a very well-paid lawyer is no worse than being a well-paid 
academic because the two are imprecisely equally good – and that the same is true about being a 
very, very well-paid lawyer. Under these circumstances, being a very, very well-paid lawyer is 
better than being a very well-paid lawyer, being a very well-paid lawyer is no worse than being a 
well-paid academic and yet being a very, very well-paid lawyer is no better than being a well-paid 
academic, although it is no worse either. Parfit believes that very similar kinds of judgement may 
take place when we evaluate populations, and that this is the source of the apparent non-
transitivity of our judgements in the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
I believe that this is a much more likely source for the apparent non-transitivity of our judgements 
than essential comparativeness. However, I will argue against Parfit’s view that the source of this 
imprecision might be the difference in population size and his view that it in some way reflects a 
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fact about the populations under consideration: the absence of any precise truth about their 
relative value. In the next two chapters, I will instead propose the alternative view that the source 
of our apparently non-transitive judgements is the underdetermination of our value judgements 
by incomplete information in the description of standard cases in population axiology. This will 
render these judgements imprecise, but for very different reasons and will not imply that there is 
no precise truth about the populations under consideration. 
2.2.1 Parfit’s argument 
Parfit’s argument for the non-transitive value of populations is that we cannot always make precise 
judgements about the relative value of populations of different sizes. 
Derek Parfit has developed his views on imprecision in population ethics over many years. 
However, I am going to focus here only on his work prior to November 2014 and presented in the 
working paper Towards Theory X: Part Two (Parfit (Forthcoming)). 
Parfit’s views on imprecision are intended, in part, to defend a certain theory about the lexical 
superiority of the value of certain lives over that of other lives. The core ideas behind this theory 
are twofold. Firstly, all lives with positive welfare have a positive value and make populations that 
contain them better. Secondly, although the existence of additional lives at a low welfare level 
always makes a population better, and this goodness does not diminish with population size, the 
existence of a certain number of lives at a very high positive welfare level is always better than any 
number of lives at this low positive welfare level (Parfit (Forthcoming) 7). I shall not discuss the 
specifics of this view further at this point. 
Parfit appeals to the ‘normative imprecision’ as a means of responding to objections to this kind of 
view, such as the claim that it is inegalitarian and elitist. Normative imprecision is the view that 
“there are often no precise truths about the relevant goodness of certain things” (Parfit 
(Forthcoming) 8). The existence of normative imprecision implies that two things may have a 
relative value such that neither of the two is (precisely) better than the other but there are some 
things that are better than one of these things but not the other. It is important to note that 
normative imprecision does not rest on any epistemic failure of ours to know which of two things 
is better or whether they are precisely equal in value. Instead, it rests on the absence of any 
precise truth that determines the relative betterness of the two things. This is a point I will return 
to later. 
Parfit argues that in population axiology, differences in population size make our judgements 
about the relative value of these populations less precise in this respect. He gives several 
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arguments for why this should be the case. Many of these arguments rely on the applicability of 
person-affecting principles to some cases and not others. I do not wish to dispute these 
arguments. However, as with similar arguments produced by Temkin that I discussed in the 
previous section, these person-affecting principles are not relevant to any of the cases I am 
considering here, and therefore the kinds of imprecision they create are irrelevant to my 
discussion of in population axiology. 
However, it should be noted that there is a difference between arguing that differences in 
population size are a source of normative imprecision and arguing that difference in the identity 
of the people involved is a source of normative imprecision. Whilst it is true that two populations 
of different sizes cannot share identity relations, it is still important to distinguish the two 
concepts. Populations of different sizes may still share many members in common, whilst 
populations of the same size may have no members in common. Hence, arguments which imply 
that moral imprecision stems from the use of person-affecting principles give us no direct reason 
to believe that population size itself is a source of such imprecision. 
Parfit next considers another group of arguments where “there is no overlap between different 
possible populations, since no one would exist in more than one of the worlds that we are 
considering” (Parfit (Forthcoming) 9). 
Parfit asks us to consider the following two populations: 
Population A: n people at 100 
Population B: n people at 100 and n people at some other level x 
He argues that if there were no normative imprecision then we could always determine some 
precise level x at which population B would be better than A, but that, in fact, there is no such 
precise level (Parfit (Forthcoming) 10). For instance, if we accepted Total Utilitarianism and 
assigned no value to equality this level would be 0. 
Parfit claims that several features of population B that might make it better than population A, 
whilst other features of population B might make it worse than population A. He argues that there 
is no precise way of comparing the value of these features and hence that judgements about the 
overall relative value of populations A and B are imprecise. 
Parfit considers several different kinds of features that might make B better or worse than A, and 
whose conflict implies the lack of any precise judgement in this case. I will take each of these in 
turn. 
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Parfit first considers what he calls the ‘Total and Average View’: 
― It would always be in one way better if 
(1) the people who exist would together have a greater total sum of well-being, 
and in another way better if 
(2) because this total sum of well-being would come to fewer people, there would be a greater 
average sum of well-being per person. (Parfit (Forthcoming) 10) 
If normative imprecision stemmed from our inability to weigh up these two competing ways in 
which one population might be better or worse than another then this imprecision would clearly 
be the result of the difference in the number of people in each population. This is because it is only 
when populations differ according to their size that the two parts of the ‘Total and Average View’ 
come into conflict. The greater the disparity between the sizes of two populations the more these 
two views will differ with respect to any fixed quantity of total well-being or any fixed level of 
average well-being. However, it seems to me implausible to claim, as Parfit does, that “it would 
always be in one way better if … there would be a greater average sum of well-being per person” 
(ibid.). As we have seen, valuing the average sum of well-being has unpalatable implications, such 
as the implication that it is better to have less welfare distributed more unequally and with some 
people having bad lives. Even if The Total and Average View were constructed so that it did not 
have these implications for any all things considered evaluation, it is still implausible that it is in 
any respect better if we increase the average welfare level of a population by either a) making 
everybody worse off, as is the case when only France survives, or b) replacing lives that are worth 
living with lives that are not worth living, as in the Sadistic Conclusion. Whilst it is true that some 
people are intuitively drawn to the Average View (and both Parfit and Sidgwick have blamed the 
economists of their day for this fault21) it is clearly mistaken. The only correct approach to 
resolving the conflict between the Average and Total Views is to reject the Average View, not to 
claim that they represent ideals that cannot be precisely compared. 
Parfit appears to accept such criticism, or objections like it, and he goes on to reject the ‘Total and 
Average View’ in favour of another principle, the ‘Part-Whole Principle’: 
                                                             
 
21  Whilst this may have been true in Sidgwick’s day and even as late as the 1950s, none of the economists 
who have actively considered population ethics in the last 50 years appear to have indorsed the view. 
Partha Dasgupta, has suggested to me that it is not true to say that any recent economists accept the 
Average View, but only that most economists believe it does not matter which view we accept – because 
they treat population growth as an exogenous variable. 
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If World T would contain more people than World S, and it is true both that 
everyone who would exist in S would either also exist in T and be better off, or would have some 
counterpart in T who would be better off, 
and that 
everyone else who would exist in T would have a life that is clearly worth living, 
these facts strongly support the view that T would be better than S. (Parfit (Forthcoming) 12) 
It is not clear what, if anything, this principle is meant to conflict with. However, it seems from 
one remark Parfit makes that it is meant to conflict with some form of egalitarianism. Parfit 
suggests when considering this principle that “inequality in [one population] would make this 
world in one way worse than [another]” (Parfit (Forthcoming) 12). 
Hence, Parfit defends the claim that although the addition of an individual life at positive welfare 
always makes a population better in one respect this need not increase its value all things 
considered. I think that there is some confusion in Parfit’s text here over whether this is the case 
because there may be other respects in which the addition of these lives makes a population 
worse, or simply because the existence of these lives makes its value less precise. However, I 
believe that Parfit intends only the second of these claims since he argues that “The existence of 
extra people creates what we can call an extra ‘margin of imprecision’” (Parfit (Forthcoming) 13). 
Parfit follows this claim with the following analysis: 
― There are now two possibilities. If these extra people existed, the amount of added value might 
be less than the increased margin of imprecision. If that is true, though the existence of these 
extra people would make the world in one way better, it would not make the world better all 
things considered. The resulting world would instead be imprecisely equally as good as the 
world in which these people would never exist. If these extra people were better off, having lives 
of a higher quality, their existence would add more value, which would come closer and closer to 
the margin of imprecision. If these people’s quality of life would be above some level, which we 
can call the High Level, the amount of added value would be greater than the increased margin 
of imprecision. If the existence of these people would not be bad in other ways, their existence 
would then make the world, not only in one way better, but also better all things considered. 
(Parfit (Forthcoming) 13) 
I therefore believe that Parfit cannot be talking about an imprecision that stems directly from a 
population being better with respect to one ideal and worse with respect to another ideal. Instead, 
he must be referring to the fact that adding lives can affect a population both by altering its value 
and by altering the margin of imprecision of that value. 
Let me try to reconstruct Parfit’s argument up to this point. Parfit claims that adding a life with 
positive welfare always makes a population better in some non-diminishing respect in accordance 
 
 
70 
 
 
with the Part-Whole Principle. However, he believes that adding lives with positive welfare may 
affect the value of that population according to other moral ideals. Since we cannot compare the 
value of adding a life with positive welfare with these other ideals this implies that adding lives to 
a population adds both a positive value and a margin of imprecision in our ability to compare 
populations. If the value of the life we have added does not exceed the value of this margin of 
imprecision then we cannot judge the population with this life as being precisely better than the 
population without it and so must judge the two populations as being imprecisely equally 
comparable. In the next section I will argue that I agree with this analysis, but that it does not 
show, as Parfit suggests, that it is differences in size that are responsible for making our 
judgements about the relative value of populations less precise. Instead, I shall argue that it is the 
absolute size of any population that makes the value of that population less precise, and that this 
is a result of the absence of certain facts about that population, such as the composition of its lives 
and their connections to each other. 
2.2.2 Why should population size matter in the way that it does? A problem 
for Parfit’s argument 
Whilst Parfit makes a strong case that our evaluation of populations is imprecise it does not follow that this 
is a result of differences in their size. 
Having set out these arguments, Parfit goes on to consider a set of objections to them that I will 
not consider at this stage. I believe that in many of the cases Parfit considers our value judgements 
really are not transitive. However, I disagree with him in that I do not accept his claim that this 
non-transitivity directly relates to population size. Instead, I will argue that in order to understand 
the true nature of this imprecision we need to understand more about the moral ideals we use to 
judge the value of lives. 
Let me start by turning to the issue of what could be the source of the margin of imprecision 
created by changing population size. One possibility is that it is our inability to precisely compare 
the value of a population according to different moral ideals. However, this could not be the 
source of the imprecision that Parfit is looking for. Moral ideals can conflict in same number 
cases, as for instance when Total or Average Utilitarianism conflicts with egalitarianism. On the 
other hand, there are many cases involving populations of different sizes that raise no conflict 
between moral ideals. For instance, merely increasing the size of any perfectly equal population at 
a positive welfare level increases total utility and population size, but does not alter average utility 
or equality in any respect. 
Whilst other moral ideals may give conflicting judgements about the value of populations, only 
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that between Total and Average Utilitarianism is based solely on population size22. However, as I 
argued above, I think that it is a mistake to value the average utility of a population at all. Average 
Utilitarianism implies that it is good in one way to make the worst-off in a population even worse 
off, so long as there are fewer of them, or to add many people to a population whose lives are very 
bad, so long as there remain other people who are even worse off. Nor do cases like this clearly 
relate to person-affecting considerations as with the Levelling Down Objection, because Average 
Utilitarianism is clearly neutral about the distribution of welfare per se and in no way respects the 
separateness of persons. 
Whilst Parfit’s ‘Part-Whole Principle’ may conflict with the value of equality in cases involving 
‘mere addition’, this conflict rests upon how welfare is distributed in the two populations and it is 
possible to use mere addition, and thus the Part-Whole Principle, to produce more equal 
populations. In particular, these two principles only clearly come into conflict when an original 
population represents perfect equality whilst the additional lives in a new population are all at 
some different welfare level. This case is important, but it is hardly the only possibility and, in 
terms of any real policy decision we might make, it is quite exceptional. 
In the absence of other reasonable principles that conflict in a way that is predicated on 
population size alone, it is hard to see how the possibility of such conflict justifies the existence of 
the kind of normative imprecision that Parfit relies on. 
However, there is an alternative view. It may be that it is not any actual conflict between ideals 
that causes the normative imprecision in our moral judgements, but the potential for such 
conflict. When Parfit discusses adding lives to a population he talks as if each life brings with it a 
margin of imprecision, rather than this margin of imprecision being a feature of the population 
itself. This position seems most credible if we believe that adding lives has the potential to impact 
upon our moral decision-making but do not understand how this happens. We therefore recognise 
that every time we add a life to a population we make it a bit harder to evaluate, because we add in 
a greater degree of uncertainty about what the value of the population itself is, even though we do 
                                                             
 
22  There are also cases in which there is no conflict between moral ideals, but between different 
implementations of them. For instance, if one accepts Total Utilitarianism but use different value for the 
neutral level of a life then this will produce different orderings of populations that are of different sizes, 
but not populations of the same size. Similarly if one accepts Critical Level Utilitarianism but select 
different welfare levels to be the critical level for value superiority. These conflicts can be said to be based 
soely on population size, but they do not represent instances of fundamental normative precision. Teru 
Thomas has recently proposed a theory of this kind that can resolve many of the problems of population 
axiology and I will discuss this in Chapter 4. 
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not understand why this is the case. 
Unfortunately, this kind of uncertainty would not imply that differences in population size imply 
imprecision in relative value either. Whilst it justifies the role played by population size, and not 
by the moral ideals themselves, it implies that populations of any size carry with them a certain 
accumulated margin of uncertainty about their value. This means that when we compare two 
populations it should not be the relative size of the two populations that provides the normative 
imprecision in our moral judgements. It should be the absolute size of each of these populations 
instead. For instance, 10 million lives carry with them an accumulated margin of imprecision that 
should be the same for any population of 10 million people. Adding any one life to this population 
will increase the size of this margin, but only by a small amount. This increase would make it 
slightly harder to value a population of 10,000,001 lives than a population of 10,000,000 lives on 
its own, but it is far more significant to our evaluation of both populations that they have a size of 
at least 10,000,000 than that they have a difference in size of 1. 
One reason we might overlook the margin of imprecision implied by 10 million individual lives in 
this case is if we assume that the 10 million lives in both populations are identical. In this case, 
perhaps we can assume that whilst the value of both populations falls in the same margin of error, 
their value with regard to these 10 million lives will occupy the same position within that margin. 
We might therefore ignore the effect of this imprecision when comparing these two populations. 
Only the additional margin brought by the additional life makes a difference to our 
considerations. However, for the purpose of producing the kind of population axiology that is 
most relevant to the Repugnant Conclusion, and that I am concerned with in this thesis, we 
should assume that these lives are not identical. We are considering two different populations, 
with no overlap, so it is not legitimate to ignore the large margin of imprecision created by 10 
million lives and focus only on the very small increase in the margin of imprecision created by the 
addition of one extra life. 
Parfit’s paper also gives us at least one possible justification for applying a margin of error to the 
value of each life, despite the fact that we do not know what effect it might be having on our 
competing moral ideals. This stems from his views about lexical imprecision. As I have already 
stated, Parfit believes that a sufficiently large number of some lives is of greater value than any 
amount of some other lives. However, he also argues that this superiority is not the result of some 
sharp distinction between superior and inferior lives. Instead, he believes that it is the result of the 
cumulative effect of many overlapping strands of goodness within each life, some of which are 
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superior in value to others. He describes this in the following vivid analogy: 
[I]t could not be true that some things are lexically better than others unless there is some deep 
discontinuity between these two kinds of thing. In the development of each of our own lives, from 
birth to adulthood, there is no such discontinuity. Nor is there such discontinuity in the 
evolutionary sequence between human beings and their many ancestors. In both these 
developments there are striking qualitative changes, some of which involve wholly new features. 
But such changes are gradual. Each sequence is like some rope of which one end is made of fibre 
and the other made of gold, with overlapping strands in between of fibre, copper, tin, bronze, 
silver and gold. (Parfit (Forthcoming) 19) 
Parfit’s view implies that the composition of lives determines their value and that the existence of 
certain components in a life gives this life a value that is lexically superior to that of other lives. 
However, there is no sharp distinction between the nature of these components and that of certain 
other components of a life. Therefore, there is no sharp distinction between the nature of lexically 
superior and inferior lives as well. 
If this were the case then it seems to me that it should not be easy to move from the welfare level 
of any life to its overall value. Lives that are composed of a few very good things (equivalent to 
Parfit’s gold threads) may have no more welfare than lives with very many things that are almost 
as good (equivalent to his silver threads). Yet Parfit’s view implies that these golden lives may be 
composed in such a way that their all things considered value is lexically superior to that of the 
silver lives. If the only information we have about a life is how good that life is for the person 
living it then it may be impossible for us to distinguish between the lexically superior and inferior 
lives in certain cases. I will return to this argument in chapter 4. 
Even if this is not the case, and we can always establish whether one life is composed so as to have 
a lexically superior value from its welfare level alone, Parfit suggests our need to make evaluations 
of these diverse kinds of components within lives is one source of our normative imprecision in 
valuing populations. As I have already claimed, however, such an imprecision depends on the 
absolute size of a population, not on its relative size compared with any other population.23 
2.2.3 How Result 6 undermines Parfit’s argument 
If the imprecision in our evaluation of populations were the result of differences in population size then this 
would not help us to escape all of the results from chapter 1. 
The preceding arguments have aimed to show that Parfit has not provided any convincing 
                                                             
 
23  In his most recent drafts, Parfit has dropped discussion of imprecision based on the relative size of 
populations in favour of this alternative source of imprecision. The preceding arguments were composed 
before I became aware of this change in his work. 
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argument for why normative imprecision should be a result of comparing populations of different 
sizes. In this section, I will raise a different objection to this view. The normative imprecision that 
resulted from comparing populations of different sizes does not help us to escape all of the 
impossibility results set out in chapter 1. 
Result 6 proved the impossibility of satisfying the following four conditions: 
The Weak Quality Addition Condition: For any population X, the addition of a sufficiently large 
group with very high positive welfare to X would be better than the addition of any group of 
people at a low positive welfare level and some people at a negative welfare level. 
The Non-Elitism Condition: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a is higher than b 
and b higher than c, and for any population A at welfare level a, there is some, sufficiently larger, 
population C at welfare level c, and a population B of the same size as A∪C at welfare level b, such 
that for any population X, B∪X is at least as good as A∪C∪X. 
The Non-Extreme Priority Condition: There is a number of lives, n, such that for any population 
X, a population consisting of the X-lives, n lives at a very high welfare level and a single life at a 
slightly negative welfare level is at least as good as a population consisting of the X-lives and n+1 
lives at a very low positive welfare level. 
The Non-Sadism Condition: An addition of any number of people with positive welfare is at least 
as good as an addition of any number of people with negative welfare. 
As I mentioned earlier, I shall not attempt to prove Result 6 but offer a highly informal 
presentation of this result in appendix A. The key point to note about result 6 is that, of the four 
conditions it depends upon, two (the General Non-Elitism Condition and the Non-Extreme 
Priority Condition) involve comparisons between populations of the same size. Therefore 
differences in population size could not produce normative imprecision in our use of these 
conditions. 
The other two conditions, the Weak Quality Addition Condition and Non-Sadism Condition, 
involve populations of different sizes. However, these conditions involve the addition to one 
population of lives that are at a negative welfare level. Parfit’s theory implies that it is only the 
number of lives with positive welfare, but below a certain high level, that can make two 
populations imprecisely equal in value. The addition of lives at a negative welfare level always 
makes that population precisely worse. This seems to be an implication of the Part-Whole 
Principle, since of these conditions involve populations that share one subgroup of lives and differ 
only in respect of groups that can contain either lives that make them imprecisely better or lives 
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that make them precisely worse. It is therefore implausible to claim that the use of these 
conditions creates normative imprecision.24 
Given this result, together with my arguments from the previous section, I conclude that whilst 
Parfit may be correct in diagnosing the presence of normative imprecision in our judgements 
about the relative betterness of populations, he is wrong to diagnose the source of this imprecision 
as lying in the different relative size of these populations. In fact, I believe that there are better 
explanations for this normative imprecision that Parfit might accept instead, although these will 
have further implications for population axiology. 
2.2.4 What are the alternatives to Parfit’s theory? 
There are two alternative sources of imprecision in our evaluation of populations: imprecision in the value 
of individual lives and imprecision in our comparison of moral ideals. I believe that it is plausible that both 
of these kinds of imprecision can be found in our intuitive evaluation of populations, but that this stems 
from a lack of information rather than any deeper normative imprecision. 
If we agree with Parfit that there is normative imprecision in our moral judgements but do not 
believe that this is a result of comparing different-sized populations, what are the alternatives? As 
I mentioned above there may be two other sources of imprecision. It may be that lives that are at a 
positive welfare level have an imprecise value themselves, or it may be that imprecision is a result 
of the conflicts between our moral ideals. 
Let me consider the second of these potential sources of imprecision first. If normative 
imprecision resulting from conflicts between moral ideals is to make a difference in cases such as 
those presented in chapter 1, it must be of a particular kind. It is not enough to say, as is surely 
true, that in many cases we cannot know which of two values matters more to our judgement of 
the relative betterness of certain populations. This is very common and to be expected. Most 
egalitarians, for instance, cannot even formulate exactly what it is about a population that makes 
it more or less valuable with respect to equality, let alone compare a gain in the value of equality to 
a loss in some other value. 
However, the cases presented in chapter 1 of this work are not ambiguous ones; they are set out to 
be very clear and precise and all involve a great deal of room for manoeuvre in changing the 
relative value of populations with reference to multiple moral ideals. Let me take just one 
example. The Quantity Condition implies a trade-off between the Total and Average Views, which 
                                                             
 
24  By this I do not mean to say that we know precisely how much better or worse these populations are than 
each other, but only that if A is at least as good as B then A is either better than or equal to B. 
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Parfit sees as one potential source of imprecision. However, in this case, we are not comparing 
trade-offs of some fixed magnitude and having to decide the exact exchange rate between these 
two values. Instead, this example asks whether it can be good to exchange any reduction, no 
matter how small, in the average welfare level of a population for any increase, no matter how 
large, in its total quantity of welfare. To claim that our judgements about this case rest on no 
precise truth about the trade-off concerned is surely to claim that any kind of pluralist moral 
judgement is impossible.  
Similar arguments apply to most of the other cases involved in chapter 1. However, in these cases 
multiple moral ideals imply that one population is better than another, whilst only one implies the 
opposite. For instance, the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition asks us only to accept that some 
increase in a population’s average and total welfare would be sufficient for an equal distribution of 
this greater quantity of welfare to be no worse than an unequal distribution of the lesser quantity. 
At the very least, I think we need to do much more work in axiology before we could confidently 
state that, whenever two values conflict in this way, there can be no precise truth about their 
relative importance. At present, I think we are not even sure what values we hold. To claim that 
whatever they might be, we know in advance that there is no exchange between them that will 
make a population precisely no worse, regardless of the relative size of these values, seems to me a 
conclusion at least as hard to bear as the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
However, there is another potential source of normative imprecision. It is possible that individual 
lives have an imprecise value themselves. I personally find this a much more attractive 
proposition. There are three potential sources for the imprecision of a life’s value, even when its 
welfare level is precisely determined. 
The first source of imprecision is the lack of clarity about what we mean by our descriptions of 
cases involving populations and their betterness.  
As Parfit points out in his paper, it is wrong to attribute numbers to welfare levels since this 
implies that welfare can be measured on a numerical scale. He has also abandoned the practice of 
representing populations as histograms, as I do here. I think that he is correct on both of these 
points, even if I do not follow his lead. However, the fact that we use numbers as labels for welfare 
levels, and that histograms remain the clearest means of representing them graphically, is 
problematic since it encourages us to retain these kinds of assumptions, at least subconsciously. It 
would be better if we could find alternative ways of describing populations precisely in terms that 
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directly reflect what the welfare of a life represents. In the meantime, this lack of clarity leaves 
these cases open to differing or vague interpretations, which may be a source of our imprecise 
judgements about them. 
Another area that is not clear to me is the intended meaning of concepts such as ‘welfare level’. In 
this thesis, I understand the welfare level of a life to represent the value of that life ‘for the person 
living it’. However, as I shall discuss in the next chapter, this concept is not at all precise and 
Parfit himself has done much to call into question the concepts of an individual life and the person 
who lives it. This concept raises important metaphysical questions that are left unanswered, or 
even unconsidered, in the field. However, this leaves it up to individual readers to make 
assumptions about the correct answer to these questions, assumptions that once again may lead 
us to make imprecise judgements. 
A second source of imprecision is in the lack of any supporting information about the lives in a 
population. Usually, when people consider populations, they make assumptions about the nature 
of people’s lives and their relationships to one another. Population ethicists have claimed for some 
time that we can ignore these concerns, since they are irrelevant to the principles under 
consideration. This may be so, but population ethics also contains many cases where this 
information is specified. Parfit’s original presentation of the Repugnant Conclusion, for instance, 
contains references to the kinds of experience in the lives of both populations and the lack of 
suffering in these lives. His presentation of the Mere Addition Paradox makes the claims that lives 
‘do not affect one another’ and that their existence involves ‘no social injustice’. Perhaps these are 
meant only as limiting assumptions that reinforce the idea that when we value populations we are 
to do so ‘ceteris paribus’. However, the fact that some cases specify this information begs the 
question of why other cases withhold it.  
As we have seen, in Parfit’s latest work he claims that welfare levels are not characterised by 
particular experiences or qualities of life, but by overlapping strands of different kinds of good. 
However, as I suggest above, it may be that the correct way to value these strands of good depends 
on whether lives are being evaluated from the perspective of the individuals living them (to 
determine their welfare level) or all things considered (to determine their contributory value to a 
population). The fact that this information is often not specified may make it hard for us to 
determine the contributory value of a life from its welfare level alone. 
A final source of imprecision is a lack of curiosity. Parfit raises various interesting cases in his 
paper, for instance whether a ‘roller coaster life’ containing many extreme pleasures but many bad 
 
 
78 
 
 
things is of a qualitatively different value to a ‘drab life’ containing just a few good things, but 
nothing bad. He acknowledges that this “raises questions that I shall not discuss here”. However, 
he argues instead that it is enough to assume that the lives in our populations are of a simple 
form. He may be right in arguing that this assumption circumvents these difficult questions, but I 
do not think this is necessarily the case. For instance, as I shall argue in the next chapter, it seems 
to me that assuming that a life at one welfare level, for instance a very high welfare level, is of a 
‘simple form’ may imply very different facts about its overall value than the same assumption 
made about a life at a negative welfare level would. 
For all these reasons, I think it quite likely that we are not yet able to make precise judgements 
about the contributory value of a life from its welfare level alone. I think Parfit is quite 
sympathetic to these problems and I wish to stress that my arguments so far are not aimed at his 
views in general, but only against his specific claim that differences in population size are a source 
of normative imprecision.  
However, there is one feature of this sort of imprecision that may be troubling to Parfit and other 
philosophers. Indeed, many may see it as a sufficiently good reason to exclude these kinds of 
arguments from population axiology altogether. 
Consider the following two populations: 
Population A – n people at welfare level 30 
Population B – n people at welfare level 31 
Let us assume that the margin of imprecision of all these lives is greater than the difference 
between level 30 and level 31. It therefore follows that, assuming the same margin of precision for 
all of these lives, we cannot say that population A is precisely better than population B. In fact, the 
two will be imprecisely equally as good, even though all the lives in population B are at a higher 
welfare level than those in population A.  
Personally, I do not find this conclusion hard to accept. As I shall argue in the next chapter, this is 
exactly the kind of conclusion that any non-simple population axiology would imply. It simply 
represents the fact that a life at welfare level 31 can have certain features (such as the presence of 
suffering or the absence of the best things in life) that make this life less valuable, all things 
considered, than a life at level 30 that has other features. 
I shall consider what these features might be, and why they have this effect on the value of lives, in 
the next chapter. However, I shall conclude this chapter by considering whether the mere 
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presence of normative imprecision or any other type of non-transitivity, in the absence of some 
otherwise satisfactory population axiology, actually allows us to escape the impossibility results of 
chapter 1 after all. I shall argue that it does not.  
 
 
80 
 
 
2.3 Does non-transitivity avoid the puzzle of population 
axiology? 
Gustaf Arrhenius has shown that the non-transitivity of value, on its own, does not allow us to escape the 
impossibility results of chapter 1. 
In section 2.1, I showed how the impossibility results of chapter 1 appear to rely upon an axiom of 
transitivity. In this section, however, I will briefly outline an argument from the work of Gustaf 
Arrhenius that reformulates these results without relying on this axiom. This would imply that, 
even if the arguments of the previous two sections persuade us that the value of populations is not 
transitive, it might still be that we face the same problems as before. 
Let us say that we abandon the transitivity of the value of populations. This would have very 
serious consequences for our moral theories. For instance, if our betterness ordering is 
intransitive so that A > B > C > A, then we should be willing to make some small sacrifice to 
obtain B when we could have A, C when we could have B and A when we could have C. The 
cumulative effect of such sacrifices would be to lead us to an outcome that is much worse than A, 
B or C, but which, because of the continual application of the non-transitive betterness relation, 
we would conclude is the best possible alternative. This makes a mockery of the consequentialist 
approach to decision-making. 
One obvious response to this failure would be to abandon this approach in favour of 
considerations about the rightness or wrongness of actions. It still seems that the rightness or 
wrongness of actions must depend in part upon the value of the outcomes they bring about, but 
there is no expectation that what we ought to do needs to reflect a coherent value set, in the way 
that consequentialism does. This allows us to avoid the contradiction that these impossibility 
results imply, albeit at the cost of abandoning the hope that our moral intuitions of betterness 
might form the basis of a satisfactory population axiology. 
Arrhenius argues that it is still possible for such an approach to moral decision-making to lead us 
to contradictory beliefs about the world. This relies upon our accepting the following condition as 
a minimum for any moral theory: 
The Separate Satisfiability Condition: For any agent and any situation, there is an action such that 
if the agent were to perform this action, then her action would not be morally wrong.25 
                                                             
 
25  Wrongness here implies impermissibility. An action might not be ‘wrong’, even though it is very bad in 
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One justification for this condition is that if there were no such action then it would seem that in 
some situations and for some agents ‘anything goes’26. For instance, if it would be wrong, i.e. 
impermissible, for me to do A, B and C, where these represent otherwise reasonable actions for 
me to perform, and if there are no other permissible actions for me to perform, then it would be 
no less permissible for me to D, which is an unreasonable action that would produce disastrous 
consequences. We might all agree that D produces a worse outcome, but this fact does not render 
it any less permissible than A, B and C, since none of these options are permissible either. Temkin, 
for instance, asks us to consider the difficult choice faced by somebody applying affirmative action 
policies to people with different qualifications and from different ethnic groups. If this problem 
implies that there really is nothing the hiring committee can permissibly do, then, given that they 
must do something, it would seem no less permissible for them to hire any candidate – and not 
only one of the three who made the shortlist but the unqualified racist Caucasian who only applied 
as a joke. Normally separate satisfiability is achieved by making conditions for moral 
permissibility choice set dependent, so that for instance whilst it is generally impermissible to run 
over a child we might view it as permissible if our only other choice is to run over two children. 
However, this will depend on the nature of the conditions of moral permissibility under 
consideration.  
If we accept this weak condition, however, then we can find ourselves facing impossibility results 
that are just as intractable as the results faced by any attempt to produce a satisfactory population 
axiology. For instance, consider the following plausible conditions of a normative population 
ethics: 
The Normative Quality Condition: There is at least one population A of n people all at welfare 
level a (where a is a very high welfare level) such that for any population Z at a very low positive 
welfare level z, in cases involving A and Z it would be wrong to choose Z. 
The Normative Quality Condition implies that if my choice set includes A and Z then it cannot be 
permissible to choose Z. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
many ways, so long as it is permissible to perform that action in preference to some action that is much 
worse. Therefore, this condition does not presuppose that there are not genuine moral dilemmas about 
what would be morally required or what would be best, only that in all cases our moral theory should 
allow that some action, including inaction, is at least morally permissible. Impermissibility, I take it, does 
not allow of degrees, an act is either morally permissible (relative to all other possible actions) or it isn’t. 
26  Some may believe that the phrase ‘anything goes’ is misleading here and that we should instead say that 
‘nothing goes’. For me the phrase ‘nothing goes’ implies the moral permissibility of some form of inaction, 
which is not correct in this case. On the other hand the phrase ‘anything goes’ implies that moral 
permissibility has ceased to be action guiding, which I believe accurately expresses the problem with 
violating the separate satisfiability condition.  
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The Normative Quantity Condition: For any population, A, of n1 people all at welfare level a 
(where a is both positive and not the lowest positive welfare level), there exists a population size 
n2 (where n2>n1) and a positive welfare level b (where b<a) such that if it is wrong to choose a 
population, B, of n2 people at b, then it is wrong to choose A. 
The Normative Quantity Condition implies that if my choice set includes A and B, and if it is 
impermissible to choose A then it cannot be permissible to choose B. 
Let us now assume that we face a spectrum of populations like that we saw in Result 1: 
 
Figure 14: The first normative impossibility result 
If A and Z are sufficiently distant in terms of the welfare level of their members to satisfy the 
requirements of the Normative Quality Condition then it seems it would be wrong to choose Z. 
However, it further seems that, according to the Normative Quantity Condition, for every 
population between A and Z on the spectrum there must be a sequence of pairs that are related 
such that if it is wrong to choose Z it is wrong to choose A. For instance, assuming that population 
b is at a welfare level only slightly lower than that of population A and that it can be much larger 
in size than population B, it will be the case that if it were wrong to choose B then it would be 
wrong to choose A. The same could equally be true of population C and of every member of a 
spectrum of populations, ending in population Z. However, we already know that if we can choose 
either population A or population Z it must be wrong to choose Z, therefore it must be wrong to 
choose any other population in this spectrum, including population A. This leaves us with no 
choice that is not wrong, thus violating the Separate Satisfiability Condition.27 
It follows that if we accept the Separate Satisfiability Condition, the Normative Quality Condition 
                                                             
 
27 As with Result 1 from the previous chapter, this result assumes either that there is a finite set of welfare 
levels, or that these conditions apply to at least one finite subset of all welfare levels. 
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and the Normative Quantity Condition this would imply a contradiction. This contradiction stems 
from an inconsistency in the conditions themselves, and does not rest on any further assumptions 
about the underlying nature of value. 
It is possible to revise all the other impossibility results from section 1.2 in the same manner, 
using the Separate Satisfiability Condition. It therefore seems that even if we abandon any hope of 
a transitive betterness relation in favour of a set of non-transitive normative moral judgements 
that includes the Separate Satisfiability Condition, this will not rescue us from the impossibility 
results of chapter 1, which remain unresolved.28  
                                                             
 
28  The non-transitivity of betterness offers us no direct solution to Tyler Cowen’s result. This is because this 
result does not invoke any spectrum of possible cases at all, but instead looks at the kinds of value that our 
acceptance of the Repugnant Conclusion implies. It is worth noting, however, that both Parfit and 
Temkin’s proposals for how betterness might be intransitive imply the violation, in practice at least, of 
Cowen’s Non-Vanishing Value Axiom. This axiom implies that it cannot be the case that, for any one 
value, there exists a distribution of other values such that the addition of any amount of this value would 
not be worth the subtraction of any finite increment of another value. However, according to both Temkin 
and Parfit’s views about betterness this can be the case. For Temkin this will be the case whenever a 
particular value is not relevant to a comparison because of the relationships that hold between two 
particular populations. For instance, he argues that equality is a value, but that in certain cases a 
relationship of ‘mere addition’ holds between two populations so that the addition of inequality makes a 
population no worse. Similarly, Parfit argues that between two populations that are imprecisely equal the 
addition of certain goods makes one population no better, all things considered, since the two populations 
remain imprecisely equal. In this way both views may offer an indirect response to Cowen’s argument, 
although this is not a point I intend to pursue further. 
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2.4 Conclusion of chapter 2 
In this chapter, I have examined two versions of the case for believing that the relationships ‘all 
things considered better than’ or ‘all things considered not worse than’ are not transitive relations. 
The first version of the case for non-transitivity was Larry Temkin’s argument that population 
axiology is essentially comparative. Amongst his many arguments for this view, Temkin only gives 
two arguments that relate to populations specifically and I reject both of these. His argument that 
essentially comparative views help us to explain the Mere Addition Paradox fails because the 
principle of equality it implies has implications that would be very hard to accept. His argument 
that essentially comparative views help us to escape the troubling implications of ‘how only 
France exists’ does not provide strong support for these views, because adopting an essentially 
comparative view is not the only means of escaping these implications. I further argue that 
Temkin does not provide a good enough reason for why his other arguments in favour of 
essentially comparative views should lead us to believe that these apply to population axiology. 
Finally, I reject the claim that Temkin’s preferred form of essentially comparative reasoning, the 
Narrow Person-Affecting View, can apply to the value of distinct populations. 
Next, I considered another version of the case for non-transitivity. Derek Parfit claims that 
betterness may involve some form of normative imprecision. Parfit believes that when comparing 
two populations of different sizes there may be no precise truth about which of the two is better. 
This is a view that I reject on two grounds. Firstly, I can find no adequate explanation for why it 
should be the difference in the size of two populations that renders their relative value imprecise, 
and secondly because if this is the source of normative imprecision then it does not help us escape 
Arrhenius’ ‘Result 6’. I believe that there may be some form of imprecision in population axiology. 
However, it seems more likely that this is a result of our failure to establish the precise value of 
individual lives from their welfare level alone, or our failure to establish the precise relative value 
of competing moral ideals. In both cases, however, I conclude that it is more likely that these 
represent epistemic failings rather than any deep normative imprecision. 
Finally, I considered Gustaf Arrhenius’ argument that the non-transitivity of value will not allow 
us to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1 since we can revise these results in a way that 
does not require the value of populations to be transitive. Therefore, whether we believe the value 
of populations is transitive or not, we face the challenge of trying to work out which of a particular 
set of possible populations is the best, and how other populations in that set relate to it in terms of 
their choiceworthiness. I shall continue considering this question in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3 – Simple and Non-Simple Population 
Axiologies 
It is plausible that a population axiology might consider facts about lives other than their value to the 
people living them. In particular, certain facts about lives directly imply morally important information 
about the people who live them, such as whether they have complaints or whether they enjoy ‘the best 
things in life’, and about the relationships between these people. 
In chapter 1, I set out several impossibility results, implying that no simple population axiology 
can mutually satisfy certain intuitively plausible conditions. In chapter 2, I argued that proposals 
to escape these results by rejecting the transitivity of value across populations are unsuccessful 
and that the two most prominent arguments in favour of a non-transitive value for populations 
are unfounded. In the final three chapters of this thesis, I will offer an alternative solution that I 
believe is both more successful and better founded. In this chapter, I will propose the possibility of 
a ‘non-simple’ population axiology, an axiology of populations that evaluates more than simply 
the number of lives in a population at different welfare levels. In chapter 4, I will show how we can 
avoid the impossibility results of chapter 1 by applying the kind of non-simple axiology that I 
develop. In the final chapter, I will defend the claim that we do in fact hold a non-simple 
population axiology by showing how only such an axiology could form the basis of a satisfactory 
response to the Repugnant Conclusion. 
The kind of non-simple axiology that I will propose in this chapter relies on the claim that the 
relationship between people and lives is not straightforward. I claim that people are continuous 
psychological entities whilst lives are extended events that belong to these entities. However, 
psychological continuity is a matter of degree and there is no simple fact about what constitutes a 
person, and therefore their life. I argue that when valuing ‘lives’ there is a sense in which we can 
define each life by setting an arbitrary level of psychological continuity required to define a 
person. However, I also argue that this will not provide us with all the facts necessary to 
determine the all things considered value of the events that constitute this person’s life. Lives, or 
parts of lives, can be evaluated from a variety of perspectives and the perspective of the people 
who live these lives is not the only one that has moral significance. The value of lives and parts of 
lives from a range of other perspectives can greatly alter our evaluation of these lives contributory 
value to populations.  
In describing an axiology of this kind, I merely wish to offer a description of a non-simple 
population axiology that will be sufficient to show how such an axiology is defensible, and how it 
could allow us to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
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3.1 A non-simple population axiology 
We can reasonably accept a non-simple population axiology that includes facts about the psychological 
composition of the people who live the lives in a population. 
Let me begin by stating that I do not think there is just one way in which a population axiology can 
be ‘non-simple’. Nor is it my intention in this work to determine what the best non-simple 
population axiology is. My aim in this chapter is merely to illustrate how such an axiology is 
possible. 
Population axiology is, at its simplest, about producing a theory to determine the value of sets of 
lives. In so doing, a population axiology does not merely produce a value function for this set; it 
also determines what features of this set are to be valued. A simple population axiology allows this 
function to be sensitive to two features of a population. The first of these is the welfare level of 
each life, as a whole, within that population (i.e. its value for the person living that life), and the 
second is the value of the relationships between the welfare levels of these lives (for instance 
whether they are equally good or whether they are above or below the average welfare level). My 
proposal for a non-simple population axiology involves expanding the range of features of a 
population that should be valued to include the value of lives from perspectives other than the 
people living them. 
3.1.1 The basis of a non-simple population axiology 
Just as population axiology values individual lives, and the relationships between them, it might also value 
individual welfare components, and the relationships between them. If it does include such principles, 
population axiology will cease to be ‘simple’. 
A life may be better or worse for the person living that life. It may also be better or worse ‘all 
things considered’. If our evaluation of populations is ‘all things considered’ then the contributory 
value of a life is logically distinct from its welfare level, i.e. its value for the person living that life. 
I do not doubt that there is a perspective from which a life ‘as a whole’ can be evaluated by the 
person living that life. By person, I mean a psychologically continuous entity comprised of 
interconnected psychological states that can have an unbiased attitude towards all of the 
psychological states from which they are comprised – i.e. connected via strongly overlapping 
chains of memory, intention and other forms of psychological connection. This perspective is not 
only important in that it determines what is in each person’s rational self-interest, it is also the 
perspective from which we evaluate other morally important features of outcomes such as their 
degree of proportional justice.  
A life is an event that ‘belongs’ to a person. It is not entirely clear what this sense of belonging 
 
 
87 
 
 
entails. However, at least some features of this belonging include the following. 
 1 – The boundaries of a life are determined by the boundaries of a person,  
2 – A life is, mostly, experienced by a person, and by no more than one person, and  
3 – People have special reason to care about their own lives that do not extend to other events. 
These features of belonging do not rule out the possibility that the perspective of the person who 
lives that life is not the only one that matters morally. The boundaries of a person cannot be 
precisely established. Parts of a life may not be experienced by the person who lives that life, 
either because the person is unconscious or because they are psychologically isolated from these 
features of their life, and parts of it may potentially be experienced by other people as well, a claim 
defended by David Lewis (Lewis (1976)). Together these claims imply that just as we can define 
the perspective of a person who owns a life, so we might be able to define other perspectives, and 
these perspectives could have a moral importance similar to that of this person. These 
perspectives would most likely be defined by the presence of a greater or lesser degree of 
psychological continuity and connectedness than that required for personhood. For instance, 
there is the present perspective, to which only the parts of a life with which one is immediately 
psychologically connected matter. Then there is the perspective that Parfit labels ‘Proximus’, to 
which only those states that we are most psychologically continuous with in the present and near 
future matter.29 There may also be other perspectives intermediate between these and the 
perspective of a life as a whole. For instance, a football-playing philosopher may have a different 
perspective on their life as a footballer (when they are more strongly connected to the parts of 
their life that concern football) and as a philosopher (when they are more strongly connected to 
the parts of their life that concern philosophy). There is no limit to the number of such 
perspectives, but as I will argue later that does not mean they are all morally important. 
Another perspective from which a life may have value is that of a group of people. Individual 
people are defined by overlapping chains of strong psychological connections. However, there 
may be a perspective that includes all connected psychological states, even if they are connected 
more weakly or by non-overlapping chains. From this perspective, it might be enough for one 
                                                             
 
29  Parfit discusses Proximus as a perspective defined by time, rather than psychological connectedness. 
However, this seems to me to be mistaken. If I have very strong intentions regarding my distant future 
then it would be rational, if I took the position of Proximus, to value what happens to me in the distant 
future more than what happens to me in the near future, but to which I am less psychologically connected. 
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person to adopt an intention from another person for their lives to form a meaningful event. Some 
might object to this possibility on the grounds that groups of people are not jointly conscious of 
their experiences. However, co-consciousness would be too demanding a requirement for a 
perspective to take on moral significance. No individual is co-conscious with their past or future 
selves; they are merely connected to these past and future selves in a certain way. I believe that it 
is possible that groups of people, such as a nuclear family, clubs, societies, institutions and maybe 
even species could share the same morally significant connections, albeit to a lesser extent, and 
that these would give some moral significance to such a group perspective on the value of lives; 
see for instance (Brink (1997) 141).30 
In the following sections, I will try to sketch out the beginnings of a defence of this view. This will 
be necessarily preliminary, since this is not a thesis on personal identity, and I suspect that some 
of the claims I wish to advance would require far more space than I am able to give them. 
I think that it should not be controversial to say that the perspective of a person is not the only 
feature that determines the value of their life. Many theories distinguish between the contributory 
value of a life and its welfare level. These include claims that equality or average welfare are 
valuable. Both of these claims imply that the contributory value of a life depends on its 
relationship to other lives in a population. Hence, the contributory value of a life can change 
without making it better for the person living that life. This will happen when we change the other 
lives in that population so that the relationships between these lives are affected. For instance a 
life at welfare level 5 may contribute more to the all things considered value of a population where 
all the other lives are at level 5 than a population where the other lives are at level 20. 
The sort of theory I want to propose here goes further than these theories in that it holds that the 
contributory value of a life depends not (only) on its welfare level and the welfare level of other 
lives in a population but (also) on the value of that life from perspectives other than the person 
living that life. One reason for this is that we do not only value the relationships, such as equality, 
that hold between different lives, but also the relationships between the parts of the same life, by 
which I mean the psychological relationships that make up the person to whom this life belongs. 
                                                             
 
30  It is hard to avoid the influence of psychologists like Jung in making a claim such as this. However, I do 
not wish to be misunderstood. The perspective I am describing is merely one that may have moral 
significance; I am not suggesting that it will actually affect the perspective of individual people or their 
components. In fact, in order to avoid the claim that perspectives like these can simply be included in the 
members of a population, I must actively resist such a claim. 
 
 
89 
 
 
The value of the relations between lives is established by principles such as its being bad that 
some are worse off than others. The value of the relationships within lives will need to be 
established by other principles.  
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3.2 How lives can be viewed from more than one perspective 
Lives are characterised by both the causal connections between people and the world around them and 
those between one person stage and another. It is highly plausible to believe that the value of welfare 
depends in part on the psychological connections within a person. I suggest that this is because these 
connections create different perspectives from which the parts of a life can be evaluated and that these 
parts may have different values when viewed from different perspectives. 
How might we account for the fact that certain events belong to people, and that they therefore 
have value as lives within a population? 
On a reductionist view about personal identity, the account may go as follows. The fundamental 
units for both persons and lives are ‘psychological states’. These may be conscious or unconscious. 
Certain coterminous psychological states constitute a person stage. Again, this may be because 
these states are co-conscious, but that may not be necessary. Why some psychological states 
constitute a particular person stage and others constitute a different person stage is a question I 
cannot pursue here. A person stage represents the instance of a particular person at a particular 
time. 
Person stages are brought together to form entire people by psychological connections, such as 
memory and intention. The basis for a psychological connection is that the psychological states 
within one person stage can have the right sort of causal connection with those in another person 
stage. Thus, if my remembering the experience of a previous psychological state alters the content 
of one of my present psychological states then this forms a connection between my current person 
stage and some previous person stage. Similarly, if a past intention of mine affects what I decide 
to do then this forms another kind of connection between two person stages. Finally, if two 
psychological states have the same content because they are causally connected, e.g. because they 
share beliefs or characteristics, then this again forms a connection between their person stages. 
As well as their causal connections with one another, person stages and their psychological states 
are also causally connected with the world, i.e. the state of affairs in which these person stages 
exist. Person stages are causally affected by the world around them, either through conscious 
experience or perhaps sub-/unconsciously. Person stages also causally affect the world around 
them through their agency. All the determinants of a person’s psychological states, i.e. all these 
causal connections between psychological states and anything else, form the content of that 
person’s life. A person’s life stages consist of all those causal connections that centre on a person 
at a particular time, i.e. how the world is affecting them at that time and how they are affecting the 
world at that time. All the life stages that belong to the stages of a psychologically continuous 
person form a unified life, the extended event that belongs to that person, and this life therefore 
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captures all of the causal connections between a person and the world in which they exist. 
This leads to the definition of a life posited in the introduction to this work to the effect that a 
person’s life is “all the features of the world that can affect how good things are for [that] person” 
(Broome (2004) 94).31 As I mentioned in the introduction, this definition is very different to the 
ordinary use of the term. Perhaps the most common understanding of a ‘life’ is merely that which 
gives us the property of being alive. However, in population ethics, lives are bearers of value. 
Many living things may not have any value, such as plants and viruses, whilst most of us would 
distinguish between the mere fact of being alive and the things that make our life valuable. Whilst 
being alive may be a necessary condition for having ‘a life’, therefore, the two do not seem to be 
equivalent. 
A life is also distinct from the person who lives it. On the above definition a person’s stages form 
part of their life, since they are one of the features of the world that make things better or worse 
for them at particular points in time. However, a person’s life also includes features of the world 
that do not form that person’s past and future stages, but are nevertheless causally connected with 
their present person stage. People can also be distinguished from their lives by considering their 
modal properties. Since a life is an event within a state of affairs, any change to that state of affairs 
that alters the nature of this event will change the identity of that life. On the other hand, people 
can exist across many possible states of affairs, since they are characterised by their psychological 
connections rather than the content of their person stages. If two states of affairs include people 
who are psychologically connected to some particular person stage, for instance if they both 
contain the same person’s childhood, but differ with respect to that person’s later life, they can be 
said to contain the same person, even though they contain two different lives. 
Another way in which we might interpret a life is simply the content of all the psychological states 
that make up a person, rather than the causal connections between these states and the world. In 
fact, I believe that these two definitions are not so different from one another. On my 
understanding, the content of a person’s psychological states is the same as the causal connection 
between the world and these states. For instance, if I have the psychological state of experiencing 
a sunset this is because the sunset has affected me, and it has affected me by causing me to have 
                                                             
 
31  Broome’s definition limits the content of a person’s life to the features of the world that affect how good 
things are for a person rather than just all the features of the world that affect a person. This addition 
neatly captures both all the features of the world that affect a person and all the features of the world that 
a person affects, insofar as these matter to that person themselves.  
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this experience. However, I do not believe that the content of a person’s psychological states 
represents all of that person’s life. For the purposes of population axiology a person’s life should, I 
believe, include all the facts about the world that might be good or bad for that person, or else 
axiologies will need to account for these facts in other ways. If we try to define a person’s life solely 
in terms of the content of that person’s psychological states then this implies the view that only 
the content of these states can be good or bad for that person. However, some things may make a 
life better or worse without directly affecting a person’s psychological states. For instance, James 
Griffin argues that it is plausible that people’s lives may be better for them if their relationships 
with other people are sincerely reciprocated, even if this has no direct effect upon the person or 
their psychological states (Griffin (1986) 19). Equating lives with the content of our psychological 
states makes the unnecessary assumption that this is not the case. I therefore believe that Broome 
is right to define a life merely in terms of the features of the world that affect how well or badly 
things are for a person, even if this definition is very different to our everyday use of the term life. 
Since person stages are causally connected to one another, the life stages that belong to them are 
unified into the extended event of that person’s life. Just as each life stage belongs to a person 
stage, so this life as a whole belongs to the person who lives it. Let us say that a set of person 
stages forms a ‘person as a whole’ when they are psychologically continuous, i.e. when they are 
connected by strongly overlapping chains of psychological connections. 
Just as the value of a life is the sum of the reasons we have to prefer an outcome viewed from the 
perspective of a person, so the value of a life stage is the sum of the reasons we have to prefer an 
outcome viewed from the perspective of a person at a particular time, i.e. all the reasons for 
preferring an outcome that are present in the causal connections between a person at a particular 
time and the rest of the world. There are many theories about why lives and life stages have a 
value for the people they belong to, i.e. which aspects of a person’s life count as reasons for 
preferring an outcome that contains it, and it is common to stipulate that population ethics is not 
concerned with this question. However, whilst I agree that population ethics does not concern the 
nature of welfare directly, it is important to note that some of these theories carry implications 
about the value of life stages, which population ethicists are not in a position to ignore.  
There are three prominent theories about the nature of this value: hedonism, desire fulfilment and 
objective list theories. According to hedonism the value of a life stage is determined by the causal 
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effects of the world on a person stage – in particular the conscious experiences people have.32 
According to desire fulfilment theories, the value of a life stage is determined by the causal 
connections between that stage and the world around it – in particular the ability of a person to 
realise their desires or intentions in the world. According to objective list theories, the value of a 
life stage is determined by neither of these causal connections but by the objective evaluation of 
the contents of each life stage, and potentially their interaction with the world. 
Whilst I do not wish to take sides in this debate33, it is worthwhile considering whether these 
theories support the claim that we could evaluate life stages independently of one another. It 
seems to me that, according to many theories at least, that the value of a life stage depends not 
only on the content of that event, but also on the composition of the person to whom it belongs.  
For instance, unless we believe that there are intrinsically positive and negative experiences, it is 
best to interpret the hedonistic view about the value of life as claiming that an experience is 
valuable insofar as it is anticipated or remembered positively by other stages of a person and that 
an experience is bad insofar as it is dreaded or regretted in the same way (Parfit (1984) 493–494). 
This implies that it is not the quality of a life stage that determines its value on this account, but 
rather how the psychological state of experiencing this life stage is causally connected with other 
stages of a person. 
Similarly, unless we believe that the satisfaction of any desire is valuable even if it has no effect 
upon the desirer, it is best to interpret the desire fulfilment view as claiming that the fulfilment of 
desires is valuable only insofar as this affects some other stage of a person (Parfit (1986) 494–
495). Again, this implies that it is not simply the fulfilment, or frustration, of these desires that is 
valuable, but rather the fact that this will come to have the right kind of effect upon the person 
who had these desires, i.e. upon some person stage that is psychologically connected to the 
psychological state of the desire itself. 
In both these cases, a life stage is only valuable if it belongs to a person stage that is 
psychologically connected to another person stage of the right kind. In this case, the right kind of 
person stage contains the psychological state of either 1) being glad to have this experience or 2) 
desiring to bring about this event. 
                                                             
 
32  By ‘the world’, I mean features of the world other than the content of a person’s psychological states. 
These could include narcotics, the simulation of experiences or the inducement of hallucinations. 
33  indeed it seems to me strange to believe that just because conscious states count as reasons for preferring 
an outcome, fulfilled desires or objective values do not count as reasons as well, and vice versa. 
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I do not think there is an analogous argument for objective list theories about the value of life 
stages, and it may be that there are good counterarguments to the above claims. However, they 
suggest that we should not exclude the possibility that the value of an individual life stage depends 
upon its relationships with other life stages, via the psychological connection between person 
stages. 
Of course, this is not the only way in which the connections between psychological stages might 
alter the value of a life stage. If we accept distributional principles, such as egalitarianism, or 
person-affecting principles, then belonging to the life of one person rather than that of another 
could greatly alter our evaluation of a life stage. The same is also true, I will argue, for a range of 
other moral principles such as asymmetrical views about the value of suffering and valuing 
perfectionist goods, such as the best things in life, more highly than other good things. Let us, 
however, set these principles aside until later in this chapter. 
Instead, let me now offer some cases that I believe illustrate a different kind of principle, based on 
taking account of multiple perspectives. 
Imagine the case of a person who lives for a very long time. This person may be psychologically 
continuous, since there are overlapping chains of strong psychological connections between all 
their person stages, but there may be no psychological connections between distant parts of their 
life. Here is one example of how such a person’s life might go : 
 ─ Consider Methuselah. At the age of 100 he still remembers his childhood. But new memories 
crowd out the old. At the age of 150 he has hardly any memories that go back before his 
twentieth year. At the age of 200 he has hardly any memories that go back before his seventieth 
year; and so on. When he dies at the age of 969, he has hardly any memories that go beyond his 
839th year. As he grows older he grows wiser; his callow opinions and character at age 90 have 
vanished almost without a trace by age 220, but his opinions and character at age 220 have also 
vanished almost without a trace by age 350. He soon learns that it is futile to set goals for 
himself too far ahead. At age 120, he is still somewhat interested in fulfilling those ambitions he 
held at age 40; but at age 170 he cares nothing for those ambitions, and it is beginning to take 
an effort of will to summon up interest in fulfilling his aspirations at age 80. And so it goes. 
(Lewis (1976) 65–66) 
In this case, there still seems to be a person, Methuselah, and this person defines the boundary of 
a life. Presumably, therefore, there is some value that this life has for Methuselah as a person. 
However, this value seems relatively unimportant in our moral considerations. During his youth, 
Methuselah has no more prudential reason to care about his own far future than he has reason to 
care about what happens to other people, since he is no more psychologically connected with one 
than with the other. If Methuselah suffers terribly in his youth but receives many benefits in his 
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old age, these benefits do not seem to compensate him for his suffering in the way that they would 
if they had come sooner. Similarly, if Methuselah achieves something of great significance in his 
youth, such that to him, at this point, this is worth a significant loss of value across his life as a 
whole, this achievement may have no bearing on the judgements he would make about his life in 
his old age. 
Parfit seems to have similar intuitions. He argues that such a person would have one reason to 
view their whole life as significant for them, since there is a single psychologically continuous 
being to which this life belongs. However, he also believes that they would have other reasons to 
differentiate between their life as a whole and those parts of it that belong to person stages to 
which they are closely and/or directly connected. Parfit does not specify how we are to reconcile 
these two kinds of reason, but it seems plausible, on his account to assume that people can 
rationally accept a range of perspectives. For instance, he suggests that: 
─ To give these people a better way of talking [I propose that] the distinction between successive 
selves can be made by reference … to the degrees of psychological connectedness. Since this 
connectedness is a matter of degree, the drawing of these distinctions can be left to the speaker 
and be allowed to vary from context to context. (Parfit (1986) 304)  
Population ethicists do not face this kind of problem directly. It would clearly be wrong for a 
population ethicist to view Methuselah as having any more than one life. As David Lewis and 
others have pointed out, the alternative view would seem to lead to the conclusion that the world 
is overcrowded. Where we formerly saw just a single life being lived by a single person we might 
now believe that there are an infinite number of lives lived by slightly different gradations of that 
person’s interconnected person stages. However, just because population ethicists take the view 
that in cases such as that of Methuselah there is only a single life, it does not mean that they can 
bypass these kinds of problem completely. There remains the question of how this life is to be 
evaluated. The Simple View of population axiology argues that the contributory value of a life is a 
function of its welfare level. However, this reflects only one way in which that life might be good 
or bad; it only reflects its value as corresponding to the reasons that Methuselah has to view his 
whole life as important. If, as Parfit suggests, he also has reason to view his life in other ways as 
well then these may imply alternative perspectives on its value. In many cases, these perspectives 
may not differ markedly in their assessment of that part of a life which they evaluate from the 
evaluation of that same part from the perspective of the person as a whole. In such cases, it is easy 
to produce an all things considered judgement of the contributory value of this life, which 
combines both of these two perspectives. However, there may be cases in which this is not so, and 
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in such cases, the possibility that a life may be viewed from multiple, morally important, 
perspectives could have a significant effect on its contributory value – and hence on population 
axiology.  
This example is based on fantasy and may be too speculative to justify our drawing general 
conclusions about the value of lives. However, it has implications for other cases that are more 
realistic. For instance, consider a life that contains three distinct phases: childhood, adulthood 
and old age. Now consider that the child and the adult are strongly psychologically connected: the 
child forms intentions about being an adult and the adult remembers being a child. Next, consider 
that the adult and the old person are strongly psychologically connected in the same way. Finally, 
however, consider that the old person and the child are not psychologically connected: the child 
cannot conceive of being old and the old person cannot remember ever having been a child (Reid 
(1785) 114). This kind of case implies, like the case of Methuselah, that the person may have 
reason to view their life as a whole and to differentiate between its different parts according to 
their own perspective. 
Let us now imagine that in the above case there are some very weak psychological connections 
between the child and the old person, such as a single memory linking the two positions. I do not 
believe that this would remove the need to include the multiple perspectives within a life when 
evaluating it all things considered. Psychological connectedness is a matter of degree, and whilst 
the addition of a single psychological connection may give the child some reason to care about 
their old age, this is surely dwarfed by the extent to which the many strong psychological 
connections they have to their adulthood give them reason to care more about this phase of their 
life. As I have suggested already, I believe that there may even be weak psychological connections 
between distinct people, such as a shared intentions or memories, but that this does not imply 
that the two people lose their individual perspectives. 
In fact, I believe that these morally important perspectives exist within all of us. Take for instance 
Parfit’s Proximus perspective. This is a perspective from which we rationally do not care about our 
past or distant future but only about our present and near future. The rationality of taking this 
position on life implies that our judgements about value from the perspective of Proximus count 
as reasons for us, even though we also have reasons to value our life as a whole. As I have already 
suggested, I do not believe that these reasons will greatly conflict in their effect upon our 
evaluation of our life as a whole in most cases. However, as I will argue in section 3.4, I believe 
there are some cases in which such conflicts not only occur, but have a very significant effect upon 
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the contributory value of lives. 
In appendix C I consider the possible relationship between these different perspectives and views 
about the value of lives from non-western philosophies. 
3.2.1 The Principle of Temporal Good and the Principle of Personal Good 
John Broome has argued that people’s psychological connections are not axiologically significant for the 
value of their lives, although this is an argument he does not complete. I accept this argument and attempt 
to complete it using the distinctions between people and their lives that I have developed in this chapter. 
Since I believe that psychological connections are axiologically relevant for populations as a whole it 
follows that they are a source of impersonal values. 
The preceding argument implies that, since they alter the perspectives from which a life can be 
valued, the psychological connections between person stages can affect the contributory value of a 
life, all things considered, even if the life stages that belong to that life remain unchanged. If this 
were the case then it would violate John Broome’s Principle of Temporal Good, which states that: 
― (a) if two alternatives are equally good for a person at every time, they are equally good for 
her, and (b) if one alternative is at least as good as another for the person at every time and 
definitely better for her at some time, it is better for her (Broome (1991) 225) 
This is because, if my arguments are sound, we can imagine a situation in which a person’s life can 
be evaluated from at least one additional perspective, and for its value to be affected by its 
evaluation from that perspective. Changing the psychological connections between person stages 
may alter both the number and nature of these perspectives and the number of life stages that are 
associated with them. Such a change could therefore alter our all things considered evaluation of 
the life as a whole, without making that life any better or worse for the person living it or altering 
any of its life stages.34 In order to protect my argument from this theory I will now try to 
demonstrate where I think Broome’s reasoning goes wrong. 
Broome does not offer a full defence of the Principle of Temporal Good precisely because he has 
no way of defending it from this sort of claim, i.e. that our psychological connections might be 
axiologically significant. He does, however, believe that such an argument will probably be an 
ethical argument, rather than a metaphysical one. In fact I accept Broome’s Principle of Temporal 
Good and believe an argument for this premise is possible. 
Broome defines axiological significance as something having a value that is independent of its 
                                                             
 
34  Note that on some sophisticated views of welfare such a change could also affect the value of a life for the 
person living that life. This is not a point that I wish to deny, it is simply that I am interested here in 
defending the view that such a change could also affect the value of a life in other ways, such as altering its 
value from perspectives other than that of the person living this life. 
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causal properties, i.e. its effects on anything else. He summarises this position as follows “if the 
unifying relations between a person’s stages did not hold, but the good and bad of each stage was 
just as it actually is, then the good and bad in the world would be just as it is” (Broome (1991) 
234). I believe that this premise is defensible on the following grounds. 
Let us accept that what is good or bad for a person stage is just the value of a person’s life stage at 
that time, i.e. that the reasons for prefering an outcome for a person at a time are just those that 
are present in the world as it is causally connected with the person at that time. The psychological 
relations that make up a person are not a feature of their life at any particular time but rather a 
feature of the people to which these lives belong – how person stages are brought together to form 
a psychologically extended person. Of course, psychological connections can have a significant 
effect upon the nature of these events and their value. However, in both of these respects this 
effect is a consequence of their causal properties, the psychological connections alter the nature of 
a person’s life stage by allowing us to consciously remember or anticipate, and thus they are not 
axiologically significant in Broome’s terminology. Given this we can argue for Broome’s position 
as follows: 
P1 – Everything that is good for a person form’s part of that person’s life. 
P2 – Psychological connections are not a feature of lives. Psychological connections merely 
characterise lives by characterising the people to which they belong. Psychological connections 
define the boundaries of this person (and hence the boundary of their life), they are causally 
significant to the content of life stages and they are causally significant to the value of these life 
stages to this person. 
P3 – Nothing is axiologically significant because of its causal effects. 
C – Psychological relations are not axiologically significant as personal goods. 
However, I have also argued that psychological connections are axiologically significant. It follows 
that, although psychological connections can affect the value of lives, their significance stems from 
impersonal goods within lives. Psychological connections have value because they affect the world 
from perspectives other than those of whole people living unified lives. My view therefore is 
compatible with Broome’s Principle of Temporal Good, but undermines his Principle of Personal 
Good, which states that: 
― (a) Two alternatives are equally good if they are equally good for each person. And (b) if one 
alternative is at least as good as another for everyone and definitely better for someone it is 
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better. (Broome (1991) 165) 
This is because the above argument implies that goodness is a feature of lives, and as I have 
already argued we cannot move directly from the value of lives, all things considered, to the value 
of these lives for the people who live them. Two outcomes can be equally good for each person in 
them, and yet the lives in one outcome may be more valuable, all things considered, than the lives 
in the other outcome because they are better from some other perspective. 
More profoundly, my argument of the previous section undermines Broome’s Assumption of 
Distribution, that “the goodness of an act is determined by the distribution of wellbeing the act 
leads to; it supervenes on this distribution” (Broome (2004) 43). Broome states that this is a 
simple assumption of his work; it is not something that he supports via further argument. 
Nevertheless he claims that the assumption is defensible on the grounds that “people’s good and 
nonhuman goods can be separated in this way – that people’s good can be evaluated separately 
from nonhuman goods” (Broome (2004) 43). However, I reject this claim. I have argued that a life 
has a value from the perspective of people and from the perspective of non-people, such as person 
stages or groups of people. If this is so, then we cannot separate the value of a person’s life from 
non-human goods, i.e. the evaluation of these lives from other perspectives. 
In the next section, I will deal with one objection to this view, that we can separate personal and 
non-human goods by using a ceteris paribus clause. In section 3.4, I will provide a more detailed 
outline of what these perspectives are, and how they can have a dramatic effect on the value of 
populations.  
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3.3 Can population axiology be ‘simplified’ using a ceteris 
paribus clause? 
Population axiology does not claim to value all aspects of an outcome and standardly rules out values that 
do not depend on the welfare levels of lives by using a ceteris paribus clause. I argue that it would not be 
appropriate to do this for the kinds of value I have described in this chapter, since they are closely 
connected with, and in some cases entirely dependent on, people’s welfare levels. 
One response to the arguments I have just made is that even if perspectives other than those of 
people might have a bearing on the evaluation of lives; this is irrelevant to population axiology in 
its purest form. It might be argued that, whilst such considerations do affect the value of a 
population, we can simply rule them out of our population axiology using a ceteris paribus clause. 
For instance, we could claim that in all cases where we consider lives at two different welfare 
levels the psychological composition of these lives is to be such that it does not alter their relative 
value. There are, after all, many other ways in which things can be made better or worse without 
being made better or worse for somebody in particular. Take the case of goods such as culture, 
understanding, beauty and the natural environment. These ‘intrinsic values’ bear no relation to 
individual welfare. If we value these things then it implies that we can alter the value of an 
outcome in a way that may not affect the welfare levels of the individuals involved. However, these 
goods do not form part of population axiology, precisely because they do not affect people’s 
welfare level. We can therefore ignore the effects of all these other goods when evaluating 
populations merely as ‘sets of people and their lives’. We can say that when comparing any two 
populations we are to assume that they have the same degree of culture, knowledge and natural 
beauty, and hence that they are equally good with respect to these things (Arrhenius 
(Forthcoming) 61). Why can’t the same be said of claims about the psychological composition of a 
person and its effect on the value of their life? 
One problem with this response is that a ceteris paribus clause could also be wielded against other 
values that are not directly related to people’s welfare level but that are usually retained within 
population axiology, even in its purest form. For instance, we might argue that the value of the 
relations between lives should be kept equal, regardless of the apparent distribution of welfare in 
a population. However, simple population axiologies do not exclude such values. They permit, for 
instance, that equality is valuable, even though the value of equality stems from the impersonal 
relationships between individual welfare levels. Another type of value that might be included in 
the all things considered value of a population is that of the relationships between a life in one 
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population and its counterpart in another population. These are the relations that are evaluated 
by so-called ‘person-affecting principles’.35  
There are a number of reasons for not excluding these kinds of value from population axiology by 
using a ceteris paribus clause. One of these is that the existence of distributional or affecting 
relationships is directly implied by facts about the welfare level of the lives in one or more 
populations. Another is that these relations matter to at least some of our moral intuitions about 
the value of lives, but that the extent to which they matter is not exhausted by the extent to which 
they make individual lives better or worse. A final reason is that not only do these values matter, 
but they make a clear and significant difference to our evaluation of populations. Note that these 
conditions are not met by many other kinds of value that some philosophers propose form part of 
our moral evaluation of populations. Some factors that may be implied by information about an 
individual’s welfare level (such as longevity, on the grounds that a very high welfare life must be 
sufficiently long to contain so many valuable things in it) either do not matter to our moral 
evaluation of populations or, if they do, can reasonably be assumed to have their value exhausted 
by its effect upon the value of a life for the person living it. Other factors that some people claim 
make a difference to our evaluation of populations (such as cultural diversity) are not directly 
implied by facts about individual welfare levels. 
I believe that the existence of alternative perspectives on the value of a life or its stages has an 
effect on our evaluation of populations and that this effect exceeds the contribution they make to 
the value of a life for the person living that life. Furthermore, I believe that this effect can, in 
certain cases such as the Repugnant Conclusion, be directly inferred from facts about individual 
welfare levels in a way that makes a clear and significant difference to our evaluation of 
populations. Finally, I believe that the difference these alternative perspectives make is such that 
it will allow us to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
Let me start by noting that a life and its welfare level are composed of interrelated components of 
that life and that it is not possible to separate this life from its components and the relationships 
between them. I can imagine a happy population with or without a thriving natural environment 
                                                             
 
35  Note that whilst these relations are not excluded from population axiology via a ceteris paribus clause, 
they nevertheless play no significant role in the cases under consideration. This is because person-
affecting principles do not apply to distinct populations of the kind I am considering here. However, there 
may be similar principles that do apply to distinct populations. If such principles could be justified then 
we should not exclude them from population axiology. 
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or a developed culture, but I cannot imagine a happy population with or without a lot of 
interrelated positive welfare components. To the extent that these patterns of interrelated welfare 
components might alter the perspectives from which a life is evaluated this might therefore be 
directly inferred from facts about the welfare level of these lives. 
Furthermore, the nature and value of the components that make up a life are closely connected to 
the welfare level of that life as a whole. The clearest example of this is that there is surely some 
welfare level that a life could never fall below unless it contains at least one bad thing (this may or 
may not be the level at which a life is said to become ‘not worth living’, but it does not seem that a 
life containing no bad things could itself be very bad for the person living it). Similarly, there 
should be a welfare level that a life could never rise above unless it contains at least one good 
thing. I think it is also feasible to claim that a ‘very happy life’ must have at least some 
components of a particular kind such as ‘the best things in life’, whilst a life at a very negative 
welfare level must have components of another kind such as ‘the worst things in life’. At the very 
least it does not seem feasible to me that a life may be considered by be ‘very happy’ or ‘utterly 
retched’ or to be at very high or low welfare levels merely as a result of being very long and 
containing uniformly slightly good or slightly bad welfare components. Finally, as the number of 
welfare components in a life increases so too must either the quantity or strength of the 
relationships that bind them together into a continuous whole. 
There are of course many different ways in which we could determine the value of a life from the 
nature and value of its components. However, I do not believe that the preceding assumptions say 
anything very radical about how to determine this. As I stated in the introduction to this thesis I 
am assuming that we can produce a satisfactory axiology of lives, i.e. that we can allocate a value 
to each life in a way that satisfies our most basic intuitions about the relationship between the 
value of a life and the nature and value of its components. Amongst these should be the condition 
that a life cannot be bad if it is not bad at any stage. I believe that it is equally intuitive to believe 
that a life that is bad at every stage cannot be good. The intuition that a life, no matter how long, 
can never be very good unless it contains some component that is itself very good is also widely 
shared, although some may wish to doubt it. However, I doubt that anyone who doubts such a 
condition would be motivated by the Repugnant Conclusion, so I shall not concern myself with 
this possibility here. 
Beyond these few logical connections between the welfare level of a life and its components there 
are, I believe, certain deep and meaningful connections that we find it almost impossible to 
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ignore. This is because these connections form the basis for our understanding of certain key 
concepts, such as welfare and equality, that we use regularly in making judgements about our lives 
and those of other people. For instance, it is logically conceivable that a life with many very 
positive welfare components could be worse than a life with only negative welfare components. 
This would be the case so long as the first life included many more negative welfare components 
than the second. However, as human beings we know that the badness of negative welfare 
components tends to be pervasive across a person’s life. Very bad experiences sever the 
psychological connections that bind us together and often prevent the enjoyment of other good 
things. On the other hand, the enjoyment of the best things in life is built upon foundations of 
other positive welfare components and requires a degree of psychological sophistication. Hence, 
when we consider a life at a negative welfare level it does not seem plausible to us that this could 
be a life that enjoyed many of the best things in life. We may acknowledge the logical possibility of 
such a life, but when contemplating a life that is ‘not worth living’ or ‘worse than nothing’ we 
invariably consider lives that have few, if any, good-making features. Therefore, to consider that 
such exceptional cases are real possibilities when we consider lives in terms of their welfare levels 
alone seems inconsistent, if not with the logical construction of welfare as a concept then with our 
understanding of what that concept actually represents. I will return to these arguments in my 
discussion of the value of the best things in life and of bad things in the next section. 
Finally, I believe that certain facts about the components of a life are the best explanation for 
some of our moral intuitions about population axiology. In particular, I will argue in the final 
chapter that these form the best explanation for the fact that we find the Repugnant Conclusion 
repugnant. That our moral judgements are affected in this way by facts about the value of lives 
that go beyond these lives’ welfare level indicate that it would not be appropriate to exclude these 
things from population axiology using a ceteris paribus clause.  
Whilst there are many other kinds of non-simple population axiology, I do not believe that many 
of them can make such strong claims against the use of a ceteris paribus clause, and indeed I 
believe that using such a clause is the correct response when considering the impossibility results 
of chapter 1 in light of such a clause. For instance, one example of a non-simple population 
axiology is Frank Feldman’s ‘justicism’, this is a population axiology that values both welfare and 
desert. Feldman argues that some of the conditions of the impossibility results of chapter would 
should not hold, because whilst lives at low positive welfare levels are ‘good’ for the people living 
them they are not ‘good enough’ to have a positive value. Feldman argues that the baseline for 
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what kind of life people deserve is considerably more than a life ‘barely worth living’ and that 
when we take account of both the value of welfare and desert we will come to see lives at low 
positive welfare levels as bad rather than good (Feldman (1997) 206-209). Such reasoning is 
mistaken however, because whilst we might value both welfare and desert we can still chose to 
consider only the effect of the value of welfare on a population, as the conditions of the 
impossibility results of chapter 1 require us to do, by using a ceteris paribus clause. Such a clause 
would require us to consider individuals in all the populations under consideration to be at 
whatever desert level would produce the same effect upon the value of their lives in each case. This 
is not hard to do because there is no logical, deep or meaningful connection between an 
individual’s welfare level and their desert level (leaving aside any metaphysical views such as 
Karma or Election). There is therefor no reason to assume that people across different populations 
are at the same desert level, be this the baseline level of desert or anything else, so Feldman’s 
argument, whilst ingenious, fails. For the reasons I set out above however, there are such 
connections between individual welfare levels and the value of lives from perspectives other than 
the people living them, so a non-simple population axiology that makes claims about the special 
value of particular welfare components does not face such an objection.  
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3.4 When do other perspectives on a life alter its contributory 
value to a population? 
The value of lives from perspectives other than those of the people living these lives has a significant 
bearing on the value of three types of goods that play an important role in population axiology: ‘the best 
things in life’, ‘bad things’ such as suffering or frustration, and the goods most associated with equality. 
So far, I have shown how a non-simple population axiology is possible. I have also defended this 
view on the grounds that the contributory value of a person’s life might take account of the value 
of that life from perspectives other than the perspective of the person as a whole. Finally, I have 
argued that these values should not be excluded population axiology using a ceteris paribus 
clause. However, I have not yet provided any good reason to believe that the lives described in the 
impossibility results of chapter 1 would be of such a kind that their contributory value is 
underdetermined by their welfare level in this manner. My aim in this section is to provide such 
reasons. In the next chapter, I will show how this underdetermination of value allows us to escape 
the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
I will argue that certain plausible principles about the value of lives indicate that we do distinguish 
between the contributory value of a life and its welfare level. I will further claim that the difference 
between the evaluations of a life from multiple perspectives, other than that of the person living 
this life, is a good explanation for this. I will argue this in relation to our moral ideals concerning 
1) suffering and other bad things, 2) perfection and the best things in life and 3) equality and other 
relational goods. 
3.4.1 Suffering and frustration 
The badness of bad things in life, such as suffering and frustration, cannot be accounted for by their effect 
on the welfare level of a life as a whole. The presence of bad things can create complaints from perspectives 
other than those of a person as a whole and these must be accounted for in our all things considered 
evaluation of lives in a population. 
Should we consider the value of the bad things in life from perspectives other than that of the 
person living that life as a whole? I will argue that we should. 
Some things in life are bad. These things form the negative components of a person’s welfare. 
These are the components of a life that make it worse for the person living that life and that they 
would (rationally) wish to eliminate. Two examples that I will refer to that may belong in this class 
are suffering – the negative experience of pain, discomfort, unease, depression and other 
psychological states that people wish to avoid in themselves – and frustration – the inability to 
achieve our ends or meet our needs. 
Let me start by considering the balance of good and bad welfare components in a life. Consider 
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the following two populations: 
Population A – n1 people at welfare level 10, n1 people at welfare level –6 
Population B –  n1 people at welfare level 2, n1 people at welfare level 1 
One way of looking at these two populations is that those people who are better off in population 
A have some benefit that the best-off in population B do not and that those who are worse off in 
population B have some benefit that the worst-off people in population A do not. Crucially, 
however, the benefit that the better-off receive in population A is much more valuable to these 
people than the benefit that the worse-off in population B receive is to them. 
Whilst population A is in one way better than population B, because the size of the benefit in A is 
larger than it is in B, B may be the better population all things considered. One reason for this is 
that in population A nobody is at a negative welfare level (i.e. everybody has a greater balance of 
positive to negative welfare components) whilst in population A the worse-off are at a negative 
welfare level (i.e. they have more negative welfare components than positive welfare components). 
It is hard to provide additional arguments for this point of view, and it is not my intention to do 
so. However, there is a significant further question to consider, what is the source of this apparent 
asymmetry? 
In this section, I want to argue that it is plausible to believe that the apparent asymmetry between 
lives with a positive and a negative welfare level can be explained by the asymmetry in the value 
between positive and negative welfare components in that life. Let us consider the following 
possible cases that would all contain the same welfare levels as in the example I have just 
introduced. In these cases I will include both an overall welfare level and the level of good and bad 
components in that life, which will be expressed in the form 10 (10+/0–), meaning an overall 
welfare level of 10, composed of 10 units of positive welfare and no units of negative welfare.36 
Population A1: n1 people at welfare level 10 (10/0), n1 people at welfare level –6 (1/–7) 
Population B1:  n1 people at welfare level 2 (2/0), n1 people at welfare level 1 (1/0) 
Population A2: n1 people at welfare level 10 (17/–7), n1 people at welfare level –6 (1/–7) 
Population B2:  n1 people at welfare level 2 (9/–7), n1 people at welfare level 1 (8/–7) 
                                                             
 
36  I do not mean to imply that one simply adds up the value of these components, only that the collective 
effect on the value of this life of its positive components is to raise its welfare level by 10 units, whilst the 
collective effect of its negative components (if any) is to leave its welfare level unchanged. In this respect I 
am measuring the quantity of good and bad things in a life using what Jamie Mayerfeld calls the ‘Global 
Evaluative Measure’ (Mayerfeld (1999) 74-80) 
 
 
107 
 
 
Population A3: n1 people at welfare level 10 (10/0), n1 people at welfare level –6 (1/–7) 
Population B3:  n1 people at welfare level 2 (10/–8), n1 people at welfare level 1 (8/–7) 
Personally, I often find fuller descriptions of these kinds of cases unhelpful, since they tend to 
dwell on oversimplified and/or repellent situations. However, to provide some additional details 
let us imagine that we face a choice between healthcare and economic growth and that in each 
case people can be either sick, which brings suffering and frustration, or healthy and either rich, 
which brings pleasure and fulfilment, or poor. 
In the first pair of populations, we imagine that the poor are sick and the rich are healthy and we 
can either spend money on economic development for the rich (A1) or healthcare for the poor (B1). 
In the second pair of examples, everyone is sick, but we can only choose between providing 
economic development for the rich (A2) or the poor (B2). 
In the third pair of examples, everyone is sick and we can either provide healthcare for the rich 
(A3) or economic development for the poor (B3). 
We may prefer outcome B to outcome A in each case simply because of the difference in the 
welfare levels of the lives involved. This would be so if we preferred A to B because we were 
prioritarians or egalitarians. If this were so, it would not matter what the ratio of good to bad 
things in each life is, since this does not alter the number of people at each welfare level. 
I believe that the ratio of good to bad things in a life does make a difference. I find that B1 (nobody 
is very wealthy, nobody is sick) is the most attractive of all of these populations, and that A2 (some 
people are very wealthy, everybody is sick) is the least attractive. More controversially, I believe 
that A3 (the wealthy are saved from sickness) may be better, all things considered, than B3 (the 
sick are saved from poverty). A1 and A2 are better than B1 and B2 in one respect, since they have a 
greater total quantity of welfare. However, A3 is better than B3 in two respects, since it not only 
has a greater total quantity of welfare, but a smaller overall quantity of negative welfare 
components. I believe it would be reasonable to prefer A3 to B3 on these grounds. 
There is nothing very new about the preceding arguments, which are based upon those of James 
Mayerfeld (Mayerfeld (1999) 145–158). However, I now wish to offer a different sort of argument 
that provides additional reasons for assigning a special value to bad things such as frustration and 
suffering. 
Let us assume that lives at a negative welfare level have a moral value that gives them a degree of 
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priority over lives with positive welfare in our evaluation of populations (Mayerfeld (1999) 145–
148, McMahan (2009) 64-66). This would imply that lives that are bad reduce the value of a 
population by more than standard aggregation procedures would imply. One reason to hold this 
view is that when a life is at an overall positive welfare level, the person living that life is 
compensated for any bad things in their life by the good things. We can pair each bad thing in that 
life with one or more good things, such that if the person who is living that life had a choice to 
either retain this combination or replace it with things that were entirely neutral in value, they 
would choose to retain it. This gives us a good reason not to value these bad things any more than 
the person whose life they belong to does. 
However, if a person has bad things in their life for which they are not compensated, this 
generates a complaint on behalf of this person, i.e. a moral reason to avoid this outcome because 
of the situation of this individual. I use the term complaint in a similar way to that proposed by 
Larry Temkin – that somebody has a complaint if we owe something to them whether or not this 
increases the total quantity of goods in an outcome (Temkin (1993) 15). This implies that 
complaints are reasons to make changes for the sake of particular individuals, rather than for the 
sake of improving an outcome overall. Hence, we might owe it to an individual that they should be 
no worse off than anyone else, or that they should not be exploited, even if this would produce an 
outcome that is worse for everyone – even them. In this particular case I am claiming that the 
uncompensated suffering in a life generates a complaint because it gives us a special reason to 
prefer outcomes in which a person does not exist even if this makes the outcome no better in other 
respects37. 
Such complaints could arise from being brought into existence with a particular life when one 
might reasonably prefer to have had no life at all. Alternatively, they may arise because people 
simply deserve compensation for having bad things in their life, and hence, that having a life with 
uncompensated bad things is a violation of their moral status or dignity38. Either way, such 
                                                             
 
37  Later in this work, I will extend the notion of complaint to include things that are owed to the parts of a 
person. Just as complaints can be reasons to prefer outcomes for the sake of individual people, even if 
they are worse overall, so complaints can also be reasons  to prefer lives for the sake of parts of a person, 
even though they are worse for the person as a whole. 
38  It is far more common to explain the asymmetrical badness of uncompensated suffering for the first of 
these reasons, that it gives people lives that are ‘worse than nothing’. However, such explanations have 
suffered from two key types of challenge. The first of these arises from the difficulty in comparing the 
value of existence with the value of non-existence. The second arises from the fact that if it is truly bad to 
have a life that is worse than nothing then why is it not correspondingly ‘good’ to have a life that is better 
than nothing (why, in my terms, if having a bad life is a source for legitimate complaints is having a good 
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complaints make such a life even worse than its welfare level implies. The effect of this person’s 
life on the value of a population is therefore compounded both by its negative welfare level and by 
the complaint that this generates. This creates an asymmetry between the value of good and bad 
things in this life, with both contributing to that life’s welfare level, but the bad things contributing 
more to the value of a population containing that life, at least to the extent that they are not fully 
compensated for. 
Let us now consider the following three lives (note that in each case the concept of a ‘unit’ is an 
evaluative welfare unit, i.e. we are to assume that each unit of either good or bad things have an 
equal effect upon the value of this life for the person living it): 
Life A: 50 units of good things and 1 unit of bad things 
Life B: 50 units of bad things and 1 unit of good things 
Life C: 51 units of good things and 51 units of bad things 
Life A is clearly very good, and life B is clearly very bad. If lives that are bad have priority over 
those that are good in our evaluation of populations, then this would give us reason to believe that 
a population consisting of the combination of life A and life B is, on balance, bad rather than 
neutral. Life C contains an equal quantity of good and bad things and is therefore neutral in value. 
Whilst the good things in life A cannot compensate for the bad things in life B, the good things in 
life C can compensate for the bad things in life C. Hence, the combination of lives A and B has a 
lower value to the single life C. 
This argument relies upon the claim that good things and bad things in a life compensate for one 
another regardless of the relationships between them. However, we might reject this claim. 
Instead, we might claim that compensation can only take place between two parts of a person’s life 
to the extent that they belong to stages of that person that are psychologically connected with one 
another (Holtug (2010) 304). If this were the case then we could not evaluate A, B and C without 
knowing something about the composition of these lives. For instance, if there were insufficient 
connections between a particular negative welfare component and suitable positive welfare 
components, then even if the life as a whole were very good, this negative welfare component 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
life not a source of ‘legitimate gratitude’?). I believe that if the asymmetry arises from comparisons 
between a life and what is required by a person’s moral status or dignity, rather than between a life and no 
life at all, these problems are more easily avoided – albeit potentially at the cost of making the asymmetry 
harder to motivate for anyone who does not find it intuitively appealing in itself. One theory that supports 
such a view is Fred Fieldman’s ‘Justicism’ (Fieldman (1997) 194 – 206) 
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would remain uncompensated. It would then be the case that, whilst a person might view their life 
on the whole as being better than nothing, there are parts of that person, defined by their greater 
degree of connectedness, that do not share this perspective. In this way the situation of our 
component parts becomes more like that of separate people who have a greater balance of 
negative to positive welfare components. Why, then, should we not have the same attitude 
towards negative welfare components, from these perspectives, that we do towards negative 
welfare lives, from the perspective of the people living them? 
Suppose that in the previous case the three lives were composed as follows. In life A, there are 
many strong psychological connections between the parts of that life that are good and the part 
that is bad. Similarly, in life B, there are many strong connections between the parts that are bad 
and the part that is good. Life C is formed by psychologically connecting two part lives, one of 
which being like life A and the other like life B. Whilst each of these parts are bound together by 
numberous strong psychological connections the connections between the two are far weaker, 
constituting the minimum degree of psychological connection required to form a whole person.39 
In this case, life C should not have a neutral value even though this is its value for the person who 
lives it. Instead, it should have a value somewhat between the combination of lives A and B and a 
version of life C in which we imagine that there are equally strong connections between all of the 
good and bad parts. Whilst there is a psychologically continuous person who lives this life as a 
whole, and for whom the good things can compensate for the bad, there are also parts of that 
person, that are only weakly connected to each other, where one of these parts has many more bad 
things than good things. Since the lack of psychological connectedness between these two parts 
limits the ability of good things in one part to compensate for bad things in the other, many of the 
bad things in this life will remain uncompensated, even though the life is not at a negative welfare 
level. For the sake of the part of this person that suffers, and is not compensated, we may believe 
that their life is bad. 
The preceding example represents an extreme case designed to persuade a sceptic, but might the 
same kind of considerations might lead us to accept an asymmetrical view for more ordinary kinds 
of life. Jamie Mayerfeld, for instance, considers the example of anaesthetics used to remove the 
                                                             
 
39  Since life A and life B already contain good and bad things that are psychologically connected to each 
other, we can unite these lives without significantly changing their composition. We simply rearrange the 
connections between the good and bad parts of the two lives so that only the identity of the good and bad 
things being connected, and not the degree of connection between good things and bad things, is changed. 
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pain and much of the discomfort associated with surgery. Mayerfeld points out that instead of 
giving surgery patients anaesthetic we could give them some greater benefit designed to provide 
them with a degree of pleasure and satisfaction that is in every way better than the surgery is 
bad.40 He suggests that even if these two options were equally good in other respects, we might 
still feel we had more reason to provide the anaesthetic than the benefit (Mayerfeld (1999) 133). 
Mayerfeld offers no further explanation for this intuition. However, one reason for preferring the 
anaesthetic to the benefit is that whilst the benefit will compensate a person for the suffering of 
surgery, it will not compensate that part of the person that experiences, and has a legitimate 
complaint in relation to this suffering. An anaesthetic, on the other hand, not only increases our 
welfare level, but also removes the badness of suffering from the point in our lives when we 
undergo this surgery41. 
Of course, distant benefits can sometimes compensate us at the point of our suffering, by making 
this easier for us to bear. However, they do this by altering the mental states we are in at the point 
when we suffer. For instance, if I anticipate a future benefit, or remember a past pleasure, whilst 
experiencing suffering, my life may appear better at this point in time. However, if my level of 
suffering remains the same, then the distant benefit does not provide significant compensation for 
my present suffering. 
This argument is similar to several others presented in the literature. For instance, Karl Popper 
has argued that “human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, whilst 
there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway. (Popper 
(1995) 317). Similarly, T.M Scanlon argue that we should give priority to the worst off in society on 
the grounds that we have a duty of rescue to assist those who are suffering from bad things (their 
lives are threatened, they are in great pain, or living at a level of bare subsistence) independently 
of how good their lives are as a whole (Scanlon (1998) 226–227). If such duties represent reasons 
to prefer an outcome in which such assistance is provided, or no longer needed, to outcomes in 
which it is not then it would imply that it is better to provide an anaesthetic, which would satisfy 
this duty of rescue, than to provide some greater benefit that would not rescue the individual from 
their present suffering but would merely make their life better overall. Since the badness of these 
bad things is greater than the extent to which they lower a person’s overall welfare level, it is also 
                                                             
 
40  Let us assume that this does not involve providing them with any of the best things in life. 
41  My explanation would also imply that we had more reason to give surgery patients a benefit immediately 
before or after their suffering, rather than a benefit that was more psychologically distant to their surgery. 
 
 
112 
 
 
greater than the goodness of an equivalent benefit. 
How should we take account of this value? One approach would be to hold that any bad thing in a 
life has two values. Firstly, it has a negative value as a contributor to the welfare level of the 
person living that life; this can be compensated for by the value of good things in their life. 
Secondly, it has a negative value from the perspective of the part of the individual who suffers this 
bad thing, because of the complaint it generates; this cannot be compensated for. Hence, the value 
of such bad things goes beyond their effect on individual welfare levels to reduce the contributory 
value of a life. As the degree to which bad things are psychologically connected to good things 
increases, this additional badness will diminish. However, I do not think it will ever disappear, so 
long as these good and bad things remain distinct parts of a person’s life. 
In this way, even a life that is worth living may have a negative contributory value because the 
small positive value of its welfare is negated by the larger negative value of the bad things in that 
life. This is most likely to be the case when a life is at a low welfare level because it has many 
negative welfare components but a slightly larger total quantity of positive welfare components. 
Let me now deal with a potential objection to this view.42 
Parfit has also identified a key objection to this kind of view, which he terms the ‘Ridiculous 
Conclusion’. This is the implication that lives at a higher welfare level may have a value that is less 
than that of lives at a lower welfare level, because they could contain more bad things43 (Parfit 
(1984) 407). Consider the following two cases: 
Population P: n people at welfare level 100, consisting of 120 units of good things (including some 
of the best things in life) and 20 units of bad things 
                                                             
 
42  There is another objection. If we value bad things in this way it will violate the Mere Addition Principle. 
This is because under this interpretation it would be possible to add lives that are worth living to a 
population in a way that involved no social injustice and for this to make the population worse because of 
the additional negative value of the bad things in each life. I do not accept this objection. For one thing, 
whilst it implies that some cases of mere addition are bad this theory does not violate the Mere Addition 
Principle as I have understood it so far. This principle applies only to the value of the inequality created by 
mere addition, not to the value of the lives themselves. The badness of increasing the quantity of bad 
thingsin a population is not part of the value of inequality, although the two may be related. Furthermore, 
this view does not violate the Dominance Addition Condition from chapter 1. This is because it remains 
true that for every population at a very high welfare level there is at least one other population with the 
same number of people at an even higher welfare level and other people at a low positive welfare level that 
would be no worse. It is simply the case that this condition holds subject to the further fact that the second 
population does not have significantly more bad things than the first. 
43  Strictly speaking, Parfit’s version of the Ridiculous Conclusion is that the addition of lives at a high 
welfare level may make a population worse. However, this is a reflection of the view he is considering at 
the time. The ridiculous aspect of this conclusion flows entirely from the fact that lives that are better for 
the individual living them might nevertheless be worse for the population containing them; this aspect is 
preserved in the presentation I offer here.  
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Population Q: n people at welfare level 99, consisting of 99 units of good things, and no bad things 
The ‘special badness’ of the bad things that the people in population P suffer may imply that it 
would be better if population Q existed instead of population P, even though everyone in Q is at a 
lower welfare level than everyone in P. However, it is sometimes claimed to be a fundamental 
principle of population ethics that a perfectly equal population at a higher welfare level is better 
than a perfectly equal population of the same size at a lower welfare level (Arrhenius (2000) 257). 
Although this implication is disturbing, it must be set against the other advantages of holding an 
asymmetrical view. Personally, I do not find this view objectionable in the same way as the 
Repugnant Conclusion. Population Q is clearly much better than P in respect of the quantity of 
bad things it contains and only slightly worse in respect of the total quantity of welfare as a whole. 
Therefore, I suggest that in this case it is our principles that may be at fault. After all, these 
principles take as their chief argument the assumption that, distributional concerns aside, nothing 
but an individual’s welfare level determines the value of their life in a population. This simply begs 
the question against the asymmetrical view. 
It is also worth noting that an asymmetrical view, or any other non-simple population axiology, is 
not the only kind of view to have implications such as this. In fact, any principle that values 
something other than individual welfare levels will have similar implications. 
For instance, egalitarians and Average Utilitarians both value relationships between lives as well 
as their welfare levels. This leads both of these principles to have implications very similar to the 
Ridiculous Conclusion. They will both imply that a smaller group of people at a lower welfare level 
can be better than a larger group of people at a higher welfare level. For instance, Average 
Utilitarianism implies that a small group at a low or negative welfare level might reduce a 
population’s value by less than a large group at a high or positive welfare level, as in the Sadistic 
Conclusion. Whilst it is true that for any simple axiology this would only apply to groups within a 
population, I do not believe that this removes the supposed ridiculousness of the implication that 
that fewer people with less welfare might be better than more people with greater welfare. 
Furthermore, both Average Utilitarianism and egalitarianism imply that it can be bad to have 
more people at a higher welfare level in a population, but do not imply that this is because it is 
better for anyone. My asymmetrical view about the badness of bad things, on the other hand, 
implies that having more people at a higher welfare level can be worse because it can be worse, in 
a complaint-generating manner, from many perspectives within this population, even though it is 
better from the perspective of the people who live these lives.  
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For all of these reasons, I conclude that the implication under discussion is not as hard to accept 
as it may seem, so long as the special value of bad things is only one part of a pluralist conception 
of the value of a population. The badness of adding people whose lives contain some suffering 
must be weighed against other goods, as we shall see, and not only the increase in the total welfare 
of the population. For instance, in some cases it must be weighed against the value of increasing 
the enjoyment of ‘the best things in life’. 
Nevertheless, I agree with Parfit that there must be some limit on the asymmetrical value of bad 
things. One reason we need this is to avoid Parfit’s ‘Absurd Conclusion’ (Parfit (1984) 410). This is 
the possibility that simply by increasing the size of a population by, for instance, doubling the 
number of lives at each welfare level, where this population contains some lives at a negative 
welfare level, we might make that population worse and change it from a very good population to 
a very bad population. I agree with Parfit that this would be a troubling implication, but it only 
follows if we view the special disvalue of suffering as increasing (relative to the goodness of 
positive welfare components) with population size. This is not a view that I am advocating here.  
We should also limit the asymmetrical value of bad things so as not to violate conditions such as 
the Non-Extreme Priority Condition and the Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition. Both of 
these conditions require that there must be some way in which a population could be improved 
such that it would be no worse even if it came to contain a single life at a negative welfare level. 
Again, I agree with this prohibition on the absolute priority of suffering. In fact, it is easier to 
accept this kind of prohibition if one believes that bad things have an intrinsic (dis)value of their 
own. This is because, on this view, it becomes implausible to believe that the suffering of an 
individual should always take priority over the suffering of the many merely because the 
individual happens to be at a negative welfare level. See my defence of this condition along these 
lines in chapter 1. 
Of course, the fact that there is an asymmetrical value for individual bad things does not mean 
that we do not also give even greater asymmetrical value to entire lives that are bad. This kind of 
bad thing is doubly bad in that it is bad from the perspective of the individual who suffers it, 
because it makes their whole life bad, as well as being bad from the perspective of the part of that 
person that suffers it, because it represents a part of their life that is itself bad. 
We might also assign additional asymmetrical disvalue to those bad things that constitute ‘the 
worst things in life’ such as chronic pain, depression or torture. I see two ways in which we might 
understand this special badness, both of which are connected to the way in which some 
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perspectives within a person cannot be fully compensated for their bad life stages. The first of 
these is that there is a special badness to clusters of bad things. Clusters of bad things are groups 
of negative welfare components that are more closely connected to other negative welfare 
components than positive components. The less well connected any negative welfare component 
is to positive welfare components, the more the possibility of ‘compensation’ is restricted. These 
clusters start to resemble individual lives to a greater extent, and thus their asymmetrical value 
increases as I suggested above. The second way in which we might understand these worst things 
in life is that some bad things weaken or sever the psychological connections that make a life 
continuous. That is, great suffering and frustration have the power to alienate us from our past 
and future selves and to rob us of the things we hold most dear (Temkin (2011) 25). 
3.4.2 The best things in life 
Perfectionists argue that the best things in life have a special value that is not captured by their effect on 
welfare levels. I defend this view and present a version of it based upon the special value certain life stages 
may obtain when viewed from a perspective that can make objective value judgements about these stages. 
It is sometimes claimed that lives at a very high welfare level necessarily contain “the best things 
in life”, and that “even if some change brings a great net benefit … it is a change for the worse if it 
involves the loss of one of the best things in life” (Parfit (1986) 18, see also Hurka (1993) 69–83). 
In population ethics, this view is called perfectionism. In this section, I will examine this claim 
and show how it violates the assumptions of a simple population axiology. 
Perfectionism, in this sense, is the combination of two separate claims. Firstly, there is the claim 
that lives at a very high welfare level necessarily enjoy ‘the best things in life’ - a class of goods that 
can be distinguished from other welfare components. Secondly, there is the claim that the best 
things in life have a value such that a loss of any one of these things involves ‘a change for the 
worse’, even if it brings a ‘great net benefit’. By a ‘great net benefit’ I understand a change that 
makes the lives in this population better for the people living them, despite the loss of the best 
things in life in some of these lives. 
Let me begin by considering whether it is possible that the loss of one of the best things in life can 
be a change for the worse even if it brings a great net benefit to the same person who lost this 
thing. 
If this were so, then perfectionism would be incompatible with a simple population axiology. 
Imagine two populations, one consisting of people who enjoy one of the best things in life and the 
other of people who do not enjoy any of these things, but who all have some great net benefit that 
raises their lives to a higher welfare level. If we accept the perfectionist’s claim, then the first 
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population will be better, even though the people in the second population are at a higher welfare 
level44. This implication is clearly incompatible with the view that the welfare level of a life and its 
relations to other lives determine a population’s value. 
A perfectionist who wanted to claim that their view did not require us to accept a non-simple 
axiology might try to do this in one of two ways. They might claim that the loss of one of the best 
things in life could never be part of a great net benefit to the same person who lost it. 
Alternatively, they might claim that the loss of one of the best things in life is a change for the 
worse if it only brings a great net benefit to others, but not if it is part of a great net benefit for the 
person who lost it. 
Let us take the second possibility first. What if a perfectionist were to deny that a loss of one of the 
best things in life which formed part of a great net benefit for the person who lost it is a change for 
the worse? This would imply that that if their loss were combined with a great net benefit for 
others it would still be a change for the worse. 
Such a move would not help the perfectionist to preserve a simple population axiology. To see 
this, consider a population of a thousand people, each of whom has a life at a moderate welfare 
level but enjoys some of the best things in life. Compare this to a population in which one of these 
people no longer enjoys the best things in life, but everyone else has received some great net 
benefit. The perfectionist would claim that this would constitute a change for the worse. However, 
such a change might be repeated a thousand times, with a different person losing one of the best 
things in life at each stage. At the end of all of these changes, everyone will be living at a higher 
welfare level, but nobody will enjoy any of the best things in life. If each of these changes were a 
change for the worse then the perfectionist would seem committed to the view that the whole 
sequence constitutes a change for the worse.45 However, everyone is now at a higher welfare level. 
This conclusion is also incompatible with any simple population axiology. 
                                                             
 
44 Derek Parfit agrees with this implication of his claim. He now claims that this is in-fact what he intended 
to imply when he argued as follows “Consider what I shall call the best things in life. These are the best 
kinds of creative activity and aesthetic experience, the best relationships between different people, and the 
other things which do most to make life worth living. Return next to A and B. Suppose that all of the best 
things in life are, in B, better. The people in B are all worse off than the people in A only because they each 
have many fewer of these things. In B, for example, people can hear good music only a few times in their 
lives; in A they can often hear music that is nearly as good. If this was the difference between A and B, I 
would cease to believe that B would be worse.” (Parfit (1986) 18).  
 
45  I am here assuming that being a change for the worse is a transitive relation, something that, as I 
described in the previous chapter, not everyone accepts. Note, however, that Parfit’s view does not 
undermine this transitivity since a change for the worse implies a change that renders one alternative 
precisely worse than another. 
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Finally, therefore, a perfectionist might deny that a loss of one of the best things in life could ever 
be part of a great net benefit to a person. This would imply that the welfare level of that person 
could never be higher without one of the best things in life than it is with it. It would follow that 
being at a certain welfare level is a direct consequence of enjoying one of the best things in life and 
that living at a lower welfare level involves not enjoying this thing, or enjoying it to a lesser extent. 
However, when combined with the other perfectionist claims this view has further implications 
that I find very hard to accept. It would imply that even very bad things might matter very little 
since, if combined with some of the best things in life, they could not reduce the welfare of a life, 
and hence its effect on the value of a population, beyond a certain level. For instance, it would 
imply that it might be better if many people who enjoyed some of the best things in life were to 
suffer from many bad things than if a person who did not enjoy the best things in life were to 
suffer from only a few bad things. In this case, the great suffering of the people who enjoyed some 
of the best things in life would reduce their welfare level to a much lesser degree, if at all, than the 
minor suffering of the person who did not enjoy any of the best things in life.46  
Let us consider the following three lives: 
Life A – a long and happy life containing all the best things in life 
Life B – a long and happy life without at least one of the best things in life 
Life C – a generally terrible life involving sickness and misery, but including certain periods in 
which all the best things in life are briefly enjoyed 
I agree with the view that the fact that life B lacks the best things in life is a bad feature of this life 
and that it is so bad it is worth forgoing many other benefits to avoid. I also agree that the 
presence of any of the best things in life in life C is a good feature of this life and that a population 
containing this life may be better than one without it, even though it is in other respects very bad. 
What I cannot agree with is the view that, no matter how great the suffering or lengthy the periods 
of misery in life C are, it will be at a higher welfare level than life B. Since I find this implication 
unacceptable, I therefore conclude that we cannot assume that simply enjoying one of the best 
things in life implies that a person’s life cannot fall below a certain welfare level. 
What I am suggesting here may seem to contradict an argument, going back to Mill, that there are 
                                                             
 
46  Of course, we would not face this problem if we also accepted the kind of asymmetrical view about the 
value of bad things that I set out in the previous section. However, such a view is not compatible with a 
simple population axiology either, for the reason I set out in the previous section. 
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certain goods in life that have a value qualitatively different to that of other goods, to the extent 
that some amount of these goods in a life is worth any amount of lesser goods (Mill (1998) 56). 
This may or may not be the case. However, it does not follow that some amount of these goods 
combined with any amount of bad things is worth any amount of qualitatively lesser goods.47 
Therefore, this view is in no way contradictory with what I am claiming at this point. It is only the 
extreme claim that nothing can reduce a life with some of the best things in life below a certain 
welfare level that I find objectionable. However, it is this extreme claim that must be defended if 
we are to associate a certain welfare level with the presence of any of the best things in life. If we 
think that lives at the same welfare level may have different quantities of the best things in life, 
then perfectionists cannot derive the value of these lives, including the value of the best things in 
life that they contain, from their welfare level alone, even if this is the only information they have. 
It seems to me that this must be the case, but how can we make sense of this kind of perfectionist 
value? 
The kinds of goods that are generally included amongst the best things in life by perfectionists like 
Parfit and Hurka48 – such as poetry, athletic prowess and musical appreciation – are marked out 
by their level of sophistication. It is necessary to develop skills and capacities in order to 
appreciate their true value. These goods are also characterised by the ways in which they come to 
define a person’s approach to living, such as their long term intentions and value judgements, for 
instance by constituting a life’s ambition, a religious calling or a state of perfection.  
To Claim that these goods have a special value without offering a further justification for why this 
is so can seem subjective and elitist. However, the fact that they tend to share these features shows 
us how such a claim may be justified. It seems that the benefits these goods produce depend 
heavily on the psychological makeup of the individuals who enjoy them, and not simply on the 
contents of their momentary life stages. In this respect, these goods are very different to the kinds 
of ordinary goods with which the best things in life might be contrasted, such as the ‘base 
                                                             
 
47  Mill’s original argument does allow that a higher pleasure could be combined with ‘greater discontent’; 
however, he does not in fact make the claim of superiority in value that has become associated with this 
argument, claiming instead only that pleasures of a lower quality are of ‘little account’. Furthermore, at a 
slightly later point Mill does seem to allow that a lower-quality pleasure would be preferred to a higher-
quality one when combined with ‘unhappiness so extreme’ (Mill (1998) 57). I retain a reference to his 
claim purely for historical purposes since it applies only to a hedonistic account of perfectionism, which it 
is not my intention to employ here. 
48  Hurka’s concept of perfectionist goods is somewhat broader than Parfit’s. Parfit is interested only in those 
goods that constitute ‘the best things in life’, whilst Hurka considers the wider set of all ‘goods of 
excellence, such as knowledge and achievement’ (Hurka (1993) 71). 
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pleasures’ of a contented pig. Instead, perfectionist goods are enjoyed across, and help to form, 
clusters of strongly interconnected life stages, and the unique perspectives created by these 
clusters can give life stages within them the special value that perfectionists apply to the 
enjoyment of the best things in life.  
Some of these stages may not be valuable on their own, but only as part of a wider whole. For 
instance, the experience of training to perform a certain feat can be distinctly unpleasant but gain 
its value through its connections to the experience of actually achieving that feat. It is plausible to 
maintain that the unpleasant experiences of training tend to make a life worse, on the whole, but 
that when evaluated from the perspective of the achiever, rather than the whole person, these 
experiences are in no way bad. What this perspective, and the strong psychological connections 
associated with it define are the parts of lives in which certain activities and experiences are not 
only subjectively good or bad in themselves, but are also valuable as contributions to the 
perfectionist good that was achieved. In this way, life stages that are closely connected with the 
achievement of perfectionist goods may contribute to the value of a life in a way that is 
independent of their effect upon its overall welfare level. 
Furthermore, the value of the life stages associated with actual achievement of perfectionist goods 
may also be greater than their contribution to a person’s welfare level would imply, because these 
goods produce different kinds of value to that obtained from the enjoyment of ordinary goods 
such as pleasure and satisfaction. On such value is ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’ in life, although I 
suspect that this may not be the only kind of value we obtain via enjoyment of the best things in 
life. Susan Wolf has characterised this as the “active engagement with projects of worth” (Wolf 
(1997) 210), which strikes me as a good description of many of the perfectionist goods that Parfit 
and Hurka describe – although I would argue that the ‘active appreciation of worthwhile 
experiences’ is of no less valuable. The achievement of meaning in life requires us to develop the 
skills and capacities for actively engage with and appreciate with the world around us as well as 
the value systems and approach to living for making sound judgements about the value of our 
experiences and activities. As such it will naturally bring our subjective judgements about the 
world around us more closely into line with its objective value.  
For instance, the appreciation of opera involves both training one’s abilities to differentiate 
musical and dramatic qualities, to interpret their meaning and aesthetic qualities and to 
understand these in the context of one’s own life as well as that within which it is written and 
performed. This cannot be achieved simply by experiencing the opera itself, but requires us to 
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develop our evaluation of the experience of opera so that it accounts for these things more 
directly. Similarly developing athletic prowess involves both achieving greater understanding and 
control of our bodies and coming to appreciate their power and potential. This alignment of 
subjective experience and objective understanding creates meaning whose irreplaceable value is 
established by its great importance to those who have enjoyed the best things in life in this way 
(Wolf (1997) 222). 
However, despite its value, meaningfulness does not contribute to the value of a life in the same 
way as ordinary goods such as pleasure or satisfaction. Whilst meaning and wellbeing are clearly 
closely connected, there are at least two ways in which we should differentiate between them.  
The first of these is that meaning is highly dependent upon not only the content of life stages, but 
also the connections between them. Its value cannot therefore be extended to a person’s life as a 
whole and so does not make this life better or worse per say, although the wellbeing created by 
meaningful activity undoubtedly does so. pleasure and satisfaction can be said to make my life 
more pleasant and satisfying overall, even though there are many points of my life that may be 
neither pleasurable nor satisfactory. However, meaning experienced at any point in time does not 
make my life more meaningful, since its value is defined by, and therefore limited to, particular 
closely psychologically connected portions of this life. This helps us to explain an apparent 
paradox posed by Wolf and others, how even people who have clearly lived lives with a great deal 
of meaning, such as Leo Tolstoy, Thomas Nagel and Albert Camus, can be so deeply concerned 
about the meaninglessness and insignificance of their lives as a whole (Wolf (1997) 222). 
The second reason to differentiate between meaning or significance and welfare is that the 
meaningfulness of an activity or experience presents us with an entirely different sort of reason for 
valuing these goods. Experiencing a sublime opera performance has greater value for an opera 
than somebody who does not love opera in part because the opera lover does not only enjoy these 
experiences, as anybody might, but also judges them to be valuable in themselves. Two reasons 
therefor count in favour of the opera lover having this experience: their self-interest in increasing 
their lifetime welfare and their realising of the worthiness of the good itself (Wolf (1997) 224). The 
first of these reasons appeals to the value that this experience has for that person’s life as a whole, 
however, the second only exists because of the particular connections between the psychological 
states associated with finding this experience meaningful and worthy, such as the knowledge and 
experience required to appreciate it or the intention to engage with it in a productive way and 
those states associated with enjoying the experience itself. This value therefore reflects our 
 
 
121 
 
 
temporary judgements about an experience or activity and cannot be extended to a life ‘as a 
whole’, even whilst the associated enjoyment can be. This is surely an important part of the special 
value that belongs to perfectionist goods such as the ‘best things in life’. 
This point is borne out further when we consider the antithesis of the best things in life: the kinds 
of things that appear to fulfil the criteria for contributing to a person’s welfare level but that do not 
appear to make a life better. These are the kinds of things that we might label ‘destructive 
pleasures’. They include narcissistic pleasure or satisfaction derived from some forms of chemical 
or psychological stimulation. Philosophers sometimes hold up these goods as counterexamples to 
particular views about welfare; however, many people who have these experiences do view them 
as contributing to their welfare. I think that it is plausible that some of these goods both increase 
the welfare level of a life and yet make that life no better, all things considered. One reason these 
goods might not make a person’s life better is that they tend to undermine people’s psychological 
connections and hence their ability to achieve the kinds of higher good I have just described. By 
weakening or severing the relationships that hold between their various welfare components these 
goods also serve to reduce the quantity of good things that are evaluated from the various 
perspectives within a life, and to disrupt the ability of good and bad things in that life to 
compensate for one another. Whilst the best things in life therefore may carry the additional value 
of being meaningful or significance these destructive pleasures carry the additional disvalue of 
being alienating – a property that they share with the worst things in life like great suffering49. 
Having argued that the best things in life really do impart a special value to lives that contain 
them, let me conclude this section by considering the relationship between this value and that of 
bad things.  
I believe that the kind of perfectionism that I have described here tends to work better and be 
                                                             
 
49  Thaddeus Metz has suggested three further reasons for differentiating between the values of being making 
a life more meaningful and more worthwhile: 1) that whilst there are certain things that make a life less 
‘worthwhile’ there is nothing that makes a life less ‘meaningful’, 2) that whilst death never makes a life 
more or less worthwhile the right kind of death can make a life more meaningful and 3) that one’s life can 
be made more or less meaningful, but not more or less worthwhile, by events that do not affect one such 
as those that take place only after ones death or form part of somebody elses life (Metz (2012) 444-446). I 
am sceptical about all three of these claims. As I have described above I do believe that certain activities or 
experiences can be alienating and that this is a natural corollary or meaningful activities or experiences. I 
have also already argued that I do not believe that it is correct to claim that a person’s life cannot be made 
more or less worthwhile by events that do not affect them, so long as they are events that the person had 
the right kind of effect on. Finally, I do not think that Metz has any real evidence for the claim that death 
itself makes a life more or less meaningful, but rather that certain acts of dieing can have this effect, for 
instance because they represent acts of self-sacrifice. However it is worth noting that nobody denies that 
certain acts of dyeing can make a life better or worse, for instance by being painful or by fulfilling a 
person’s settled disposition to end their life in a certain way. 
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more defensible when combined with the kind of asymmetrical view about the value of bad things 
that I set out in the previous chapter. Let me offer three respects in which this is so. 
Firstly, we might assume that accepting the perfectionist view about the value of the best things in 
life will block the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit (1986), Griffin (1986) 87, Crisp (1992) 150–151, 
Hurka (1993) 69–83, Rachels (2004) 177–178, Huemer (2008) 914–915). However, this is not the 
case. This is because perfectionism only makes claims about the composition of lives at very high 
welfare levels. It therefore implies nothing about the components of lives that are ‘barely worth 
living’. 
Lives at low positive welfare levels may contain more of the best things in life than those at a very 
high welfare level. This would be the case if they contained many of the best things in life, but also 
a great many bad things, such as suffering or frustration. As I have argued above, no matter how 
much a particular person enjoyed the best things in life, their life might still be considered ‘barely 
worth living’ if they also suffered from enough bad things. 
However, if this is so then we can imagine a version of the Repugnant Conclusion where each of 
the people with very happy lives in population A enjoys fewer of the best things in life than any of 
the people with lives that are barely worth living in population Z. Therefore, no matter how we 
aggregate the value of perfectionist goods across these lives it remains the case that perfectionism 
implies the Repugnant Conclusion.50 
On the other hand, I believe that if a life is barely worth living and contains some of the best 
things in life then it must contain some bad things as well. The best things in life, as I described 
them, are something more than momentary experiences or capacities that anyone might have. 
They are the results of a fulfilling and fulfilled life. It would therefore be impossible for a life to 
contain any of the best things in life without also containing many other good things. A person 
who enjoys any of the best things in life, even to a minimal extent, and suffers from no bad things 
must be at a significantly positive welfare level and could not fall below this level unless their life 
also contained bad things, such as suffering or frustration.51 
                                                             
 
50  Note that in this respect perfectionism performs worse than utilitarianism. Since the quantity of welfare 
in a life is the same as its welfare level, we can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by selecting an 
appropriate aggregation mechanism for its value. However, since the quantity of perfectionist goods is 
independent of a life’s welfare level this means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion is no longer 
possible. 
51  Parfit does consider a case involving an individual living a dull and boring life and yet enjoying one of the 
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If it were the case that no life below a certain welfare level could contain both any of the best 
things in life and no bad things, then this would affect our evaluation of populations if we held an 
asymmetrical view about the value of bad things. On such a view the badness of these things 
would serve to block the Repugnant Conclusion, even in cases where the barely worth living lives 
enjoyed many of the best things in life. I will discuss this possibility further in chapter 5. I believe 
it offers both a good explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion and a means of 
avoiding it. On the other hand merely accepting the perfectionists claim that enjoyment of the best 
things in life has some special value offers neither of these things on its own. 
Parfit has suggested another reason why the combination of an asymmetrical view about the 
badness of suffering may help to make perfectionism a more defensible position to hold. He 
argues that perfectionism, on its own, may have implications that are unacceptably elitist and 
show a disregard for those who are worst off. For instance, if we do not give bad things a disvalue 
that is comparable with the superior goodness of the best things in life we may face the very 
unattractive view that ‘the prevention of great suffering can be ranked wholly below the 
preservation of creation of the best things in life’ (Parfit (1986) 20). 
Finally, let us note that perfectionism, like the asymmetrical view, may imply the Ridiculous 
Conclusion. As we have already noted, it is possible for a life at a very low welfare level to contain 
at least as much of the best things in life as a life at a very high welfare level. If we do not take into 
account the special badness of bad things, we may therefore face the following equally ‘ridiculous’ 
conclusion: 
Population R – n people at welfare level 100, consisting of 100 units of good things 
Population S – n people at welfare level 99, consisting of 120 units of good things (including some 
of the best things in life) and 21 units of bad things 
Perfectionism, on its own, would give us at least some reason to believe that population S is better 
than population R. This is so even though everyone in population R is living a higher quality of life 
and everybody in population S suffers from some bad things. As I argued in the previous section, I 
think that implying the Ridiculous Conclusion is a troubling result, but that it is defensible under 
certain circumstances. 
Note, however, that the combination of perfectionism and the asymmetrical view can avoid the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
best things in life for a short time. However, for the reasons I have given already I do not believe that this 
kind of life is possible.  
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Ridiculous Conclusion in this and other, similar, cases. Once again, this is because the combined 
effect of the special goodness of the best things in life and the special badness of bad things could 
block this conclusion in cases like this. This hybrid view will continue to imply the Ridiculous 
Conclusion, but it can avoid it in many cases, including those where we have most reason to find 
such implications hard to accept. 
In this section, I have tried to show that the most reasonable form of perfectionism is one that 
implies a non-simple population axiology. I have offered a description of perfectionism in terms of 
the value of the relationships between welfare components that I find matches our intuitions 
about perfectionism more closely than other interpretations. Finally, I have shown that this kind 
of perfectionism implies the kind of non-simple population axiology that I am proposing in this 
thesis and that the combination of perfectionism with an asymmetrical view about the value of 
bad things may help to avoid some of the less attractive implications of this kind of axiology. 
3.4.3 Equality 
Three conditions for a satisfactory population axiology directly concern the value of equality, the 
Dominance Addition Condition, the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition and the Levelling Down Objection. In 
chapter 2, I argued that Larry Temkin’s ‘Essentially Comparative View’ of equality does not respect these 
three conditions. In this chapter, I propose a different, non-simple, conception of equality that I believe does 
better. 
The previous two sections have sought to indicate that the evaluation of lives from perspectives 
within the person who leads that life may make a significant difference to our all things 
considered evaluation of these lives. In this section, I will consider whether the same might also be 
true of perspectives that are not contained within a single person such as the perspective of a 
group of people. 
It is often claimed that it matters whether some individuals are relatively better or worse off than 
others. This implies that not only the welfare level of lives matters for determining their value, but 
also the relationships between the welfare levels of these lives. 
So far, I have considered three sets of cases that have a direct bearing on the value of equality. 
These cases imply conditions for what role the value of equality could play in a satisfactory 
population axiology, which can be summarised as follows: 
The Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition implies simply that if equality had negative value then its 
badness would have to be limited so that a sufficiently large increase in the total welfare of a 
population combined with an equalisation of the distribution of this welfare would not make that 
population any worse. 
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The Dominance Addition Condition and the case of mere addition imply that it is not bad to make 
a population less equal merely by adding people with positive welfare. Nor can it be in any way 
good to make a population more equal merely by removing people with positive welfare. 
The Levelling Down Objection implies that it is in no way good to make a population more equal 
by replacing people who are at a higher welfare level with people who are at a lower welfare level. 
A fourth case, that of ‘how only France exists’, may be seen as a combination of the cases of mere 
addition and levelling down. It implies that it can be in no way good to make a population more 
equal by removing people who live at a positive welfare level and replacing people at a higher 
welfare level with people at a lower welfare level. 
Together, these cases might seem to support a neutral view about the value of equality. However, 
this does not match our intuitions that it is better, ceteris paribus, if people are equally well off 
than if some are worse off than others. As I explored in the last chapter, Temkin proposes that the 
way to capture this intuition without giving the wrong results in some of these cases is to adopt an 
essentially comparative view of equality. However, as I pointed out, such a view would still give 
the wrong result in the case of levelling down, and indeed does so in particularly troubling ways. 
Whilst I find this is a serious objection to Temkin’s account, I do not mean to imply that the 
Levelling Down Objection is always a fatal objection to egalitarian theories. I share Temkin’s belief 
that in certain cases the Levelling Down Objection is no objection at all, because levelling down 
can produce what Temkin calls “proportional justice” (Temkin (1998) 138–139). I also accept the 
implicit assumption behind those principles that involve mere addition that whilst in some cases 
the addition of lives with positive welfare makes a population all things considered no worse, 
there are other cases in which this is not true. 
In fact, I have argued in the previous two sections that, contrary to the levelling down objection, 
there are cases in which reducing a life’s welfare level can make it better, not worse. These cases 
occur when reducing a person’s welfare level also involves adding some of the best things in life, 
or removing suffering, from this life. Similarly, I have argued that the addition of lives with 
positive welfare can make a population worse, all things considered. This is the case when these 
lives involve a significant quantity of bad welfare components. I have also pointed out that there 
are deep and meaningful facts that lead us to believe that lowering the welfare level of a life will 
not in fact make it better and that adding lives at a positive welfare level will not make a 
population worse. However, this does not make such cases impossible and we should understand 
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the principles behind mere addition and the Levelling Down Objection to be subject to whether or 
not these ‘deep and meaningful facts’ are actually true in the cases under consideration or not. 
I think we can expand on our ideas about the value of equality in a similar way. I propose an 
alternative account of the value of equality, which provides a more substantial description of the 
relations that egalitarians should value. These are usually limited to ‘relatively better off’, 
‘relatively worse off’ and ‘equal to’ in terms of welfare. However, these relations can be hard to 
connect with many of the things that people claim to care about when they value equality. I think 
we can incorporate many of these other things if we consider other kinds of relationship that 
equality promotes. 
I will base this account on a theory about the value of equality produced by Martin O’Neill. O’Neill 
argues for a synthesis of different values that have been proposed as underpinning the goodness of 
equality, and suggests the following direct consequences of a more equal distribution of welfare:52 
1 – A sense of equal status in which nobody feels either superior or inferior to anyone else 
2 – Fair and reciprocal relations of power in which nobody dominates, or is dominated by, anyone 
else 
3 – Self-respect  
4 – Honest, open and fair behaviour without servility or deference 
5 – Healthy fraternal social relations 
He also provides what I see as a key insight into how these goods affect our evaluation of sets of 
lives. There is, he argues, a deep social fact that links an equal distribution of welfare to the 
presence of these egalitarian goods and an unequal distribution to their absence (O’Neill (2008) 
131). This sort of fact is what I have referred to as a deep and meaningful connection. The 
connection between equality and these goods is contingent; however, it is a connection we cannot 
easily ignore. Since it is contingent, however, we can construct cases in which these egalitarian 
goods are not closely connected to an equal distribution of welfare. One of these is the case of 
                                                             
 
52  O’Neill presents these goods inversely as the costs of inequality as follows “… (b) creates stigmatizing 
differences in status, whereby the badly-off feel like, and are treated as, inferiors; (c) creates objectionable 
relations of power and domination; (d) weakens self-respect (especially of the worst-off); (e) creates 
servility and deferential behaviour; and (f) undermines healthy fraternal social relations.” (O’Neill (2008) 
126). O’Neill also considers the relationship between inequality and suffering as part of this list, but 
rejects this on the grounds that our concern for the alleviation of suffering is not strictly egalitarian. 
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‘mere addition’ where the existence of the worst-off lives in a population involves no social 
injustice and that these lives do not affect, and are not affected by, the best-off in a population. 
However, these kinds of case remain exceptions.  
Furthermore, O’Neill argues that the badness of inequality is not merely a result of its being 
caused by injustice. Instead, it represents a badness that is intrinsic to the unequal society. He 
argues that the egalitarian goods are present in the distribution of welfare itself, as it affects 
individual lives, and that it is the absence of these goods that makes inequality bad.  
Because cases involving mere addition do not lack these goods in the way we would expect, they 
subvert our reasons for valuing equality and confuse our general judgements. We value equality in 
most cases. However, when we understand that a particular case of inequality is the result of mere 
addition or something similar, we make an exception because we recognise that in this case there 
is no loss of egalitarian goods, meaning that this instance of inequality is no longer bad in this 
respect. However, unless we have reflected upon what this implies about the value of equality we 
may not have any clear idea of why we should do this. I believe that something very similar may 
happen in cases of levelling down. We assume that merely reducing one person’s welfare (often in 
a person-affecting way) does not seem like it will bring about the kinds of egalitarian goods we 
would expect, and so does not have the same value that we would assign to other ways in which a 
population may become more equal. 
These egalitarian goods, such as self-respect, friendship and a sense of equal status, can make a 
life better from the perspective of the person living that life. Therefore, their value is partially a 
result of the fact that they increase an individual’s welfare level. However, I believe that these 
goods can also make a population better in ways that are not reflected in this increase in personal 
welfare. 
O’Neill presents his list of egalitarian goods as both personally and impersonally valuable. He 
believes that they are personally valuable in that they make people’s lives go better for them. 
However, he argues that they are also impersonally valuable because:  
― it is not at all implausible to think that considerations of the dignity and standing of human 
agents, together with the vision of how they might best live together, might lead us directly to an 
endorsement of the value of equality that did not have to be routed via consideration of the 
particular claims of individuals. (O’Neill (2008) 145–147) 
I agree with this distinction, but I think that O’Neill mischaracterises its significance. He 
postulates two sources of impersonal value. The first of these is our consideration of the dignity 
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and standing of human agents. The second is our vision of how human agents might best live 
together. These represent quite different visions of the value of equality, one individualistic and 
the other communal. 
O’Neill’s individualistic impersonal value of equality indicates that something is owed to ‘human 
agents’ that is not related to their welfare. I agree that this is so and have proposed several 
examples of this kind. We owe it to human agents to prevent suffering, even if doing so will lower 
their welfare level. Similarly, we owe it to human agents to help them enjoy the best things in life 
even if this is part of a net loss for them. I think that some of O’Neill’s egalitarian goods represent 
just these kinds of consideration. Some of these goods indicate the presence in lives of goods that 
constitute the best things in life, where these flow from our significant relations with other people. 
These include fraternal social relationships and a lack of domination, leading to the freedom to 
pursue our own aims and ambitions. Other goods on this list indicate the lack of certain bad 
things in life that stem either from social isolation or from relationships based on dehumanisation 
and objectification. A lack of self-respect in particular is associated with living a life without aim 
or purpose and is inconsistent with the enjoyment of the best things in life. The value of these 
things can be accounted for in the way described in the previous two sections. It is worth noting 
that in so doing we value these things in a way that is both individualistic and impersonal. It is 
individualistic in relying on no perspective outside of the person. However, it is impersonal in 
valuing these things not only from the perspective of the person, but also from other perspectives, 
such as those of the parts of that person that share an aim or an ambition. 
O’Neill’s communal and impersonal considerations can be accounted for in a similar fashion, by 
showing that something is owed to individuals in a way that does not make their lives better, all 
things considered. In this case however, rather than relating to perspectives within a person these 
considerations relate to perspectives outside of a person, perspectives that are created via the 
psychological connections that exist between individuals. O’Neill’s list of egalitarian goods 
suggests three ways in which the presence or absence of equality is closely connected with 
psychological connections between people. These are when people’s lives share common 
experiences and memories, when they share common aims and intentions and when they are 
affected by sympathy. In all of these ways, we can be connected with others in a fasion similar to 
that which we are connected with our own past and future selves. This may create extended group 
perspectives on the value of goods within our lives that can affect our evaluation of populations as 
a whole. Of course, the degree of connection between persons will be much less than that within 
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persons; however, if we value the connections between welfare components then we may value 
these connections just as much, if not more, than those between the welfare components that 
make up a single life. 
These connections create the possibility of fresh perspectives on individual lives and their stages, 
and these perspectives may make a significant difference to their all things considered value. For 
instance, when people work together as a group then the achievement of a shared objective by 
some members of that group may make all its members’ lives more valuable, all things considered, 
even if some of its members had died prior to the achievement of this ambition and had had their 
own intentions frustrated whilst they were alive.53 
This reflects a longstanding tradition about the value of interpersonal connectedness going back 
to the ancient Greeks. On this view it is virtuous and good to develop loving communal relations 
and strong friendships because these extend the boundaries of individual interests outside of the 
confines of one’s individual life. This idea is often used to justify the claim that it is better to be 
just and virtuous, even if this is not in ones self-interest narrowly defined, but it also has 
implications abou the value of lives. David Brink has shown how this tradition concords with the 
model of reductionist personal identity that I have been using throughout this chapter. The ability 
for intimates, such as family members, friends, partners in cooperative endevours and even fllow 
members of associative groups can all come to gain a degrees of psychological connectedness so 
that “B’s good can be regarded as a part of component of A’s good” (Brink (1997) 141-142). As I 
argue in appendix C, this tradition is also reflected pominantly in other world views. 
I believe that there is a deep and meaningful connection between these interpersonal connections 
and the distribution of welfare across a population. Both sympathy and shared memories and 
experiences will tend to bring individual welfare levels closer, so that inequality in individual 
welfare level provides good evidence for the absence of these things. On the other hand, equality 
brings with it the kinds of equal distribution of power and healthy social relationships that help us 
develop sympathy and encourage shared intentions and aims. 
Taking account of all of these impersonal considerations, both individualistic and communal, we 
can see how inequality can make people’s lives better or worse in ways that are not reflected in the 
                                                             
 
53  Note once again that I am not arguing here that the psychological connections between people create 
valuable entities. This may or may not be the case. I am merely claiming that they create new perspectives 
on individual lives that may alter their contributory value to a population. 
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extent to which these lives are made better or worse for the people living them. This directly 
contradicts the logic of the Levelling Down Objection, which rests on the idea that if people lose 
welfare then they cannot also be receiving a benefit. However, I believe that it is consistent with 
the implications of the Mere Addition Paradox and the case of ‘how only France exists’. The terms 
of mere addition state that inequality is not bad if it involves the existence of 
― extra people 1) who have lives worth living, 2) who affect no one else, and 3) whose existence 
does not involve social injustice. (Parfit (1984) 420) 
The claim that these additional lives do not affect anyone else and that they involve no social 
injustice would directly exclude the kinds of good described by O’Neill, and the effects of these on 
the relationships between welfare components. Of course, this is not the only kind of theory that 
closely matches the exclusions presented in the terms of mere addition. However, unlike Temkin’s 
essentially comparative response this view both matches our intuition regarding the Mere 
Addition Paradox and provides a successful defence against the charge that it implies the 
Levelling Down Objection. I therefore believe that this view represents a coherent egalitarian 
principle that matches our intuitions regarding both mere addition and the Levelling Down 
Objection. 
One objection to this view would be the claim that what egalitarians are really concerned with is 
not the equality of lives in terms of their welfare level, but in terms of their contributory value. For 
instance, even if we concede that it is good for people to be psychologically connected to one 
another and that an equal distribution of welfare is a necessary condition for this to happen, an 
egalitarian might still claim that, whilst this is in some sense valuable, it is still bad if some lives 
are worse than others in the sense that they have unequal value.  
However, I think there is a limit to how the value of equality can be extended in this way. Those 
who value equality are primarily concerned with equality between people, i.e. that one person is 
not worse off than another person. The value of a life for a person just is that life’s welfare level 
and the contributory value of a life to a population, it’s value ‘all things considered’, may be quite 
different. Therefore, whilst we might have reason to prefer a population in which people were at 
the same welfare level, and we might believe that this increased the contributory value of these 
people’s lives, the contributory value of lives should not itself be the focus of egalitarian concern54.   
                                                             
 
54  One possible exception would be if, as well as having a concern for equality between individuals, 
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3.5 Conclusion of chapter 3 
This chapter has attempted to argue that a life can be better or worse without being better or 
worse for the person living that life. I have argued that the contributory value of a life to the all 
things considered value of a population can only be established by reconciling diverse perspectives 
on the value of that life, and that the perspective of the person living that life is only one of these 
perspectives. It has been crucial to this claim to distinguish between the nature of a life and the 
nature of the person who lives that life and to consider all the ways in which people’s lives can be 
evaluated. I started by illustrating how I believe people come to own lives and to give them value. I 
argued that in neither of these respects is the relationship between people and their lives 
exclusive, and that it is possible that other perspectives can also define the stages of a life and give 
them value. It follows that the perspective of a person is not the only one that might matter for the 
value of a life. Next, I considered whether the evaluations of a life from other perspectives might 
be excluded from population axiology using a ceteris paribus clause. However, I argued that this 
would be a mistake because these values are closely connected with, and in some cases 
determined by, individual welfare levels. I argued that in this respect these values are similar to 
others that population axiology does not rule out using a ceteris paribus clause, such as 
distributional and person-affecting values. Finally, I considered a number of theories about the 
value of the components of a life and the possible value of groups of people to argue that 
alternative perspectives on a life make a significant difference to our moral evaluation of lives and 
of populations. In the next chapter, I will consider how this difference allows us to escape the 
impossibility results of chapter 1. 
In appendix C I will consider whether the diverse perspectives that I have discussed in this section 
include perspectives that are of little importance in Anglo-American moral philosophy, but are 
emphasised to a far greater extent in other world views.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
egalitarians were also concerned about equality between groups. It may be that one group is doing better 
than another even though members of both groups have equally good lives, because one of these groups 
has more interpersonal connections and therefore enjoys more of the egalitarian goods. However, even 
this would not lead us to prefer an equal distribution of contributory value across lives per se, but only 
between groups. 
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Chapter 4 – How a Non-Simple Population Axiology 
Makes a Satisfactory Population Axiology Possible 
Once we accept a non-simple population axiology, and that the descriptions of populations in terms of their 
welfare levels underdetermine their value, it is possible to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
There are two different kinds of problem expressed in the impossibility results of chapter 1. The 
first of these represents conflicts between two axioms and spectrums of cases for which one axiom 
seems appropriate when comparing cases that are close together on this spectrum and the other 
for cases that are far apart. The second represents conflicts between three or more axioms that 
deal with very different kinds of case. 
The kind of axiology that I sketched in the previous chapter undermines these results by implying 
that the axioms set out in chapter 1 are underdetermined because they refer only to the welfare 
level of the lives involved in a population when this is not the only morally feature of these lives. I 
have argued that features about the composition of the people who live these lives, and the groups 
they might belong to, also have moral importance and that this cannot be removed from 
population axiology by using a ceteris paribus clause. In this chapter, I will argue that, once we 
expand our axioms to take account of this new information, there are no more contradictions 
implied by these results. 
In this chapter, I will first set out and examine the implications of this kind of solution to the 
problems of population axiology. I will argue that the implications of this solution are more 
attractive than those of abandoning some of the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology. 
I will then complete my axiology by showing the need for additional views about the value of 
welfare in order to deal with some impossibility results of the first kind. Finally, I will show in 
detail how this expanded axiology can resolve the impossibility results of chapter 1, and why I 
believe it to be a satisfactory population axiology.  
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4.1 Two resolutions of the impossibility results 
The standard response to the impossibility results of population axiology is to reject some of the conditions 
for a population axiology, whilst retaining the other conditions. An alternative response is to retain all the 
conditions for a satisfactory population axiology subject to additional facts about the populations involved. 
Modifying the conditions for a population axiology in this way has implications that more closely reflect 
our intuitions about population axiology. 
It is commonly assumed that, if our judgements about the value of populations are transitive then 
the only way to resolve the impossibility results that I presented in chapter 1 is to reject one or 
more of the conditions we place upon population axiology. As I have argued it will not be 
sufficient to reject just one condition, we must reject at least two or three conditions to avoid these 
results. 
However, there are some such groups of conditions that we might reasonably reject. For instance, 
we would have reason to reject the Quality, General Quality, Non-Anti-Egalitarian and General 
Non-Elitism Conditions if we believed, as Parfit does, that the lives of people at a very high welfare 
level matter a great deal because these people enjoy ‘the best things in life’, which have an 
intrinsic value greater than any sum of lesser goods. Parfit accepts that this is an unattractive 
view, but argues that accepting it, and therefore violating these four conditions and others like 
them, is still more attractive than accepting the Repugnant Conclusion and so having to violate 
the Quality (and Weak Quality) Conditions.  
I shall refer to approaches like Parfit’s, which attempt to escape the impossibility results by 
considering which conditions we have least reason to retain, as the first or ‘standard’ response to 
the impossibility results of chapter 1. 
However, this is not the only response, nor do I believe it is the best response. The alternative that 
I propose is to retain all of the conditions in population axiology, subject to certain further facts 
about the populations involved. I think that many would agree that the conditions of population 
axiology hold subject to some other facts, if only because population axiology is only one part of 
how we evaluate outcomes. However, for most people this is not an important feature of these 
conditions, since their axiologies make no reference to such facts, and thus presume such 
conditions to hold for all cases under a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause. However, I have argued in the 
previous chapter that we should not exclude at least some of these facts from population axiology 
via such a clause.  
Since the conditions of population axiology describe only the numbers of people at different 
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welfare levels there is no reason to believe that any of these conditions would not hold in the kinds 
of judgement they describe. However, if this were not the case, i.e. if population axiology took 
account of additional information when evaluating lives, then this would give us reason to believe 
that in certain cases one or more of these conditions would not bind a satisfactory axiology. This is 
because we would be making a judgement where we have good reason to believe that this 
particular condition does not hold. We would then face a choice, either we complete the 
description of these conditions in such a way that they imply the ‘wrong’ judgement in such cases, 
thus implying that there is nothing unsatisfactory about a population axiology that violates them, 
or we complete the condition in such a way that it makes the right kind of judgement by allowing 
such cases as an exception, but thus bring them into line with the other conditions for a 
satisfactory population axiology, removing the contradiction between these conditions. 
Let me give a very simple example. The conditions of chapter 1 each have the structure that for 
any population of type P there is a population of type Q that would be at least as good/better, 
where P and Q describe the welfare levels of the people in these populations and the number of 
people at each of them. I contend that such conditions are indeed correct, but that they are subject 
to other features of these populations as well, such as the hair colour of their members. The fact 
that a condition is true subject such features does not in any way undermine the truth of this 
condition so long as we assume that identifying a population of type A or type B does not 
necessarily imply anything further about them with regard to hair colour. 
Now, let us suppose that the following three, admittedly absurd, conditions are all necessary for a 
satisfactory population axiology: 
Condition 1: An addition of lives with positive welfare and an increase in the welfare of the rest of 
a population does not make a population worse, so long as it adds more brunettes and no more 
blondes. 
Condition 2: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a > b and b > c, and for any group of 
(n1) people, there is a larger number n2 such that a population of n1+n2 people all at welfare level 
b would be at least as good as a population consisting of n1 people at a and n2 people at welfare 
level c, so long as it had more brunettes and no more blondes. 
Condition 3: For some population of n1 people all at a very high welfare level a, there is a very low 
positive welfare level z such that no population of any number of people at z would be at least as 
good, so long as it had more brunettes and no more blondes. 
These conditions are functionally equivalent to the Dominance Addition Condition, the Non-Anti-
Egalitarian Condition and the Quality Condition, at least with the addition of a ‘ceteris paribus’ 
clause. However, unlike those three conditions there is absolutely no contradiction implied by 
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trying to incorporate these three conditions into our population axiology. It is true that these 
conditions would seem to imply something the ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ when we only consider 
lives in terms of their number of lives at a particular welfare level, but this would overlook the 
moral salience of hair colour in this axiology. However, once we take account of the relative 
quantities of blondes and brunettes in each population we discover that for any triplet of 
populations like A, A+ and Z, at least one of these conditions will not hold for that triplet. Either A 
could have more brunettes and no more blondes than Z or A+ could have more brunettes and no 
more blondes than A and Z could have more brunettes and no more blondes than A+. One of these 
statements about the relative quantities of blondes and brunettes must be false. 
I believe that it is possible to resolve the impossibility results of chapter 1 in the same way, using 
the kinds of principle set out in the previous chapter. Before illustrating this however, let me first 
compare this approach to the standard response to these results in three respects. 
The first respect in which I will compare these responses is the kind of solution each would allow 
to these impossibility results, i.e. what would using each approach to escape the results imply? 
The first response gives the result that simply by knowing the welfare level of all the members of a 
population we know that one of the populations involved in each of these results is the best one. 
Once we establish which axiology is correct these results should give us no further uncertainty or 
concern as to which population is best. The second response, on the other hand, holds that whilst 
one population is the best, we cannot determine which population this is without additional 
information. I believe that the second response matches our intuitions more closely in this 
respect, and that even once we have established the correct axiology we still may not know which 
population in each of these results is best until we know more about each of them.  
The results presented in the previous chapter present two kinds of puzzle. The first of these stems 
from the reasonableness of the conditions that support the pairwise judgements that produce 
them. The second stems more directly from the fact that it does not appear that any of the 
populations they present us with is uniquely best amongst that set as a whole. Even if we were not 
required to endorse the judgements each condition implies, they still seem intuitively attractive in 
these cases and it does not seem very attractive to accept a theory that implies that one of these 
outcomes is clearly best, no matter what. 
The second respect in which I want to compare these responses is the sort of moral theories these 
responses allow us to hold. If we reject some of the conditions of a satisfactory population axiology 
outright, as the first response suggests, this implies that we accept an axiological theory that 
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violates these conditions no matter what.55 However, all the theories that have been suggested so 
far that violate any of these conditions do so in very troubling ways and turn out to be theories 
that very few of us could reasonably accept.56 Since the second response does not require us to 
reject any of the conditions of a satisfactory population axiology ‘no matter what’ it is much less 
extreme. It only requires that we accept an axiological theory that is not bound by any of these 
conditions when there is good reason for it not to so bound. Therefore, we will still be able to 
conform with each of the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology in situations where 
their violation would be most troubling. The situations under which these conditions apply are not 
determined solely by the number of people at particular welfare levels but also by additional facts 
that are not described in many standard examples. Nevertheless, it seems very likely that this will 
allow us to restrict the degree to which our moral theory must violate any of these conditions so 
that it can avoid many or all of the most troubling cases we face with simple axiologies. Whilst we 
may still find the simplicity of a simple axiology appealing in itself, it seems that we will find the 
implications of a non-simple axiology easier to bear. 
The third respect in which I will compare these responses is the diagnosis they make as to the 
source of the impossibility in each of these results. The first response implies that we falsely 
believe that a certain type of axiological judgement is unacceptable (e.g. that it is unacceptable to 
judge a large happy population to be no better than one that is much bigger, but at a much lower 
welfare level) when we are morally required to make this judgement. Michael Huemer, whose 
arguments I will consider in chapter 5, has argued that this simply shows the power of moral 
theory. However, this begs the question: why, if some of our moral intuitions are erroneous, are 
we still willing to hold onto any of our other intuitions as necessary conditions for a satisfactory 
population axiology? The second response holds instead that we should only ignore any of our 
moral intuitions when further facts about the populations under comparison give us good reason 
to do so. Furthermore, it seems as though there are cases in which we do have strong reason to 
ignore at least one of our intuitions, but lack the necessary information to know which one. By 
placing all of our intuitions in the same boat, this response renders the claim that our intuitions 
are sometimes in error yet remain the standard for a satisfactory population axiology less 
                                                             
 
55  The conditions are couched in terms of there being ‘some population of the type X that is at least as good 
as any population of type Y’. If we do not accept these conditions, then it follows that there can be no 
population of the type X that is at least as good as Y. This is a strong position that our axiological theories 
will need to uphold given that types X and Y often define very broad classes of populations. 
56  For a systematic presentation of the failure of all such theories, see Arrhenius (Forthcoming). 
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troubling. I will return to this argument again in section 5.1. 
I find the appeal to a non-simple population axiology more attractive than the standard response 
in all of these respects. In the next section, I will continue to formulate this response by 
considering what our non-simple axiology should say about the value of welfare.   
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4.2 How should we value the total quantity of welfare? 
The principles of a non-simple population axiology that I sketched in the previous chapter are incomplete 
in that they do not make any claims about how we should value welfare. In order to address all the 
arguments of chapter 1 a non-simple axiology will have to place an upper bound on the value of welfare 
relative to other goods. This might be achieved in a number of ways. 
In the previous chapter, I have put the case for accepting a population axiology that takes account 
of more than individual welfare levels. I have based this account primarily on the view that lives 
may be better or worse from perspectives other than the perspective of the person living that life, 
and that the value of these lives therefore cannot be determined from their welfare level alone. As 
an illustration of how this might be the case I have offered an extended example involving valuing 
not only individual welfare levels and the relationships between them, but also the components of 
these welfare levels and the relationships between them. To reiterate, my claim is that in some 
cases these components comprise a good, be it an egalitarian good, one of the best things in life or 
a bad thing such as frustration or suffering, that has both a direct effect upon an individual’s 
welfare level as well as additional value that is not related to this effect. 
It remains for me to show how producing a non-simple population axiology can allow us to escape 
the impossibility results of chapter 1. In order for me to do this, it is necessary to make one further 
claim: that the value of these additional goods can be, under certain circumstances, greater than 
that of any quantity of individual welfare in population Z. Without this claim, I could still 
plausibly escape impossibility results that arise from three or more competing moral ideals, but 
not those that involve a sequence argument that only relies on trade offs between a bounded and 
unbounded good, such as the quality and quantity of individual welfare. Nor would I be able to 
respond to Tyler Cowen’s argument or avoid Greaves and Ord’s effective Repugnant Conclusion. 
This is because, if there is nothing that has greater value than any quantity of welfare then, even 
taking account of other goods in a population, a population with a sufficient total quantity of 
welfare would still have a value greater than any population with sufficiently less welfare.  Since I 
do not wish to accept the Repugnant Conclusion or the effective Repugnant conclusion I am 
forced to the conclusion that there must be something in our axiology that is even more important 
than any amount of individual welfare in population Z. 
I will briefly consider four possible responses one might make to this challenge. 
The first of these is to defend the view that individual welfare does not matter for the purpose of 
making judgements about the value of populations, and so deny its value. Whilst we do in fact use 
information about welfare levels to make such judgements, it might be claimed that we only do so 
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as a means of assessing the kinds of goods these lives contain and then make a comparison based 
solely upon the value of these goods from perspectives other than those of the people living these 
lives. Although this is a very extreme position to take, it becomes more justifiable if we believe that 
the perspective of the ‘person as a whole’ is artificial, and is not even the only perspective from 
which we should assess the prudential value of outcomes – since we can rationally also assess 
prudential view from Pafit’s ‘proximus perspective’. On the other hand, it is important to note that 
the rejection of the value of total utility only allows us to escape Cowen’s result if we do not believe 
that there is some other feature of populations that could potentially be infinite in size and have a 
non-diminishing marginal value. For this reason, and since I believe that the perspective of the 
person does matter, I am not attracted by this response. 
This leads to the second response, that while the total quantity of welfare is a valuable and 
unlimited feature of populations like Z, there is also some other valuable and unlimited feature of 
populations like A. We might believe that this was the case if we viewed welfare levels as ‘dense’, 
i.e. we believed that between any two welfare levels it would always be possible to identify some 
third intermediate welfare level. In this way we might argue that there were an infinite number of 
welfare levels between the lives in population A and population Z, and that it was always better for 
lives to be at a higher welfare level than a lower welfare level, so that whilst there were potentially 
infinitely many valuable lives in Z, there were also an infinite number of welfare levels between 
the A lives and the Z lives, making the loss of value from reducing the individual welfare of each 
life in Z could also be unbounded. I am not sure that this view would be credible if applied equally 
to all welfare levels, since it would therefore apply that there was also a potentially infinite loss of 
value in moving from population A to a population the same size as population Z, but where 
everybody is at a level just discernible below that of the lives in A. However, we might still argue 
that there were an infinite number of welfare levels between the level of the A lives and the level of 
the Z lives, for instance because there are ‘patches’ of dense welfare levels between these two 
welfare levels (one model for how this might work has recently been proposed by Eric Carlson and 
I discuss this further in section 4.4). As I discuss in section 1.1.1, I do not believe that we should 
assume that welfare levels are dense for the purpose of constructing our axiology of lives – not 
because I do not believe that this is a real possibility, but because I feel that there should only be a 
small loss of welfare between lives that are only barely indistinguishable, and that there are only a 
finitie and discreet number of ‘barely indistinguishable’ welfare levels between the lives in 
population A and population Z. 
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The third response is to defend the claim that whilst welfare does matter for the purpose of 
evaluating populations there is an upper bound to the value of individual welfare in any 
population, relative to other possible values. Note that the existence of such a bound does not 
imply that the value of welfare diminishes or that it is bounded in any absolute sense. We might 
still argue that every unit of welfare is of equal value, both relative to all other units of welfare and 
to some other values. However we it does imply that there are some features of a population that 
are so valuable as to be worth more than any amount of welfare, and these values effectively place 
an upper bound on the relative value of the total quantity of welfare for population axiology. Here 
are three examples of how such a bound might work in the kind of population axiology I have 
described:  
 10 billion people all enjoying the best things in life may have lives with a perfectionist 
value greater than that of any amount of welfare in the lives of people who do not enjoy 
any of the best things in life, because there is a maximum possible value for individual 
welfare and this is set below the value of 10 billion people enjoying some of the best things 
in life.  
 A very large and perfectly equal population can never be made better by the addition of 
extra lives if this destroys its egalitarian goods, even if they increase its stock of welfare, 
because the value of these goods may already exceed the difference between the current 
value of that population with respect to welfare and the maximum possible value any 
population may obtain from individual welfare alone. 
 No amount of welfare may ever be sufficient to make up for introducing a large amount of 
suffering (or other bad things) into a world that was previously free of bad things, because 
the introduction of suffering represents a loss of value that any increase in welfare alone 
could never make up for.  
These claims might be defended on the grounds that although individual welfare matters to us, 
the concern each individual has for the value of their life as a whole should never come to 
dominate the other perspectives from which that life might be valued.  
Once again, however, in order to escape Cowen’s result, none the other features that might 
contribute to the value of a population can be potentially infinite in size. If they were, then we 
would be forced to select between the Axiom of Value Pluralism and the Non-Vanishing Value 
Axiom - and we could construct results similar to the Repugnant Conclusion in which a massive 
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increase in any of these values can outweigh any amount of other goods. However, it is not 
implausible, although Cowen does not consider the possibility, that there may be versions of the 
Repugnant Conclusion, involving goods other than total welfare, that are not so hard to accept. 
Furthermore, as we noted in section 1.2, if our theory is able to avoid the impossibility results of 
chapter 1 then we will have less reason to wish to avoid the Non Vanishing Value Axiomm, making 
these other Repugnant Conclusions easer to avoid. 
However, this objection would not apply at all if, as well as placing an upper bound upon the value 
of welfare in our evaluation of populations, we placed an upper bound on the potential value of all 
other features as well. This would still allow us to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion and the 
Effective Repugnant Conclusion so long as the combined maximum bound for value that can be 
obtained from all goods other than the total quantity of welfare exceeds that which can be 
obtained from the total quantity of welfare alone. This claim is analogous to Temkin’s ‘capped 
model’ for comparing moral ideals, although it can be applied to very different kinds of good than 
those of Temkin’s model. On this view, it is not the case that the value of some good can exceed 
the maximum possible value for another, including welfare. Rather, any population that is already 
very good in all respects would lose more overall value from a significant loss of value in one 
respect (e.g. a reduction in the enjoyment of the best things in life) than it would gain from any 
increase in any of the others – because its value with respect to these other features is already 
close to its maximum bound. 
Tyler Cowen does not pursue any of these responses and, in replying to his own argument, rejects 
the idea of placing an upper bound on the total value of welfare as a whole. One reason he gives 
for this that he believes that adding an extra very happy life to a population is always very good 
and that we should not accept a view that implies that this value diminishes to almost nothing, 
even for very large populations. Similarly, Cowen objects to the idea that the lives of presently 
existing people might have less value if we discovered that there were a greater number of positive 
welfare lives in the universe than we had previously thought, for instance, if we discovered happy 
civilisations on other planets.  
Instead, he proposes a fourth kind of response, that we place an upper bound merely on the 
contribution that barely worth living lives can make to a population (Cowen (2004) 84). This 
implies that if we know that our lives are barely worth living then we should accept that our lives 
matter less if it turned out that there were aliens on other worlds living barely worth living than if 
there were not, but that so long as our lives are ‘very happy’ then this will not be the case. 
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Cowen accepts that a view such as this implies that there is some kind of discontinuity between 
the value of barely worth living lives and lives at higher welfare levels. However, he argues that 
this implication is not so hard to accept. He suggests that the bound that we place on the value of 
certain lives might increase with their welfare level, so that there is no sharp point of discontinuity 
but merely an exponential increase in the upper bound on the value that such lives can add to a 
population. Cowen defends this claim on the grounds that different moral ideal are satisfied by the 
existence of different kinds of life. He uses the moral importance of ‘civilisation’ as an example of 
this, arguing that when we consider many barely worth living lives together we conclude that they 
may not be as morally important as we believed them to be individually, but that advanced 
civilisations and their very happy lives retain a special value, regardless of how plentiful they 
become (Cowen (2004) 91). 
My non-simple axiology has some similarities with Cowen’s proposal, not least in arguing that 
there are important discontinuities between the moral ideals we appeal to when evaluating 
different kinds of life. However, my view implies that these discontinuities emerge because of 
differences in the composition of these lives and the people who live them, rather than differences 
in the lives as such. I find this view more compelling than Cowen’s, for instance I am dubious 
about Cowen’s argument that none of the parts of a very happy life should diminish in value when 
considered as part of a very happy population. Should we really treat the parts of these lives that 
live up to and exemplify what makes these lives special in the same way as the parts of these lives 
that are perfectly normal? The fact that I enjoy drinking cups of tea does not seem so important 
when I consider the enjoyment millions of others receive from the same activity. The fact that I 
am capable of the degree of reflection required both to value the pursuit of knowledge and 
progress and to work on some of the most interesting philosophical problems of my age does not. 
This kind of good, since it reflects the attainment of objective value within ones life, does not 
diminish, I believe, even when placed against millions of other people reflectively working 
towards their own highest aims and ideals. However, why should the fact that I sometimes engage 
in the pursuit of excellence, such as philosophy or virtue, tend to increase the value of my 
enjoyment ordinary pleasures, such as tea drinking? 
I therefore believe that the best way to construct a satisfactory population axiology would be to 
combine the kind of theory I have proposed here with an upper bound on the value of welfare, so 
that as the total quantity of welfare in a population increases it will approach, but never exceed, 
the value of some quantity of the kinds of good that I have advocated in the previous chapter. Such 
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a theory can replicate most of the good features of Cowen’s response and be even better in some 
respects. However, I am aware of its downsides as well. One of these, as Cowen points out, is that 
if we bound the value of welfare, but leave the value of suffering unbounded then our theory will 
imply Parfit’s Absurd Conclusion. I have discussed this problem in the previous chapter and I 
conclude that the absurd conclusion need not bother us if we take the possibility that the value of 
a life depends on more than its welfare level, however others may not be so persuaded. For this 
reason I believe that the most acceptable claim would proably be that there is an upper bound to 
the value of all morally important features of a population – relative to the value of all the other 
morally important features at least. 
Other claims about how we should value the total quantity of welfare remain viable however, and 
my aim in this section is not to endores any of these claims in particular, but merely to point out 
the necessity of accepting one of them if our non-simple population axiology is to avoid Cowen’s 
result and escape the Effective Repugnant Conclusion. I believe that in this respect simple and 
non-simple population axiologies perform roughly equally. However, I now intend to show why 
non-simple axiologies perform much better than simple axiologies at escaping the impossibility 
results of chapter 1.  
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4.3 Resolving the impossibility results using a non-simple 
population axiology 
A non-simple population axiology that attributes additional value to egalitarian goods, enjoyment of the 
best things in life and avoiding suffering and that accepts one of the three views about the value of positive 
welfare from the previous section can escape the impossibility results of population axiology. I show that 
this is the case for one of these results, the Three-Way Paradox. 
I think that the special ability that a non-simple population axiology has to escape the 
impossibility results of chapter 1 is most clearly illustrated in cases that do not involve a spectrum 
argument. 
Let us return to Result 2 from the previous chapter. This result involved ordering populations of 
the following four types: 
 
Figure 15: The Three Way Paradox 
Population A represents a large population at a very high welfare level. Population B represents a 
larger population at an even higher welfare level but with one single individual at a negative 
welfare level. Population C contains the same-sized group at a higher welfare level, but instead of 
a single individual at a negative welfare level, this population also contains an even larger number 
of people at a low positive welfare level. Population D is the same size as population C, but 
everyone in population D is at a welfare level slightly higher than that of the worst-off in C. 
As we saw in chapter 1, there are intuitively plausible conditions that no simple axiology, applied 
to this set of populations, could mutually satisfy without producing a contradiction. From this 
result, we can conclude that no satisfactory simple population axiology is possible. 
The standard response to this problem, set out in the first section of this chapter, is to claim that 
at least one of these conditions does not hold at all and that a population axiology that violates 
that condition is still a satisfactory population axiology. It follows that if we can find out which 
condition that is, we can order these populations using the conditions we retain and discover 
which is best. 
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In this case, we might reject one of these conditions for the following three reasons: 
Firstly, we could reject the Quality Condition; this implies we hold some sort of Total Utilitarian 
view and would produce the order D > C > B > A. 
Secondly, we could reject the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition; this implies that we hold some 
form of anti-egalitarian perfectionism and would produce the order C > B > A > D. 
Thirdly, we could reject the Non-Sadism Condition; this implies that we accept some form of 
egalitarian pluralism and would produce the order B > A > D > C. 
In addition to the reasons I have already given for believing that this kind of response is inferior to 
my own in several respects, I have two further problems with rejecting any of these conditions. 
Firstly, I am not convinced that we have enough information in this case to identify which of the 
populations is uniquely best. I accept that there are good reasons to doubt the various conditions 
that imply this result. However, it seems to me that none of my intuitions in this case is more 
suspect than the others. I find this concerning. I cannot share the confidence of those who argue 
that one of these intuitions is definitely incorrect. I also cannot accept that if any of these 
intuitions mistaken then this does not cast doubt on the intuitions that lie behind the other 
conditions as well. 
Secondly, I am concerned that whichever set of conditions we choose to reject in this case it seems 
that there is no doubt that B is at least as good as A. I agree that there are good reasons for holding 
that B is indeed better than A (it has a larger population, almost all of which lives at a higher 
welfare level). However, if we do have a reason, as I suggested we should, to give priority to the 
value of bad things such as suffering then there might be cases in which we would not accept that 
B > A. For instance, B might not be at least as good as A when the single individual suffers due to 
one of the worst things in life and the rest of the population benefit, but not because of any 
additional enjoyment of the best things in life.57 
My response in this section will be to give a more flexible solution based upon applying a non-
simple population axiology. Let us then consider how a non-simple axiology evaluates these four 
                                                             
 
57  Giving priority to the value of bad things can also imply that in some cases B is very much better than A. 
For instance, if the difference between the best-off in B and the people in A is that the A-lives endure one 
of the worst things in life and the worst-off person in B suffers from many things that are somewhat bad, 
but none of the worst things in life, then there will be more, and worse, suffering in B than in A. 
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sets of lives. These four populations have certain positive and negative features that a non-simple 
population axiology might evaluate as follows: 
If we hold a non-simple population axiology then these features imply, via reasonable 
assumptions about the deep connections between the distribution of welfare and other goods, the 
relative quantities of different kinds of goods (and their value from certain perspectives) across 
these four populations. 
Let us begin by comparing populations A and D. A has the lowest total quantity of welfare and D 
has the highest (in fact there is no limit on how much more welfare D might have compared with 
A). Therefore if the value of welfare can trump other values it seems that D must be better than A. 
However, if that is not the case then the relative value of A and D remains unknown. There may be 
other facts about these two populations that imply that A is better than D. 
One fact that makes a key difference to our evaluation of A and D is that the very high welfare lives 
in A must contain some of the best things in life whilst the barely worth living lives in D must 
either contain none of the best things in life or contain bad things such as suffering and 
frustration. 
Both A and D are perfectly equal; however, it does not necessarily follow that both have an equal 
quantity of the egalitarian goods. On the one hand, since D is a larger population than A, it may 
contain proportionately more of these goods. On the other hand, it may also be the case that the 
people being equally well off represents a different distribution of egalitarian goods to people 
being equally badly off, for instance because it suggests that these people are not all members of a 
flourishing society. Finally, as we shall see, either population may be a population with a perfectly 
equal distribution of welfare that nevertheless lacks the egalitarian goods completely, e.g. because 
it represents a ‘war of all against all’.  
Now, let us compare populations A and B. Leaving aside the relative quantity of happiness as a 
whole in the two populations, B will be better than A so long as the N2 people living at a higher 
welfare level in B enjoy no less of the best things in life than the N1 people at a high welfare level 
 A B C D 
Positive N1 people at a high 
welfare level 
Perfect equality 
N2 people at a higher 
welfare level 
N2 people at a higher 
welfare level 
Highest quantity of 
welfare 
Perfect equality 
Negative Lowest quantity of 
welfare 
Some inequality 
Some bad lives 
Lots of inequality 
N3 people at a low 
welfare level 
N2+N3 people at a 
low welfare level 
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in A and neither the badness of the single life at a negative welfare level in B, nor the inequality in 
this population, trumps this additional value.58 This is because the value of this extra enjoyment 
would cancel out the combined badness of the suffering and inequality brought about by adding a 
single life at a negative welfare level. Note that, since this life is at a negative welfare level, it 
cannot be the result of mere addition. It follows that the Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition 
holds in this case subject to the further fact that the value of the additional good things in life in B 
is at least as great as that of any additional bad things and any reduction in the quantity of 
egalitarian goods in B. 
Let us now consider populations B and C. Again, population C will be better than population B if 
its inequality does not represent a further loss of egalitarian goods and/or it does not have a 
considerably greater quantity of bad things in its lives. This would seem to be the case if the N3 
people at a lower welfare level are the result of ‘mere addition’. Again, this is a reasonable 
assumption, especially if it we specify that these extra lives in C are the result of mere addition. 
Finally, let us consider populations C and D. Once again leaving aside the value of the total 
quantity of welfare let us ask: if it is true that C > B > A then what would have to be true for D to 
be better than C? The answer is that the loss of the enjoyment of the best things in life from 
exchanging N2 people at a higher welfare level for N2 people at a low welfare level would have to 
be no greater than the benefit, in terms of equality and the reduction in the quantity of bad things, 
from exchanging N3 people at a low welfare level for N3 people at a slightly higher welfare level.  
However, if it were the case that C > B > A then, as we have just seen, it must also be the case that 
the combined badness of the inequality and bad things in C is no greater than that in B and that 
the badness of inequality and bad things in B is less than the goodness of exchanging N2 people at 
a high welfare level for N2 people at a higher welfare level.  
Given these facts D can be no better than C since these are precisely the same circumstances 
under which we would have no reason to believe that D is no better than C. We can therefore 
conclude that, in this case, it is worth sacrificing the greater quantity of welfare as a whole in D for 
the greater quantity of the best things in life and/or the lesser quantity of suffering in A. However, 
these circumstances, which are simply the result of reasonable assumptions about the populations 
A, B, C and D, are nevertheless exceptional and violate some of the deep and meaningful 
                                                             
 
58  This is a reasonable assumption to make, although as I have argued I do not believe it is necessarily true 
for any two populations like A and B. 
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connections between the value of the best things in life and the benefits to be gained through a 
more equal distribution of welfare. Under these exceptional circumstances, the Non-Anti-
Egalitarian Condition no longer binds us, i.e. we have sufficient reason to believe that, in this case, 
an equal distribution of a greater quantity of welfare really is worse because it involves either a 
loss of the best things in life or an increase in the quantity of bad things. The further implication 
that I believe explains this discrepancy is that this loss indicates to us that the composition of 
people in populations C and D has fundamentally changed and that this implies either a 
significant increase in the quantity of moral complaints or a significant loss of psychological 
connections.  
Under these circumstances, there is no longer any contradiction in our intuitive moral 
judgements. If the features that justify our preference for C over B, B over A and A over D are 
present, then we are in one of the rare and exceptional circumstances under which we are no 
longer justified in our view that D is no worse than C. It would follow that, given these 
circumstances; D is the worst population, then A then B with C as the best.  
Of course, this represents only one case, illustrating one exceptional set of circumstances. There 
are other circumstances under which D is better than C. For instance, if the value of the best 
things in life enjoyed in C were not so great or the badness of its inequality were higher. Under 
these circumstances, however, one of the other conditions that frame this result will not hold. It 
might be that C will not be at least as good as B because the inequality and suffering created by 
adding many people at a low welfare level is worse than that of adding a single life at a negative 
welfare level. Alternatively, it might be that B will not be at least as good as A because adding that 
single life at a negative welfare level creates inequality and suffering that are so bad as to outweigh 
the goodness of increasing the welfare level of N2 people from a high to a higher welfare level. 
If, however, the conditions under which D is better than C, C is better than B and B is better than 
A all hold then it seems that the people in A do not enjoy the best things in life to such an extent 
that this adds significantly to the value of A. This implies that the increase in the total quantity of 
welfare, together with the value of any additional egalitarian goods in population D, can 
reasonably outweigh the value of the best things in life enjoyed by the members of population A. 
One of these exceptional circumstances must be the case given the populations under 
consideration. However, since we do not have any information about the relative quantities of the 
best things in life, bad things or egalitarian goods in these populations we can have no way of 
knowing which of these possible circumstances it might be. Furthermore, the kind of non-simple 
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population axiology I am considering, and that I believe reflect our intuitions most closely, does 
not imply that any one of these orderings has to be correct. Whether A, B, C or D is truly the best 
population is simply not a question we can answer given the information we have available. 
However, in the absence of this information we can and do rely on some reasonable assumptions 
about the distribution of welfare in each population that reflect the deep and meaningful 
connections between these distributions and other goods. This in no way detracts from the fact 
that each assumption expresses a merely contingent truth and, given the exceptional nature of the 
populations under consideration, that they imply contradictory facts about these populations. 
We assume that since people in A enjoy a very high quality of life, the value of their lives is 
significantly increased by their containing many of the best things in life. We assume that since 
most people in B live lives that are better than those of the people in A and that only one person 
has a life that is bad, the value of these lives is not less than that of those in A. We assume that the 
lives in C can be no worse than those in B and that C's inequality represents no great loss of 
egalitarian goods because there are many more people in C who all have lives worth living and 
there are exactly the same number of people in C enjoying exactly the same very high quality of 
life as in B. We assume that since there are the same number of people in D as in C, but that they 
are all equally well off, then the increase in the quantity of egalitarian goods, together with the 
increase in the total quantity of welfare, means that D can be no worse than C. Finally, we assume 
that, since people in D live lives at a low welfare level, then even though D contains much more 
welfare than C it will contain no more of the egalitarian goods and either many fewer of the best 
things in life or many more bad things, so that D is worse than A.  
One of these assumptions must be false and this is what creates the impossibility result. Indeed, 
when we set out the assumptions we are working on it is clear that they themselves imply the 
contradiction, but we simply have no information to tell which of them is at fault. Hence, the 
impossibility result remains a genuine puzzle to us and one that defies any simple solution. 
If we redescribed these populations in terms of the contributory value of their lives then the fact of 
the Repugnant Conclusion would imply that the combined contributory value of the lives in A is 
higher than that in D, no matter how many lives there are in D, for instance because contributory 
value cannot be expressed on a linier scale. One reason this might be the case, as I argued in the 
previous section, would be if the contributory value of a sufficient quantity of the best things in 
life, in the absence of significant quantities of bad things, was greater than that of any amount of 
welfare. If therefore simply follows that either the contributory value of the lives in B will be lower 
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than that in A, despite mostly being at a higher welfare level, or the additional lives in C will have 
negative contributory value, because of the bad things they contain, or the lives in D must have a 
lower contributory value than the lives in C. This fact becomes trivial, although the precise 
relationship between such contributory values and the features of these populations remains 
highly significant. My attempts to explain this relationship in these last two chapters are meant 
only as a first try. 
Before continuing, I shall simply state my belief that it is reasonably straightforward to construct 
similar explanations for the other impossibility results I mentioned in chapter 1. However, doing 
so would add little to my argument and a great many words to this thesis. I shall therefore, in the 
best tradition of verbose philosophers, ‘leave it as an exercise to the reader’.  
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4.4 Non-simple population axiologies and other approaches to 
population ethics 
This result builds on the work of others and I argue that its main contribution to solving the puzzles of 
population ethics is to provide a normative justificiation for certain axiological models that have been 
formulated by Teru Thomas and Eric Carlson, and to show how they can be extended. 
The solution I have sketched to the impossibility results in population axiology in the last two 
chapters is novel. As far as I am aware it is the first attempt to justify the claim that the value of a 
life may depend upon more than the welfare level of that life, even when we invoke a ceteris 
paribus clause. However I nevertheless believe that I am merely building upon the work of others 
in this respect, and I will now aim to put my theory in its appropriate context. 
As I sketched in section 4.2, I believe that my arguments share a common intuition with Tyler 
Cowen’s response to the Repugnant Conclusion. Cowen correctly diagnosed the necessity of not 
only denying the truth of Total Utilitarianism, but also advocating the value of some other good as 
being of equal or greater worth to any amount of utility if we are to avoid the Repugnant 
Conclusion. I agree with Cowne’s assessment that whilst we do not wish to accept the Repugnant 
Conclusion, we do wish to value the total quantity of welfare, or at least not to give a zero credence 
to the possibility of its being valuable. Cowen therefore argues that we must establish an upper 
bound to the value of total utility relative to some other good and he tentatively suggests the value 
of ‘civilizaiton’ as playing this role. What Cowen’s account fails to provide is why we might believe 
that civilization has a value such as this and why  we cannot simply remove the effect of such 
values from our judgements by using a ceteris paribus clause. Cowen is not alone in feeling that 
there may be something more at stake in the Repugnant Conclusion than merely the correct way 
to aggregate the value of lifetime wellbeing and I hope that my theory has helped to provide a 
more robust defence of the view that this is so. I do not pretend to have completed this task, for 
instance I suspect that what is really at stake in the Repugnant Conclusion may indeed be 
something like ‘civilization’, which is a non-seperable and emergent good that arises from 
complexes of perfectionist and egalitarian goods across large populations, but I hope at least to 
have made a start. 
As I discussed in section 2.2 I also believe that my theory shares intuitions with that proposed by 
Derek Parfit. Parfit has argued that we cannot determine a precise value for populations from the 
welfare levels of its lives. He argues that this represents a deep normative imprecision, most likely 
the result of a lack of precise comparisons that can be made between the various values, such as 
welfare and perfectionist good, that may be present in a population. Whilst I believe that Parfit is 
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correct that the value of a population cannot be precisely determined in the way he suggests I 
argue that he has not done enough to justify his conclusion that this is a result of deep normative 
imprecision. Of course this does not mean tat we can easily make precise comparisons between 
the value of populations, and such comparisons may be practically impossible. However, I suspect 
that much of the imprecision Parfit alludes to stems from epistemic failures, rather than from 
deep moral facts about the value of populations. My hope is that even if normative imprecision 
cannot be entirely eliminated from our axiology, my hope is that by understanding what the 
values that we trade off when we compare different populations are we can greatly reduce it. 
My theory resolves the puzzles of population axiology in a way that is similar to, but not identical 
with, Parfit’s theory. Parfit argues that we can say that A is no better than B and B is no better 
than Z because A and B and B and C are imprecisely equal in value, and that this therefore does 
not contradict our conclusion that A is better than Z. I have argued that we can say that A is no 
better than B and B is no better than Z because for every A there is at least one B, and for every B 
there is at least one Z, such that this is correct, without this implying that there is any Z that is 
better than any A. Whilst on first glance these two proposals may appear to be two different 
solutions, I suspect that at heart they are very similar at heart. For instance, if it turned out that it 
were not possible to disaggregate between different As, Bs and Zs based upon the kinds of goods 
that they contained, or if it turned out that our ability to make comparisons between the value of 
these goods really was as limited as Parfit suggests, then I believe that my theory would collapse 
into offering Parfit’s solution to these puzzles. 
The theory I have advanced here is also closely connected to two recent proposals in population 
axiology that I have not discussed so far, produced by Teru Thomas and Erik Carlson. Both of 
these theories rely on the concept of a sharp cutoff between two welfare levels, such that if one life 
is above this cutoff and another below it then the difference between the two lives will never be 
‘slight’. 
Thomas begins his consideration by comparing various impossibility results in population 
axiology with sorties paradoxes. He argues that rather than considering these results as 
arguments concerning the value of particular populations it might be better to understand them 
as concerning the properties of welfare levels. In particular, Thomas introduces the concept of we 
welfare level being ‘G’, where this implies that a sufficient number of lives at this welfare level is 
better than a very large number of lives at a very high welfare level, such as those in population A 
(Thomas (forthcoming) 9). 
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Thomas argues that in this case result 1 can be reinterpreted along the following lines. The 
Quantity Condition implies that for any two welfare levels A and B, where the difference between 
A and B is very slight, if A is G then B is G. However the Quality condition implies that whilst very 
high positive welfare levels such as A definitely are G, very low positive welfare levels, such as the 
welfare levels of population Z, definitely are not G. This creates a paradox. 
Thomas attempts to resolve this paradox by applying the standard solution to a sorties paradox, 
what Thomas calls the ‘indeterminacy thesis’. This is the view that whilst A is definitely G and Z is 
definitely not G, certain intermediate welfare levels are indeterminately G, i.e. that they are 
neither definitely G nor definitely not G. In particular Thomas suggests that our belief that any 
particular welfare level is G may decrease with its welfare level (Thomas (forthcoming) 23). 
Thomas likens this to our conviction that a person is tall. There are some hights such at we are 
certain that a person is tall and some heights where we are certain that a person is not tall, but for 
many heights we are unsure, we do not feel that a person is either definitely tall or not tall, 
although we may well believe that if a person at any particular height is tall then somebody who is 
only slightly shorter than them would also be tall. 
The difference between Thomas’s ‘indeterminacy thesis’ and Parfit’s theory of normative 
imprecision is that Thomas believes that there really are sharp cutoffs between welfare levels that 
are G and not G, and that it is only the location of these cutoffs that is indeterminate. Parfit, on 
that other hand, seems to believe that there is no strict cuttoff between higher and lower value 
lives, but only a vague continuum of value. On this point my arguments lead me to agree with 
Thomas’s view. However, I believe that his view could be improved if we did not attribute the 
property of ‘Gness’ to welfare levels alone, but to the combination of welfare levels with certain 
other facts about a life, such as its composition in terms of good and bad welfare components and 
its connectedness, or lack of connectedness, with other lives in a population. 
For instance, Thomas acknowledges that one of the weaknesses of his argument is the difficulty 
we have in believing that such cutoffs exist, in part because their existence would violate the non-
elitism condition (Thomas (forthcoming) 26). Thomas argues that we should accept this 
conclusion and that violating this axiom in somce cases is not as bad as it seems. One reason that 
this might be so is that the cutoff between G and non G welfare levels might represent a significant 
threshold for the people living these lives such as if individuals would much prefer a certain 
chance of having a life above this level to any chance of living a life at a considerably higher level 
combined with some possibility of living a life below this level (Thomas (forthcoming) 29). 
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Another reason why this might be so is if the cutoff between G and non G welfare levels had great 
impersonal significance, for instance if it represented a ‘sufficitarian’ cutoff between lives that 
were good enough and those that were not (Thomas (forthcoming) 30). Thomas suggests that the 
personal view of the significance of sharp cutoffs is implausible, whilst many people have objected 
to the notion of a sufficitarian cutoff between the value of lives on the grounds that there are no 
impersonal values that can justify such a cutoff (Arneson (2000) 56-57, Segall (2015) 48-49). 
A non-simple axiology, such as the theory I have proposed here, allows us to give other kinds of 
justification for why some lives have superior value to others. In particular it allows us to move 
away from the view that our theory makes judgements between different kinds of life. One of the 
things that makes elitism hard to stomach is that two lives may have very different values, even if 
they only differ, in Thomas’s terminology, to the extent of ‘a single grain of chocolate’. Why should 
we view the entirety of one life as being so much more valuable than the entirety of another life 
when they differ in such a small way? It implies that the presence of absence of this grain imbues 
every part of these lives with totally different values. The kind of axiology I have defined here 
however makes no such claim, implying that if one life is of superior value to another than it is 
only the thing that makes these lives different that has this superior value, and not all the other 
aspects of these lives (things that might well be absolutely identical for both lives). I believe that 
this fundamentally alters the objection that a theory is elitist. 
Finally, Erik Carlson has proposed a solution to the puzzles of population ethics based on the 
claim that we cannot produce fine grained and discreet (what Calson calls ‘A discreet’) subset of 
welfare levels. Rather than using this claim to undermine individual axioms of the puzzles of 
population axiology Carlson uses it to undermine the mathematical underpinnings of the 
impossibility results that have been proven so far. Since I have not presented these underpinnings 
I will not discuss the nature of his argument here. I shall instead merely discuss the model Carlson 
offers for how welfare levels might be fine grained and S-descreet (a property that shares some 
features in common with, but does not imply, being A-dexcreet). 
Carlson suggests that welfare levels may not be representable on a numerical scale, but may 
require instead to be represented by ordered pairs of numbers (x,y). He then suggests that welfare 
levels might be ordered along the following lines. For any two welfare levels a (x1,y1) and b (x2, 
y2) : 
1. if x1 is greater than x2 then a is better than b, and is never only ‘slightly better’ than b, 
regardless of how they compare with respect to y 
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2. if x1 is equal to x2 and y1 is greater than y2 then a is better than b, but may be only 
‘slightly’ better if y1 and y2 are similar and  
3. if x1 is equal to x2 and y1 is equal to y2 then a is equal to b. (Carlson (forthcoming) 15-16) 
Carlson does not specify how we should interpret x and y in this model, however it is natural to 
understand them as representing different kinds of welfare component, in which case Carlson’s 
theory becomes a kind of non-simple axiology, albeit one in which some welfare components play 
a dominant role in determining the value of lives over others. 
The problem with this interpretation, as Gustaf Arrhenius has pointed out, is that even if a life 
contains some of the very best welfare components, it might still be at a very low welfare level, e.g. 
one that is comparable in value to a life that contains none of these components, if it also contains 
many bad welfare components. I discussed this issue at length in section 3.3 and concluded that it 
was important, if we gave a special value to very high quality welfare components, that we give a 
similar value to some or all bad welfare components as well. If we do this however then the simple 
ordered pair model of welfare that Carlson presents is no longer viable and we must present 
welfare as the three place vector (x, y, z), furthermore it is no longer possible to claim that any one 
of these components will play a dominant role in establishing the overall value of a life. 
Although this modification of Carlson’s ‘toy model’ greatly increases its complexity, I have tried to 
argue that it is also easier to justify normatively. I hope that my arguments might strengthen his 
claim that some combinations of welfare components defy classification into fine grained yet 
discreet sets of welfare levels and that it might also hep to deal with some of the most obvious 
objections to this emerging view, such Arrhenius’s.  
As with all of the theories I have presented in this section, I do not mean to claim that my theory 
replicates Calson’s far more robust and elegant proofs of how satisfactory population axiologies 
may be possible. I merely wish to illustrate how I see the work of these thesis as potentially 
providing additional support for emerging arguments in the literature on population axiology. I 
hope that my work may help to provide the kind of normative justification that these theories 
sometimes lack, and that by taking the best features from these different theories we can move 
towards a satisfactory theory of population axiology. For the rest, my aim in this thesis has been 
merely to establish that such a theory is possible.  
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4.5 Conclusion of chapter 4 
The aim of this chapter has been simple: to illustrate how a non-simple population axiology can 
give what seems to me to be the ‘right’ kind of response to the impossibility results of population 
ethics. My arguments, however, may at times have appeared more ambitious. I should therefore 
reiterate that I am not trying to claim that a certain kind of non-simple population axiology is 
definitely correct. 
Accepting my arguments means accepting some or all of the following. Firstly, that the 
contributory value of a life is logically distinct from the value of that life for the person living it. 
Secondly, that one way in which this could be done is by taking into account the value of that life 
from alternative perspectives to that of the person living it. Thirdly, that this value cannot simply 
be dismissed using a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause in the way that some other values can. Finally, that 
the value of welfare might be restricted in some way that prevents it from being able to ‘trump’ 
these other values.  
The right kind of answer to the impossibility results in population axiology is one that does not 
imply that any of the populations is uniquely best, regardless of all further facts. Nor does it place 
extreme constraints upon our moral theories or imply that some of our intuitions are clearly 
unreliable whilst the rest are reliable. A non-simple axiology will do none of these things. It 
implies merely that the apparent contradictions in population axiology result from a lack of 
information in the examples used to illustrate it, and the fact that the reasonable assumptions we 
use to provide this information, and so allow us to make ceteris paribus judgements about 
betterness, can themselves lead us to contradictory beliefs about the value of populations. 
That a non-simple population axiology allows us to give the right kind of answer to impossibility 
results in population ethics seems to me to provide strong reasons in its favour, as does the fact 
that they can be used to support some of the best approaches to addressing the problems of 
population axiology currently being proposed, whilst addressing some of their chief weaknesses. 
However, I will offer further reasons in the next chapter. In doing so I will seek to provide a final 
argument against the use of a ceteris paribus clause to deal with the cases I have discussed. To do 
this I will argue that the only successful explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant 
Conclusion relies upon accepting a non-simple population axiology and on the claim that further 
facts about the composition of lives are not equal when comparing any two populations. 
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Chapter 5 – Revisiting the Repugnant Conclusion 
A non-simple population axiology is not only an intuitively compelling means of resolving the puzzle of 
population axiology. It also provides the best explanation for the strength of our moral intuitions about the 
Repugnant Conclusion. 
One reason for accepting the Quality and Weak Quality Conditions is that any theory that violates 
these conditions implies one or both of the following, intuitively very hard to accept, judgements. 
The Repugnant Conclusion:  
― Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very high quality of 
life, there is some much larger number of people whose existence would be better, even though 
these people would all have lives that were barely worth living. (Parfit (Forthcoming) 1) 
The Very Repugnant Conclusion:  
― Compared with the existence of many people who would all have some very high quality of 
life, there is some much larger number of people whose existence would be better, even though 
most of these people would have lives that were barely worth living, and all of the others would 
have lives that would be full of suffering and much worse than nothing. (Parfit (Forthcoming) 2) 
These conclusions have spawned significant literature on two key questions. The first of these is 
how to construct a satisfactory population axiology that does not imply either of these 
conclusions. This has been the subject of the previous four chapters. The second concerns whether 
we should in fact find these conclusions so hard to accept after all. As I explained in chapter 4, I 
agree that this is one way out of the challenges involved in finding a satisfactory population 
axiology, but I do not believe it is the right way. 
In this chapter, I will consider a third question, one that seems to have been substantially 
overlooked. What is it about these conclusions that is very hard to accept? What is it about the two 
populations involved in each case that makes us so sure that one is better than the other that we 
find it very hard to accept any moral theory that implies otherwise? To put this question more 
directly: ‘What is it about the Repugnant and Very Repugnant Conclusions that is the source of 
their repugnance?’ 
Before I go on to address this question directly I will set out how it relates to the two other 
questions about the Repugnant and Very Repugnant Conclusions and why it is worth considering 
as a question in its own right. 
Firstly, in relation to whether or not we should ‘accept’ the Repugnant Conclusion (i.e. reject or 
revise those intuitions which make us find theories that imply this judgement very hard to accept) 
it seems vital to first consider what it is that we are rejecting by doing so. If there were strong 
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reasons to retain the intuitions that lie behind the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion, then 
this would give us extra reason not to accept theories that imply it, since doing so could have 
profound implications for our other moral judgements. On the other hand, if there is no good 
reason why we should retain these intuitions then it seems far safer to accept these theories. 
Doing so will imply violating only a few isolated intuitions and carry no further implications. 
Secondly, in relation to how we can ‘escape’ the Repugnant Conclusion (i.e. produce a satisfactory 
population axiology that does not violate the Quality and Weak Quality Conditions), it seems 
equally vital to know what intuitions such theories need to incorporate. The fact that it seems 
almost impossible to avoid the Repugnant and Very Repugnant Conclusions without violating 
several other intuitively plausible conditions suggests that these intuitions are connected (see 
section 1.2.4). Without considering why it is that we find it hard to accept the Repugnant (and 
Very Repugnant) Conclusion, we do not even know if it is for the same or different reasons as we 
want to accept the other conditions presented in chapter 1. It is hard to see how we could possibly 
try to incorporate such reasons into our moral theories without first discovering what they are and 
how, if at all, the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology are related to one another. 
My investigation into why we find it very hard to accept theories that imply the Repugnant or Very 
Repugnant Conclusion will take the following form. I will begin by considering the most sceptical 
solution, namely that there is no good reason why we find it hard to accept the Repugnant and 
Very Repugnant Conclusions, but that we simply have some intuitions that these judgements are 
wrong. I submit that this explanation is possible, although I argue that it will inevitably lead us to 
the view that the Repugnant Conclusion is not repugnant and that we should have no difficulty 
accepting theories that imply it. After this, I will consider what seems to be the simplest solution: 
we find it hard to accept these conclusions because we are Average Utilitarians. I will show how 
this solution is deeply flawed, even if we take reasonable steps to try to improve it. I will do this by 
illustrating cases in which this explanation suggests we should find it very hard to accept theories 
that imply certain other conclusions when this is clearly not the case. Next, I will consider a more 
sophisticated approach to solving this problem, by systematically considering possible 
explanations for why it is hard to accept any moral theory that implies the Repugnant or More 
Repugnant Conclusions and that draws on a simple axiological theory. I shall aim to show how 
none of these solutions seems any better than the sceptical solution. Finally, however, I shall show 
how some of the failings of these solutions that have been exposed by my analysis point to the 
possibility that the real answer to this question can only be appreciated if we accept a non-simple 
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population axiology.  
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5.1 Is the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion explained 
by a ‘bare intuition’? – The sceptical solution 
One explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is that we have a specific intuition 
against that judgement, and nothing else. I reject this response on the grounds that if we can find no better 
explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion then this severely undermines the support for 
this intuition given the impossibility results of population ethics.  
The first possibility we should consider is that there is no further explanation for why we find 
moral theories that imply the Repugnant Conclusion very hard to accept. This implies that we 
merely have some intuition that when comparing two populations where one has ‘many people 
who would all have some very high quality of life’ and the other has ‘some much larger number of 
people who all have lives that were barely worth living’, the second population cannot be better 
than the first. 
One proponent of this sort of explanation is Michael Huemer. He has argued that our attitude 
towards the Repugnant Conclusion is based upon a single ‘unrepugnant intuition’.59 He further 
claims that this is “a ‘bare’ intuition, lacking significant support from other intuitions, and lacking 
a satisfactory theoretical explanation” (Huemer (2008) 907). However, it should be noted that 
Huemer does not in fact provide any argument to back up this claim. Such a view may in part be 
appealing because, as I noted above, the question of why we find theories that imply the 
Repugnant Conclusion very hard to accept has not been properly addressed, creating the 
impression that no satisfactory explanation is possible. 
I term this kind of response the ‘sceptical solution’ for two reasons. The first of these is that it 
represents a view that is sceptical about the possibility of explaining the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion. It is also sceptical, I will argue, in that it is the view that lends itself most 
to the sceptical view that it is not repugnant after all. 
Huemer’s argument 
Huemer argues that we should accept the Repugnant Conclusion and reject or revise our 
‘unrepugnant intuition’. He argues that we should reject or revise ‘bare’ intuitions such as this 
under the following circumstances: 
1 – The intuition conflicts with other firm and widely shared intuitions 
                                                             
 
59  This term is somewhat confusing but I shall use it in this section since it is Huemer’s own term for the 
intuition and it is his theory I intend to discuss in this section. 
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2 – There is a plausible error theory that can explain why the intuition may be mistaken 
3 – There are multiple lines of argument against the intuition and 
4 – There is a good theoretical explanation for the contrary view (Huemer (2008) 907) 
In the case of the ‘unrepugnant’ intuition, he argues that all of these are true. It is not my 
intention to challenge any of these arguments but to explore their implications for our intuitions 
more generally. I will therefore present only a very brief summary of these arguments. 
Firstly, that the ‘unrepugnant’ intuition conflicts with other intuitions is clear from the results of 
chapter 1. Each of the conditions that I mentioned in chapter 1 is intuitively plausible and these 
intuitions are both firm and widely shared.60 Furthermore, as I have illustrated, the Quality 
Condition is inconsistent with many subgroups of these intuitions. In fact, my own results show 
that the conflict between the intuitions behind the Repugnant Conclusion and our other intuitions 
is deeper than Huemer believes. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I have shown that it covers 
a wider set of intuitively plausible conditions than he considers. Secondly, I have shown that it is 
not possible to revise or reject just one of these intuitions; rather, we must reject several if we are 
to retain the intuitions that lie behind the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. 
Secondly, Huemer suggests a number of plausible error theories that might explain why we have 
the unrepugnant intuition. People have a weakness when it comes to compounding many small 
values together when considering large populations. People are prone to two types of error: firstly, 
they fail to appreciate the real size of very large numbers and secondly they fail to compound very 
small numbers correctly. 
Thirdly, Huemer advances multiple lines of argument against the ‘unrepugnant intuition’, i.e. he 
argues that we should reject this intuition and accept theories that imply the Repugnant 
Conclusion. He points to the fact that no otherwise satisfactory population axiology can avoid it, 
which is a further consequence of the impossibility results of chapter 1. He also argues that when 
evaluating each population in the Repugnant Conclusion we may be biased by considering only 
the value of the lives that we produce, and not the counterfactual value we lose by not bringing 
into existence the alternative population. Finally, he argues that the value of average welfare 
                                                             
 
60  They may not be so widely shared amongst most people as they are amongst certain philosophers. 
However, they are at least as well supported as the intuitions behind the Quality Condition and the 
Repugnant Conclusion. 
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should be equivalent to that of population size, so that if we value either of these we cannot 
justifiably ignore the value of the other and must therefore accept a totalist view of the value of 
welfare. It is therefore irrational, he claims, if we value welfare at all, not to value the total 
quantity of welfare in a population. 61 
Finally, he offers one further argument against the unrepugnant intuition, which he also sees as 
producing a natural theoretical explanation for the contrary view. This is based upon the claim 
that lives with positive welfare are good and make the world better, so that it is always better if 
there are more such lives than if there are fewer, and by adding such lives we could produce any, 
arbitrarily large, value. This is what Parfit refers to as ‘the simple view’ (Parfit (Forthcoming) 1). 
I am willing to accept Huemer’s arguments in favour of points 1 to 4 and I agree with his claim 
that these points together give us strong reason to reject or revise any bare intuition that lacks 
‘significant support from other intuitions’ or any ‘satisfactory theoretical explanations’. I therefore 
believe that if the reason we find theories that imply the Repugnant Conclusion very hard to 
accept is that we have a single bare intuition of the Repugnant Conclusion’s repugnance (the 
‘unrepugnant’ intuition) then we have good reason to reject or revise this intuition. 
However, I do not believe that we should accept this explanation precisely because I do not agree 
with Huemer that we have good reason to reject or revise this intuition. As I have argued before, I 
do not see the rejection of the conditions that produce the impossibility results in chapter 1, or any 
of the intuitions that produce and support them, as the correct solution to these results. This 
includes the ‘unrepugnant intuition’. Two of my reasons for believing this have direct relevance to 
Huemer’s argument. 
First objection – Huemer’s argument undermines too many intuitions 
Accepting Huemer’s arguments about the ‘unrepugnant’ intuition could have very profound 
effects for our other intuitions about population axiology. 
Huemer does not even consider whether other intuitions we have about the relative value of 
populations are equally strong candidates for rejection or alteration. Huemer does make 
arguments for why some of the other intuitions in population axiology (the Dominance Addition 
Condition and Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition) are not bare intuitions; however, these are not 
                                                             
 
61  I will not present these arguments here, since they are hard to summarise and have little bearing on the 
points I am making. 
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convincing.  
Huemer’s argument that the Dominance Addition Condition is not based on a bare intuition is as 
follows:  
― if, from the standpoint of self-interest, x would rationally be preferred to y by every being who 
would exist in either x or y, then x is better than y (Huemer (2008) 914) 
This argument relies on claims about the modal features of lives that would not be true for distinct 
populations, i.e. claims about the value of possible lives for the people who might live them. 
Hence, this argument is not applicable in the cases under consideration here, in which nobody 
exists in both populations in any sense.  
Huemer’s argument that the Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition is not based on a bare intuition is 
similarly weak. He merely presents a large number of axiological theories, for which he provides 
no further justification, all of which support this condition. This would only count in favour of the 
view that this intuition had strong theoretical support if at least one of these theories were 
satisfactory. However, each of these theories implies violating our intuitions to a greater or lesser 
extent so that none of them can escape the impossibility results I set out in chapter 1. This gives us 
good reason to believe that none of these theories are satisfactory and therefore that they do not 
provide strong theoretical support for this intuition. 
Had Huemer’s arguments for these conditions been stronger, then even if the intuitions behind 
them had been strong candidates for rejection or revision, we might still have had reason to retain 
them. Furthermore, since these conditions come from two of the three groups of conditions that I 
showed in chapter 1 might allow us to escape the impossibility results of that chapter this would 
have given us some reason to reject the conditions in the final group. These intuitions rule out 
perfectionism and pluralist egalitarian moral theories respectively and therefore give us good 
reason to accept a position like Total Utilitarianism, which is the position defended by Huemer.  
Instead, the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology seem roughly equivalent to one 
another in terms of the strength of their theoretical support and the degree to which they support 
one another. Each of these conditions is consistent with many different moral theories and 
violates only one or two of our intuitions. I therefore do not accept that we can differentiate 
between these conditions based on the bareness of the intuitions they appear to rest on. 
Furthermore, Huemer’s points 1–4 can also apply to the intuitions that lie behind many or all of 
these other conditions. As the impossibility results in chapter 1 show, all of these intuitions 
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conflict with many other widely and firmly held conditions, and hence with the moral theories and 
intuitions that support them. Furthermore, no satisfactory population axiology can accommodate 
any reasonable subset of these conditions without violating at least some of the others. It is not 
hard to construct an error theory to explain away any of these intuitions, nor to construct a sound 
moral theory for any of the alternative points of view. The history of population ethics is testament 
to the equal fallibility of all of these conditions and the intuitions that support them. 
For instance, whilst I have not evaluated Huemer’s arguments for points 3 and 4 (that there are 
multiple lines of argument against the ‘unrepugnant intuition’ and good theoretical support for 
the alternative points of view), these arguments rely on the axioms of Total Utilitarianism. As we 
have seen, however, utilitarianism is not the only theory we might want to consider. There are also 
good theoretical reasons to violate other conditions for a satisfactory population axiology, such as 
perfectionism or egalitarian pluralism, and these theories rely on very different axioms. However, 
Huemer gives us no good reason for why we should accept the axioms of Total Utilitarianism 
rather than the axioms of any of these other theories. 
This leaves Huemer’s point 2: that there is a plausible error theory that can explain the mistakes 
we make when judging the Repugnant Conclusion to be very hard to accept. I accept that our 
inability to compound small values across large sets is well attested and that it represents one 
possible cause of repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. However, there are other plausible 
error theories that could explain the mistakes we make when intuitively judging other intuitions. 
Many of the cases in population axiology involve populations of various sizes and welfare levels 
that are significantly different to one another in critical respects. Some of them contain ill-defined 
concepts, such as equality, and others contain concepts that may or may not be understood to 
imply certain modal features of the lives involved, such as mere addition. As I have argued in 
chapter 3, there may be diverse perspectives within a population that affect our judgements about 
the relative value of populations. We must therefore use reasonable assumptions to evaluate the 
goodness of a population from these perspectives alongside its value from the perspective of the 
people in it. If the reasoning that supports the intuitions that lie behind the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is open to error then I do not think it can be distinguished in this respect, 
in kind at least, from many other intuitions in population axiology. I therefore see little reason 
why any of the conditions I have mentioned could not be undermined on the grounds that we 
make such mistakes when evaluating populations. 
If the intuitions that support all the conditions for a satisfactory population axiology are bare 
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intuitions, and if, in the presence of Huemer’s points 1–4 above, we have good reason to reject or 
revise such intuitions, then it seems we have good reason to reject or revise these other intuitions 
as well. However, if we rejected all of these intuitions it is hard to see how we could make any 
progress in population axiology at all. I therefore believe that it is up to us to try to find additional 
support for the intuitions in population axiology, either our own or those of others, and not to be 
too quick to suggest that they are bare intuitions in need of revision or rejection.  
Second objection – Huemer’s argument implies the Very Repugnant Conclusion 
If what I have argued here is correct then we have no special reason for rejecting the ‘unrepugnant 
intuition’, and if we accept Huemer’s arguments for doing so then the intuitions behind similar 
conditions are just as vulnerable. However, what if this was not the case and there were no reason 
to reject or revise our other intuitions? It still seems to me that rejecting the unrepugnant 
intuition would be a mistake. If we are to escape the impossibility results of chapter 1 in this way, 
it is not enough to accept the Repugnant Conclusion; we must also accept the Very Repugnant 
Conclusion. The intuitions that lie behind the repugnance of the Very Repugnant Conclusion are 
no less vulnerable to Huemer’s points against the Repugnant Conclusion. However, this is a very 
unattractive position to take. Having to accept the Very Repugnant Conclusion is the kind of 
extreme moral position that simple axiologies designed to escape the results of chapter 1 often 
imply; however, I think most of us would want to avoid such positions. Instead, we should be 
trying to find a way of incorporating as many of our intuitions as possible and not rejecting any of 
them outright. This is my second reason for not accepting the sceptical solution. 
The implications of the sceptical solution for population ethics 
If we accept, as I do, that Huemer’s points 1 to 4 give us good reason to reject or revise any bare 
intuition, that compelling arguments can be made in favour of points 1 to 4 with regards to the 
unrepugnant intuition (although these may not be the points Huemer makes) and that we have no 
good reason to reject or revise this intuition then it follows that the repugnance of the Repugnant 
Conclusion cannot be based on any bare intuition. 
Any argument in favour of the sceptical solution must therefore rely on defending one of three 
claims. Firstly, that the Repugnant Conclusion is not repugnant after all (the truly sceptical 
position that Huemer himself supports) with all this may imply about our other moral intuitions 
and the implications we must accept. Secondly, defending the intuition that lies behind the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion against at least one of Huemer’s points 1 to 4, and thus 
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showing that we do not have reasons to revise this particular bare intuition. Finally, arguing that 
Huemer’s points 1 to 4 do not give us good reason to reject or revise bare intuitions, even when 
they all hold. 
If we could defend any one of these claims then the sceptical solution may be a good explanation 
for why we find theories that imply the Repugnant Conclusion very hard to accept. I do not accept 
these claims, and so I do not wish to accept this solution. However, I can find no further argument 
against the sceptical solution. It therefore remains a viable candidate for an explanation of the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. The best reason for holding this view is that no better 
explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion has yet been produced. In the rest of 
this chapter, I will consider whether any better explanation is possible.  
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5.2 Is the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion explained 
by Average Utilitarianism? – The simple solution 
Another explanation of the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is that we intuitively hold some form 
of axiology that provides a contrary judgement. The simplest such axiology would be a form of Average 
Utilitarianism. However, if our sense of repugnance were based upon Average Utilitarian then we should 
find many other judgements repugnant even though these are highly acceptable. 
The Repugnant Conclusion is implied by the following two claims: 
1 – All lives with positive welfare have positive value and make populations that contain them 
better (what Derek Parfit calls ‘the simple view’62). 
2 – The value of all lives can be expressed on a numerical scale and compounded together so that, 
for any given population, there is another population with a greater number of lives with any 
positive value that would be better. (Arrhenius refers to this as the ‘Archimedean Principle’ 
applied to value.) 
Together, these claims violate the Quality Condition and thus imply the Repugnant Conclusion. 
We can therefore explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion by showing that we 
intuitively reject either or both of these claims. For instance, we might intuitively reject the first 
claim, the Simple View, on the grounds that we believe that the addition of a life makes a 
population worse if it lowers that population’s average welfare level, even where that life is at a 
positive welfare level. Let us call this the ‘Average View’. I will refer to this possible explanation of 
the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion as the ‘simple solution’. 
I refer to this as the simple solution because it seems to provide the most straightforward 
explanation. It reflects the view of the Malthusian economists to whom Sidgwick objected and it 
implies one of the most commonly held views with regard to the value of welfare, Average 
Utilitarianism.63 However, my main reason for singling out this potential explanation is not its 
simplicity, but because it provides a clear basis for explaining and testing my methodology for 
evaluating potential explanations of the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. 
Firstly, I want to point out a key difference between the search for an explanation of repugnance 
                                                             
 
62  This view should be contrasted with the criteria for what I have termed a ‘simple axiology’. A simple 
axiology is any axiology where the value of a life is a function of its welfare level and nothing else, and the 
value of a population is the function of the value of the lives it contains and nothing else. 
63  I suggested earlier that Average Utilitarianism is an unacceptable moral theory, even if it is just one 
among a plurality of values. I retain this view here. However, the fact that it is unacceptable does not 
detract from Average Utilitarianism’s intuitive appeal. 
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and the search for a moral theory. If it were the case that we found theories that imply the 
Repugnant Conclusion very hard to accept because we intuitively reject the Simple View in favour 
of the Average View, it does not follow that we need to accept Average Utilitarianism. It is 
perfectly consistent to reject theories like Total Utilitarianism because they violate the Average 
View in extreme cases like the Repugnant Conclusion and yet accept some other theory that does 
not violate the Average View in these cases, but does violate it in other, less extreme, cases. 
Furthermore, I am not arguing that we should always accept our pretheoretical intuitions (we may 
have good reason for not doing so) but that we do still have reason to respect them when they 
imply that a theory is very hard to accept. 
I will now illustrate this point. Even if the correct explanation for the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion were that we intuitively accept the Average View, it need not follow that we 
found it very hard to accept any theory that implies that populations with lower average levels of 
welfare are ever better than those with higher average levels. It is simply that in extreme cases, 
such as the Repugnant Conclusion and cases involving comparable average levels of welfare, we 
should not accept moral theories that violate these intuitions. 
Let us consider the following five populations: 
Population A – 5 billion people at welfare level d (with a value of 50) 
Population B – 25 billion people at welfare level m (with a value of 10) 
Population C – 125 billion people at welfare level n (with a value of 5) 
Population D – 8.6 billion people at welfare level a (with a value of 60), 1.4 billion people at 
welfare level z (with a value of –10) 
Population E – 8.6 billion people at welfare level a (with a value of 60), 121.4 billion people at 
welfare level p (with a value of 1) 
These populations are represented in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 16: Populations A–E for testing the simple solution 
Note that the average value of the lives in each population, and hence the value of that population 
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according to the Average View, is as follows: A = 50, B = 10, C = 5, D = 50.2, E = 4.9. 
The repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion implies that any population of lives at welfare level 
n can never be as good as a sufficiently large population of lives at welfare level d.64 According to 
the Average View, the reason for this is that the population at welfare level d has a value of 50, 
whilst that at level n has a welfare level of 5. I do not think it need follow from this, even for the 
purposes of consistency, that we find it very hard to accept that any population at welfare level m 
(with a value of 10) could be as good as a sufficiently large population of people at welfare level d. 
Nor does it follow that any population at welfare level n could be as good as a sufficiently large 
population of people at welfare level m. This is because we are not considering simply which 
populations are better or worse, but which are morally equivalent to the Repugnant Conclusion 
according to this explanation. 
However, if this were our explanation of the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion then it 
should be equally hard for us to accept that any population with an average welfare level of value 5 
or below, such as E, could ever be as good as a sufficiently larger population of value 50 or above, 
such as D. However, contrary to this claim, it seems much harder to accept the opposite, namely 
that a population like D could be at least as good as a population like E, since this is an example of 
the ‘Sadistic Conclusion’ and violates the Anti-Sadism Condition. Even if we did not find it hard to 
accept any theory that implies that D is better than E (i.e. even if we did not find it hard to accept 
theories that imply the Sadistic Conclusion) it does not follow that we find it hard to accept the 
opposite. In fact, this conclusion appears both reasonable and attractive. Note too that we should 
find it equally hard to accept any theory that implies that E is at least as good as A, but E seems to 
be in many respects better than A. 
There seem to me to be two plausible objections that somebody who wanted to explain the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion by appealing to the Average View might make to this 
argument. Both point to features of this comparison that might neutralise the sense of repugnance 
that we would otherwise feel about it. They might object that the Repugnant Conclusion only 
applies if everybody at the lower welfare level has a life that is worth living or that it only applies if 
the two populations have a perfectly equal distribution of welfare. It may be that in this case we do 
                                                             
 
64  These are not the most extreme welfare levels we might have chosen, but it is not usually claimed that the 
Repugnant Conclusion applies only to cases involving the most extreme levels, only levels that are 
sufficiently high or low. 
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not find it hard to accept that E is better than D because D contains some lives that are not worth 
living or because D is more unequal, due to its wider range of welfare, even though their average 
welfare levels are equivalent to those in the Repugnant Conclusion. 
Firstly, let us note that neither of these features (that D is more unequal than E and includes some 
lives that are not worth living) can apply in comparing populations A and E, since A is clearly 
more equal than E and contains no lives with negative welfare levels. This means that we have no 
further grounds to believe that A is at least as good as E whilst their average welfare levels are 
equivalent to those of the two populations in the Repugnant Conclusion. However, there are those 
who might indeed agree that E is worse than A because of its inequality, and the fact that the 
worst-off people in E are at a much lower welfare level than everyone in A. Therefore, the Average 
View may still be defensible in these cases.65  
I therefore offer the following comparison, which seems to me to be a comprehensive response to 
all of these objections. 
Population F – 14.7 billion people at welfare level c (with a value of 53), 0.9 billion people at 
welfare level p (at a value of 1) 
Population G – 14.7 billion people at welfare level b (with a value of 54), 240.1 billion people at 
welfare level o (at a value of 2) 
 
Figure 17: Populations F and G for testing the simple solution 
The average value of the lives in each population, and hence the value of that population 
according to the Average View, is as follows: F = 50, G = 5. These values are the same as those of 
populations A and C.  
In these two populations, both of the objections to my previous argument have been neutralised. 
                                                             
 
65  In fact, to say that A is better than E would be to violate the Dominance Addition Condition. 
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There is no suffering in F and F is at least as equal in its distribution of welfare as G. The 
proportion of better-off to worse-off in F is the same as that in G, as is the degree to which the 
better-off fare better than the worse-off, indeed many measures of inequality, such as the GINI 
coefficient, would imply that F is better than G with respect to equality. However, the claim that it 
would be very hard to accept any theory that implies that G is better than F is clearly incorrect, for 
the following reasons: 
1 – The worst-off people in G are better off than the worst-off people in F. 
2 – The best-off people in G are better off than the best-off people in F.  
3 – G has many more people with lives worth living than F and nobody with a life that is not worth 
living. 
Given these conditions, I find it implausible that anyone would find it hard to accept a theory for 
the simple reason that it implies that G is at least as good as F. Even if people might also be willing 
to accept theories that imply that F is better than G, it is simply inconceivable to believe that this 
comparison is equivalent to the Repugnant Conclusion. Thus, it seems highly plausible to believe 
that G is better than F, and that a theory would be no harder to accept for implying this. Based on 
this case, and the others I have mentioned, I reject the simple solution that we can explain 
repugnance by appealing to the Average View. 
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5.3 Can the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion be 
explained by other kinds of simple axiology? – The 
sophisticated solution 
There are many other possible explanations for our sense of repugnance based on our supposed intuitive 
support for a simple axiology that provides a contradictory judgement. However, each of these possible 
explanations suffers from the same weakness as the simple solution: they each suggest that we should find 
certain judgements repugnant that we actually find acceptable. As attempts to explain our sense of 
repugnance become more sophisticated, they are better able to pick out only judgements that we find hard 
to accept; however, they also start to push the boundaries of what is possible under a simple population 
axiology. 
It is now possible to begin mapping out what other options are open to us for explaining the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion via a simple axiology. As I noted in the introduction, a 
simple population axiology involves two functions. Firstly, a function that produces a single value 
for each life based upon its welfare level. Secondly, another function that produces a single value 
for a population based upon the value of each life within it. As I noted in the previous section, if 
we are to explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion we must produce an axiology that 
explains our intuitive evaluation of lives without implying both of the following views. Firstly, the 
Simple View, that all lives with positive welfare have positive value and make populations that 
contain them better. Secondly, the Archimedean Principle applied to value, that a set containing a 
sufficiently large number of lives with positive value (and that make it better) can have a value 
greater than any other set of lives. 
It follows that if we are to explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion on the grounds 
that it violates, to a significant degree, the judgements of our intuitive axiology, then this axiology 
must include one of the following claims: 
1 – Some lives with positive welfare do not have a positive value, contrary to the Simple View, or, 
2 – A set of some lives with positive welfare (e.g. lives at a very high welfare level) is more valuable 
than a set of lives that each have less welfare (e.g. lives at a very low welfare level), regardless of 
the relative size of the two sets, contrary to the Archimedean Principle applied to value. 
It is possible to divide the first of these options into two distinct claims, based on which of the two 
functions of our population axiology is used to accommodate it, as follows: 
1a – Lives at certain positive welfare levels never have positive value and make populations that 
contain them no better. 
1b – Lives at positive welfare levels sometimes have no positive value and some populations are 
no better because they contain them. 
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The difference between these two claims lies in whether the fact that some lives with positive 
welfare make a population no better is a result of the value of these lives in themselves, i.e. for all 
populations, or whether it is a result of the value of these lives within the context of a particular 
population. Somebody who took the Average View would accept 1b, but could not accept 1a 
because lives at any welfare level might still make some populations better, so long as they were at 
or above the average welfare level of those populations. 
In this section, I will take each of these possible claims in turn and aim to show that none of them 
provides a satisfactory explanation of why we find theories that imply the Repugnant Conclusion 
very hard to accept. 
5.3.1 What if some lives with positive welfare lack positive value? 
In this subsection, I examine critical level theories, which imply that lives at certain positive welfare levels 
have negative value. 
Perhaps we intuitively take the following view. Positive welfare is always better than negative 
welfare, but if a life is not good enough, from the perspective of the person living it, then it adds 
nothing to the overall value of a population. We might add that lives with little or no value to the 
people living them are actually bad, and that it would be better if these lives had never existed. 
This does not imply that we believe these lives are not worth living, only that it would have been 
better if they were never lived. If we take a view such as this then it implies that we intuitively 
accept claim 1a, and therefore deny the Simple View. However, it also implies that we must assign 
a cut-off point, or critical level, to determine whether lives have positive or negative value. This 
critical level will not be the same as the neutral welfare level. Assuming that the Repugnant 
Conclusion’s ‘lives that are barely worth living’ are below this level, the source of its repugnance 
becomes clear. Let us assume that the critical level lies somewhere between the welfare levels m 
and n from the previous example. The Repugnant Conclusion presents us with the following 
choice: 
Population A – 5 billion people at welfare level d 
Population C – 125 billion people at welfare level n 
If we accept the Simple View, we might attach the following values to these welfare levels: d = 50, 
n = 5. If we also adopt the Total View, these two populations would have the following total 
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values: A = 250, C = 600, making C superior to A.66 
However, if we deny the Simple View by claiming that lives below a certain ‘critical level’ have a 
negative value, we might attach the following values to these welfare levels instead: d = 44, n = –1. 
This produces total values for these populations of A = 220, C = –125. There are two reasons why, 
if this is indeed our intuitive evaluation of A and C, it might be so hard to accept any theory which 
implies that C is better than A. The first of these is that C has a negative value whilst A has a 
positive value. The second is that C is very much worse than A (i.e. it has a value over 340 points 
lower). Let us take each of these possible explanations in turn. 
Consider the following two additional populations: 
Population A* = 15 billion people at welfare level d (with a new value of 44) 
Population B* = 80 billion people at welfare level m (with a new value of 4) 
These populations, together with those from section 5.2, are summarised in the following table: 
On this view these populations would have intuitive values A* = 660, B * = 320. The difference 
between these two values is 340. So if we find it repugnant that C could be superior in value to A, 
because it has a much higher value (for instance a value 340 points higher), then it should be just 
as repugnant that B* is superior in value to A*, even though B* has a greater total quantity of 
welfare than A*. However, the Repugnant Conclusion is only meant to hold between populations 
at welfare levels like d and n, not welfare levels like d and m. Hence, we should not find this 
position hard to accept in the same way that we find the conclusion that A is superior to C 
                                                             
 
66  I am here assuming that we take the Total View when aggregating the value of the lives in a population 
(i.e. their welfare level – the critical level). The problems with the Average View, discussed in the previous 
section, will persist with or without a critical level. Other kinds of pluralist approaches to valuing lives 
may be able to deal with some of the issues I raise here, but I am not aware of any that do. 
 Description Numerical value 
of welfare levels 
Numerical value 
of welfare levels 
– critical level 
Total value of 
population on a 
critical level theory 
A 5 billion people at welfare level d 50 44 220 
A* 15 billion people at welfare level d 50 44 660 
B 25 billion people at welfare level m 10 4 100 
B* 80 billion people at welfare level m 10 4 320 
C 120 billion people at welfare level n 5 –1 –120 
D 8.6 billion people at welfare level a, 
1.4 billion at welfare level z 
60 and –10 54 and –16 443.4 
E 8.6 billion people at welfare level a, 
121.4 billion at welfare level p 
60 and 1 54 and –5 –140.6 
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repugnant, and not the conclusion that A might be superior to B*.  
Now let us compare B, with a value of 100, with C, with a value of –120. This time B has a positive 
value and C a negative value. Therefore, if we found it hard to accept that C is better than A 
because A has a positive value whilst C has a negative value, then we should find it equally hard to 
accept that C could be better than B. However, this seems even less repugnant than the view that 
B might be better than A*. After all, the lives in B and C are not so different and all these lives 
might contain no bad things, such as suffering or frustration. Again, we do not need to believe that 
C is definitely more valuable than B in order to find this view unrepugnant; we must simply 
believe that this conclusion would not, by itself, make theories that implied it hard to accept. 
Thus, it seems that we cannot explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion on the basis 
that A is clearly better than C because all the lives in C actually have negative value. Neither the 
simple fact that the C-lives have negative value nor the difference in total value between A and C 
can explain our sense of repugnance without implying that other judgements, such as B* ≤ A* or C 
≤ B* are just as repugnant, even though we do not find these judgements very hard to accept. 
Finally, any explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion that appeals to a 
difference between our intuitive understanding of the neutral level between good and bad lives 
and positive and negative welfare levels implies that we intuitively reject the Anti-Sadism 
Condition that it is always better to add lives with positive welfare than lives with negative 
welfare. This is true even if we adopt a totalist view about how to derive the value of a population 
from the value of its lives. For instance, let us consider the following pair of populations from the 
previous section with their values adjusted: 
Population D – 8.6 billion people at welfare level a (with a new value of 54), 1.4 billion people at 
welfare level z (with a new value of –16) 
Population E – 8.6 billion people at welfare level a (with a new value of 54), 121.4 billion people at 
welfare level p (with a new value of –5) 
According to this approach, we should intuitively value these two populations as follows: D = 
443.4, E = –140.6. The difference between the value of D and E is much greater than that between 
the value of A and C, and like them, the value of D is positive whilst that of E is negative. Therefore 
if we find it hard to accept that C is more valuable than A we should also find it just as hard to 
accept any theory that implies that E is more valuable than D. However, it seems much harder to 
accept that D is at least as valuable as E since this is an instance of the Sadistic Conclusion. 
Therefore I cannot accept that the correct explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant 
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Conclusion is based on our intuitive belief that lives at certain positive welfare levels have negative 
value. 
5.3.2 What if populations are not always improved by the addition of lives 
with positive welfare? 
This subsection considers explanations based on diminishing value and pluralist theories. 
Even if we do not intuitively believe that lives at certain positive welfare levels always have 
negative value, we can still believe that they make some populations that contain them no better. 
This implies that we reject the Simple View regarding the function for obtaining the value of a 
population from the value of its lives. The difference between this explanation of the repugnance 
of the Repugnant Conclusion and the explanation considered in the previous section is that we are 
now not considering changing the value of certain lives from positive to negative, but rather 
changing the way in which we aggregate these values together. The assumption of this approach is 
that the value of a population is not a strictly increasing monotone function of the total of the 
value of the lives it contains, so that it is possible that adding some lives with positive welfare 
makes a population no better. 
Variations of Average Utilitarianism 
One reason this might be the case is if our intuitive evaluation of populations considers the 
average value of the lives they contain, so that adding lives with a value at or below this average 
makes the population no better. I have dealt with this possibility as the ‘Average View’ in the 
previous section on the simple solution and concluded that it cannot explain the repugnance of 
the Repugnant Conclusion. 
Another, closely connected, reason would be if we intuitively believed that the total value of lives 
in a population diminishes with population size towards some upper bound. An alternative, 
closely related and functionally equivalent, reason would be if we intuitively consider both the 
total and average value of lives and believe that the importance of the average value of lives does 
not diminish to zero relative to that of the total value of lives. This is the view that the value of 
adding extra lives at or below the average value in a population is positive when the population is 
small, but diminishes as its size increases. If the value of adding lives at a certain positive welfare 
level becomes zero, or negative, at any finite population size, then this could be a reason for 
supporting the view that lives with positive welfare sometimes add nothing to the value of 
populations that contain them. If, on the other hand, the value of adding these lives diminishes to 
zero only for populations of infinite size, this view might still explain the Repugnant Conclusion. 
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However, in this case the explanation will depend on undermining the Archimedean Principle 
applied to value, which we will consider in the next section. 
All theories of this kind will revert to some form of the Average View for populations that are 
sufficiently large. This is because, beyond the point at which adding lives to a population ceases to 
make it better, only changes in the average value of lives will alter a population’s value. In this 
case these theories will have all the same implications about what sorts of comparison we should 
find repugnant that I mentioned in the section on the ‘simple solution’ and for this reason I reject 
these theories as possible explanations for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. 
A third reason why adding more lives to a population might not make it any better would be if we 
accepted some form of pluralism that includes a range of ideals apart from the total and average 
value of lives in a population. In the previous section on the Average View, I considered that 
repugnance might only result from a significant difference between the average value of two 
populations if: 
1 – The population with the higher average is no worse than that with the lower average in terms 
of inequality. 
2 – The population with the higher average contains no people with lives that are not worth living. 
I developed examples to deal with these reasons why a comparison might not be as repugnant as 
the Repugnant Conclusion. However, these examples also work equally well as a response to 
pluralist theories involving either an average or diminishing value for welfare and a negative value 
for inequality or bad lives.67 
Temkin’s pluralism  
However, many other forms of pluralism also imply that adding lives with positive welfare 
sometimes makes a population no better, since whilst it increases the population’s quantity of 
welfare it may also make the population worse with respect to some other moral ideal.  
For any pluralist theory to remain a ‘simple’ axiology, all of the moral ideals we hold relate solely 
to the welfare level of lives, since this is the only thing that determines their value. So far, we have 
                                                             
 
67  Alan Carter has suggested a diminishing value theory and egalitarian pluralism (Carter (2015) 42). The 
possibility of a diminishing value theory that gives special weight to the badness of lives with negative 
welfare is discussed, and rejected, by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Parfit (1984) 406–412). 
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considered four possible values of this kind. To aid in further discussion, let us give each of them a 
letter, following the classification from Temkin’s ‘capped model’ that I discussed in chapter 2. 
These ideals are: the total value of lives (U), the average value of lives (A), the equality of the 
distribution of welfare (E) and the presence of lives with a negative welfare level (S). Two other 
plausible candidates have been suggested as part of our intuitive evaluation of populations: some 
form of perfectionism (or elitism) such as MaxiMax, giving priority to the value of the best-off 
lives in a population (P) and some form of beneficence such as MaxiMin or prioritarianism, giving 
priority to the value of the worst-off lives in a population (M).68 
There are too many potential combinations of these values for us to consider all of them. Let me 
instead confine this chapter to a consideration of three pluralist theories of special note. 
The first of these is Temkin’s capped model. Temkin suggests a pluralist moral theory involving U, 
P, M and E. He makes two further claims about this pluralism. Firstly, all of these goods have a 
maximum value of 100, which represents the best possible value for a population in relation to 
this value. Secondly, the value of an equal distribution of welfare E increases with population size, 
so that in order to receive a score of 100 with relation to E a population must not only be perfectly 
equal but also infinitely large. Let us briefly consider these two features. 
That the value of the total quantity of welfare, U, can never exceed some maximum level is 
necessary if we are to explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. That the value of the 
best life, P, and the worst life, M, in a population also have maximum levels would be necessary if 
we believed that there were some ‘best possible life’ and/or some ‘worst possible life’. However, 
even if we did not believe this to be the case, it might still be reasonable to cap the maximum 
possible value for M and P in order to avoid the potential problem of a ‘utility monster’.69 For 
instance, if the value of M and P were uncapped then it would imply that some individual life 
might be so valuable, because it is at an extraordinarily high welfare level and thus has an 
immense value with respect to P (and potentially M), that its presence would dwarf any other 
good in a population. 
Of all the ideals Temkin considers, E may seem the most reasonable candidate for a cap since it is 
                                                             
 
68  Temkin’s P and M describe moral ideals of maximising the welfare of the relatively best-off and worst-off 
in a population. Other forms of perfectionism and beneficence represent an ideal of caring more about 
people’s welfare the better or worse off these people are, irrespective of how they fare relative to others. 
69  The possibility, introduced by Nozick, that the welfare of any one individual might dominate that of all 
other members of a population simply by virtue of the relative ease by which it is obtained (and hence its 
potential maximum quantity). See Nozick (1974). 
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impossible to improve upon the value of a perfectly equal population. However, as I mentioned in 
chapter 2, this is a point that Temkin denies. Temkin points out that we generally believe that two 
populations with the same ratio of people at the same welfare levels (say, 50% of people at level a 
and 50% at level c) should both be at least as good as perfectly equal populations of the same size 
where everyone is at the same welfare level b. However, if one of these populations were bigger 
than the other, then such an equalisation would reduce the total welfare in this population to a 
greater extent, indicating a greater reduction in the value of U for that population. Therefore, if we 
value both E and U then the gain in the value of E from equalising the larger population must be 
bigger than that from equalising the smaller population, in order to compensate for the greater 
loss of U (Temkin (2012) 353). It follows that the value of E should increase with population size. 
Therefore, the reason we should cap the maximum possible value of E is the same as the reason 
we should cap the maximum value of U: to prevent the Repugnant Conclusion. If the maximum 
value of E were not capped then the total value for E in a very large population of barely worth 
living lives could be greater than the total value, for all our moral ideals, of a smaller population at 
a much higher welfare level. 
If our intuitions are consistent with something like Temkin’s view then the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is a result of the fact it weighs a very small reduction in two values against 
a very significant increase in two other values. Whilst a very large population of barely worth 
living lives might have higher values for U and E than a large population of high welfare lives, the 
population at a high welfare level is already sufficiently large to be very close to the highest 
possible values for U and E, so this increase in value is very small. On the other hand, since both 
populations are perfectly equal, both the best-off and the worst-off lives in the population at a 
high welfare level are much better than those in the larger population at a low welfare level, 
producing much higher values for P and M. This discrepancy between a small increase in the 
values of U and E and a large decrease in the values of P and M leads us to find it very hard to 
accept that the larger population could be as good as the population at a higher welfare level. 
This theory, however, cannot explain our sense of repugnance. This is because it fails to have the 
same implications about repugnance in cases that are almost identical to the Repugnant 
Conclusion. Consider the following populations: 
Population X – 10 billion people at welfare level a, 1 person at welfare level p 
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Population Y – 1 person at welfare level a, 10 trillion people at welfare level p 
Y has a greater total welfare than X and this welfare is distributed just as equally.70 However, in 
this case, the best-off and worst-off people in Y and X are at the same welfare level and it is only 
the number of people at each level that has changed.71 Temkin’s theory makes no allowance for the 
number of people at each level, however, so this fact should make no difference; the values of M 
and P for both populations are the same. It is hard to see why, if we saw the Repugnant 
Conclusion as repugnant, we should not think it equally repugnant if Y has a greater value than X, 
but that cannot be explained on Temkin’s theory. 
This is not the only problem with Temkin’s capped model and I discussed some difficulties for it 
that he points out in chapter 2 regarding the case of how more than France exists. Given these 
problems, I conclude that this model cannot explain why we find the Repugnant Conclusion 
repugnant. 
Revising Temkin’s pluralism 
The problems I have just discussed seem in part to flow from the fact that MaxiMin and Temkin’s 
version of perfectionism both give absolute priority to the welfare level of the best and worst-off 
person respectively. These ideals are completely insensitive to numbers: it does not matter, for 
determining the value of M, if the worst-off person is the only one at a very low welfare level or if 
the rest of the population are at exactly the same welfare level. This makes these values insensitive 
to changes in a population that matter in our evaluation of populations and so makes producing 
counterexamples relatively easy. Therefore, this view may be improved by replacing these crude 
values with more sophisticated ones that take account of the numbers involved. This would also 
bring Temkin’s view more into line with standard interpretations of prioritarianism. 
However, if we were to accept that the number of individuals at different welfare levels matters in 
our moral judgements and yet try to retain a pluralist moral theory which holds that both the 
welfare of the better-off (perfectionism) and the worst-off (prioritarianism) matter more, this 
leads us to an obvious inconsistency. Prioritarianism and perfectionism not only express 
                                                             
 
70  Whilst there are some accounts on which the lives in Y are less equal than those in X, these are less 
numerous, and less compelling, than those on which X is less equal than Y. 
71  This result is based on Arrhenius’ Quality Addition Condition, and the principle that if we find the 
Repugnant Conclusion repugnant for populations as a whole we should also find it repugnant for 
subgroups within a population. Here we consider a population divided into one subgroup of 1 person at a 
and 1 at p and the addition of many people at a or very many at p. Similar results can be created by 
considering populations formed by the addition of such people to other subgroups. 
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conflicting moral ideals, as we might expect, but are directly inconsistent, since they make 
incompatible claims about the marginal value of individual welfare. Prioritarianism claims that 
this value decreases as a person’s welfare level increases whilst perfectionism, in this context, 
claims that the marginal value of individual welfare increases as a person’s welfare level increases. 
Insofar as we try to apply both of these principles to the value of people’s welfare, the two 
transformations will simply cancel each other out. We must decide if the value of individual 
welfare increases or decreases at the margin, or if it does something else instead. 
Temkin’s view does not face this difficulty, because by capping our prioritarian concern to those 
who are relatively worse off, and our perfectionist concern to those who are relatively better off, he 
prevents us applying the two views to the welfare of the same individual (assuming we are not 
dealing with a population with a size of 1). However, it is precisely this feature of his view that 
allows us to change the way in which we value individuals’ welfare by manipulating amongst 
which group they are counted. 
One possible response to this inconsistency is to claim that we are intuitively neither prioritarians 
nor perfectionists, but instead have an intuitive view of the value of welfare that incorporates both 
views. I call this priofectarianism. Priofectarianism represents a consistent position so long as the 
transformations we equate with prioritarianism or perfectionism have different weights or 
different shapes, so that they do not entirely cancel each other out when combined. One form of 
priofectarianism would be the view that the marginal value of increasing people’s welfare 
decreases up to a certain point and then increases again. Another would be the view that the value 
of people’s welfare decreases along a numerical scale but also crosses one or points of 
discontinuity associated with an increase in the marginal value of welfare. However, since neither 
of these are views that anyone (so far) actually purports to hold, I find it implausible that they 
represent our intuitions about the value of welfare. 
It should also be noted that priofectarianism has some intuitively troubling implications of its 
own. For instance, on any version of priofectarianism there is a range of welfare levels b–z (the 
prioritarian range) such that, for any population whose members have lives between level b and 
level z, a more equal distribution of welfare is better than a less equal distribution. However, there 
will be another range, a–y (the perfectionist range) such that for any population whose members 
lives are in this range, a less equal distribution of welfare is better than a more equal distribution 
of welfare, since this will produce more people at higher welfare levels. Furthermore, it is possible 
that a relatively small change in the welfare level of the lives in a population could entirely change 
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our view about the value of an equal distribution of welfare for these lives. 
We might try to combine prioritarianism and perfectionism in two other ways. The first is to claim 
that either or both views represent narrow person-affecting values, a view that would seem highly 
consistent with the rest of Temkin’s theory. For instance, we might value high welfare lives more 
in cases involving distinct populations, such as the Repugnant Conclusion. However, when some 
people exist in each of the populations under consideration, so that our choices directly affect 
them, this is (more than) cancelled out by a competing belief that we should benefit the worst-
off.72 In this way we simultaneously apply both an increasing and a decreasing transformation to 
the marginal value of individual welfare; however, the two are applied to different people so that 
they are no longer inconsistent. However, narrow person-affecting views would have nothing to 
say about populations that were distinct from one another, so that for all the cases we have 
considered thus far, including the Repugnant Conclusion, our view would reduce to a set of 
impersonal values. 
Finally, we can avoid the inconsistency by interpreting one or both views as claims about the value 
of something other than welfare. For instance, we might claim that perfectionism is a view about a 
particular good (the best things in life) which is closely associated with, but not the same as, a very 
high welfare level. Similarly, prioritarianism can be understood either as a view about the priority 
given to satisfying the claims of the worst-off or about the value of things that are associated with 
lower welfare levels, such as suffering or frustration. If we understand these theories as making 
claims about goods other than welfare then, again, they can be consistent. However, in this case 
they achieve this inconsistency by implying a non-simple population axiology. 
I therefore conclude that there is no way in which Temkin’s pluralism, either in its original or 
revised forms, can plausibly explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion unless it implies 
that we hold a non-simple population axiology. 
Other forms of pluralism 
Tyler Cowen’s argument also reveals a broader possible explanation for the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion, namely that we reject it because we see in it the impossibility of accepting 
any pluralist ethical theory without implying that some values become infinitely small in 
                                                             
 
72  For instance, we may believe that it is impersonally better to have more people at high welfare levels, but 
also that this is trumped by a person-affecting reason to benefit the worse-off rather than the better-off. 
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importance at the margin (the Non-Vanishing Value Axiom). If it is possible for the value of the 
total quantity of welfare in Z to be better than any other feature of A then it is possible for Z to be 
better than a large population with any other valuable features of finite size, including such values 
as culture, freedom, dignity and justice. 
It is hard to make this claim unless we can also claim that there are no other values apart from 
welfare which imply that population Z from the Repugnant Conclusion is no better than 
population A. As I argued in a previous chapter, I accept that for many such values it is acceptable 
to claim that this is the case because these are excluded by the use of a ‘ceteris paribus’ clause. For 
instance, it would be wrong to claim that Z is no better than A because A has greater biodiversity 
since we have no facts about biodiversity for either population and no reason to think biodiversity 
might be greater in A than in Z. However, as I argue, this does not apply when these values are 
themselves deeply and meaningfully connected to individual welfare. Features of these lives such 
as the balance of positive and negative welfare components or the presence or absence of the best 
things in life cannot be excluded from our considerations ceteris paribus since they are connected 
to individual welfare in a deep and meaningful way. 
However, for all the values of this kind that I can conceive of, they seem to give us more reason to 
believe that A is better than Z. Therefore, any theory which implies that Z is better than A, must 
deny the Axiom of Value Pluralism. Nevertheless, I do not think there is any evidence that there 
are no other values that might lead us to believe that Z is better than A – and which might be 
connected to individual welfare in a deep and meaningful way.73 If the existence of these values 
remains an open question, then it is not legitimate to move from the fact of the Repugnant 
Conclusion to the violation of the Axiom of Value Pluralism, and Cowen’s explanation for the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is unproven. 
Nevertheless, I am sufficiently convinced about the absence of these goods to accept that this 
forms part of the intuitive repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion. However, in order for this to 
explain its repugnance we need to know more about what sort of value pluralism we intuitively 
hold, and to ensure that the values comprising it do not imply that population Z is better than 
population A and should not be excluded ‘ceteris paribus’. 
Any pluralist theory that stands a reasonable chance at explaining the Repugnant Conclusion will 
                                                             
 
73  The only plausible exception I can think of would be if the size of a population were intrinsically valuable. 
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therefore include values such as equality (E), perfection (P) and anti-sadism (such as S or M). 
However, if they appeal only to a simple axiology then they can appeal to these ideals only insofar 
as they reflect the distribution of lives at particular welfare levels. As we have seen, such theories 
are problematic and I believe that this is the real source of Temkin’s difficulties, since he can only 
consider the welfare level of the best-off and the worst-off, not the distribution of goods such as 
‘the best things in life’. However, in chapter 3 I argued that we should value precisely these kinds 
of goods. 
If our explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is to capture these views about 
value pluralism then it seems we cannot employ such an explanation without appealing to a non-
simple population axiology. 
5.3.3 What if the Archimedean Principle does not apply to the value of lives? 
In this subsection, I consider explanations based on theories that include some form of Value Superiority. 
We can explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion without implying that lives at 
positive welfare levels can make populations that contain them worse or appealing to other moral 
ideals if we instead argue that our intuitions are inconsistent with the Archimedean Principle 
applied to value. This means that we intuitively value lives on a non-numerical scale so that, 
whilst adding lives at lower welfare levels always makes a population better, these lives could 
never add more value to a population than a sufficient number of lives at some higher welfare 
level. Another way of putting this is to say that we believe that some lives have a value that is 
superior74 to the value of other lives. We could achieve this either by modifying our axiology of 
lives, based upon their welfare level, or our axiology of populations, based upon the value of their 
lives. However, in what follows I will assume that the failure of the Archimedean Principle is a 
feature of the value of lives, rather than its aggregation. 
In order to explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion we must be able to show that our 
intuitions obey the following condition: that there exist sets of lives at a very high welfare level 
that have a value greater than any set of lives at a very low positive welfare level, regardless of how 
large the second set is. 
If we formalise any theory that obeys this rule then we must set a precise level that differentiates 
                                                             
 
74  In what follows, I shall assume that superiority refers to lexical superiority, although I am aware that 
other forms of superiority would also explain this kind of non-numerical discontinuity (Arrhenius and 
Rabinowicz (2005)). 
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these two kinds of lives, such that any sufficiently large set of lives just above this level has a value 
greater than any set of lives just below this level. It cannot be that there are two levels such that 
lives above the higher level have a value superior to lives below the lower level but all lives above 
the lower level or below the higher level have values that can be represented on the same 
numerical scale. This further implies that we should find moral theories which imply that equality 
is valuable in all cases very hard to accept, since it would always be better to have an unequal 
distribution of welfare if this means that any lives are at a welfare level that has a value superior to 
the other lives in that population. For instance, consider two populations, A, consisting of a 
sufficiently large number of lives at welfare level a and some lives at level c, and B, consisting of 
the same number of people, but with everyone at level b – where a, b and c are all positive welfare 
levels. If the dividing line between lives of a superior and inferior value lies between level a and 
level b then, even if a and b represent very similar kinds of life, the group of lives at level a in A 
must be superior in value to the entire population B at b. This implies that the unequal population 
will always be better, no matter how close together welfare levels a and b are, or how far apart 
welfare levels b and c are. The first population must be better than the second, even if c is a 
welfare level much lower than a and there are many more people at level c in the first population 
than at level a. In contrast to this view, many people find such an Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion very 
hard to accept.75 This case is illustrated below: 
 
Figure 18: The Anti-Egalitarian Conclusion 
However, if we are only considering this kind of theory as a possible explanation of repugnance, it 
is not necessary for us to formalise our theory of the superiority of value in this precise way. This 
is because repugnance is a vague concept and may only apply when one population is much worse 
                                                             
 
75  Cases in which A and B are not very similar are still anti-egalitarian. However, in this case it is easier to 
argue that the anti-egalitarianism inherent in the conclusion is not due to the disvalue of equality, but to 
the extra value of some other good. 
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than another, not just when it is worse to some minimal extent. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that even this vaguer sense of repugnance can be explained by the 
failure of the Archimedean Principle applied to value in this way, without in turn implying that we 
should accept a non-simple population axiology. Consider the following four populations: 
Population T – n1 people at welfare level a 
Population U – n2 people at welfare level m 
Population V – n3 people at welfare level n 
Population W – n4 people at welfare level z 
Now let us assume that it would be very hard to accept any moral theory that implies that W is 
better than T, irrespective of the relative size of n1 and n4. This is because welfare levels a and z 
are far enough apart and on either side of a critical level, representing a boundary of superiority in 
value. 
In order not to imply that it is very hard to accept any kind of egalitarian moral theory we cannot, 
however, find it very hard to accept that there is some number, n3, sufficiently large that a 
population of n3 people at welfare level n is not at least as good as a sufficiently large population 
at welfare level a. Similarly, we cannot find it very hard to accept that for any number, n2, of 
people at welfare level m there is some number, n4, of people at welfare level z such that it is at 
least as good.  
Setting the numbers n1, n2, n3 and n4 in this way, we now have the following results: 
1 – It is very hard to accept that population W is at least as good as population T. 
2 – It is not very hard to accept that population W is at least as good as population U. 
3 – It is not very hard to accept that population V is at least as good as population T. 
However, if we did accept both that V is better than T and that W is better than U then it seems we 
can only continue to deny the possibility that W is better than T if we can also accept that U might 
be better than V. However, U may be a population equal to or greater than V in terms of size (i.e. 
n2 may be greater than or equal to n3) and everyone in U is better off than everyone in V. 
We might conclude that this is a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ of the view that we can explain 
repugnance in this way. However, this is the only way of explaining our sense of repugnance using 
the failure of the Archimedean Principle which does not imply that it should be very hard to 
accept any theory with a non-negative value for equality.  
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I view this result in a very different light. It seems to me that there are cases in which V might be 
better than U. These are cases in which T and V consist of lives that contain the best things in life, 
or lack bad things, whilst U and W consist of lives that do not. As I explain in sections 3.4.1 and 
3.4.2, I believe that in such cases we may well have reason to believe that a population of lower 
welfare lives could be better than an equally sized population of high welfare lives. As I will argue 
in the next section this fact also gives us a good explanation for why T is necessarily better than W, 
despite the fact that W contains much more welfare overall, and that this explanation is 
compatible with the claims that W might be better than U and V better than T. This is because, 
when populations contain goods whose value is not entirely reflected in the welfare level of their 
lives, the value of these things may be superior to any amount of welfare on its own. 
Regardless of whether you accept the kind of theory I set out in chapters 3 and 4, if we find that 
any population such as V may be better than a population such as U then, as I pointed out in the 
introduction to this work, we must accept a non-simple axiology of some kind. I believe that if we 
are to explain the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion by appealing to the failure of the 
Archimedean Principle applied to value, without implying that any non-anti-egalitarian theory 
must be very hard to accept, we must accept just this implication – and thus a non-simple 
population axiology. 
On the basis of this result, I conclude that no satisfactory explanation for the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is possible if we appeal only to a simple population axiology. Let me now 
turn to explanations for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion that appeal to a non-simple 
population axiology.  
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5.4 Can we explain the repugnance of the Repugnant 
Conclusion using a non-simple axiology? – The successful 
solution 
If our intuitions reflect a non-simple population axiology then we can explain the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion without implying that any unrepugnant judgements should be equally hard to 
accept. 
I have argued in the previous two sections that if we try to explain the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion by appealing either to pluralism or to the failure of the Archimedean 
Principle applied to value then it seems that the best possible explanations imply that we accept a 
non-simple axiology for populations. I have also suggested that no successful explanation that 
appeals only to a simple population axiology is possible, although there are still simple population 
axiologies left to consider which might conceivably succeed where others have failed. Based on 
these results, I propose accepting a non-simple explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant 
Conclusion. We might do this in a number of ways. 
One possibility is to interpret the Repugnant Conclusion as a claim about the interaction between 
two goods. The first of these are the welfare components that make lives better or worse and the 
second are the psychological connections that are responsible for uniting welfare components into 
lives. The most direct way to interpret the Repugnant Conclusion in these terms is that a 
sufficiently densely connected nexus of positive welfare components is more valuable than any 
quantity of less strongly connected welfare components. When we compare population A with 
population Z we therefore believe that A is better than Z because each person in population A 
brings together many positive welfare components into a closely connected whole, and these 
people are themselves likely to be connected in strong societies and flourishing cultures. In 
population Z on the other hand, welfare components are dispersed across many people’s lives, and 
these people are less likely to be closely connected with others. This reading assumes a non-simple 
population axiology since it implies the connections between welfare components are valuable, 
and that this is not reflected in the welfare level of a life. If this is so, then it suggests that some 
aspect of our psychology makes our lives better or worse, without making them better or worse for 
us. 
However, this very simple interpretation could not explain the Repugnant Conclusion in all cases. 
This is because we can imagine lives at a variety of levels having very different degrees of 
psychological connectedness. ‘Barely worth living lives’ may contain many drab welfare 
components that are very closely connected to one another or a wider range of closely connected 
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welfare components including some of the best things in life as well as some very bad things. 
Whilst the explanation I have set out above explains why we find the Repugnant Conclusion 
repugnant ‘for any given quantity of welfare’, it does not explain why we find it repugnant even 
when the welfare and composition of the barely worth living lives is allowed to change. 
In chapter 3, I set out a more sophisticated explanation. Whilst the total value of a larger 
population at a lower welfare level is clearly greater in respect of the value people would place 
upon these lives, it is much lower with respect of the value that other perspectives would place on 
them. People who enjoy very happy lives not only place a great value on these lives as people, but 
contain other perspectives that can realise morally more important kinds of value, i.e. that enjoy 
‘the best things in life’. From these perspectives, a life contains meaning, self-realisation, 
transcendent joy or whatever else we find most valuable in life and this imparts great value to that 
life as a whole.  
In a much larger population at a lower welfare level, either these perspectives do not exist, or if 
they do, the low welfare level of such lives implies that there are also perspectives from which 
these lives are especially bad, for instance the perspectives of parts of these people that experience 
suffering, alienation and despair.  
From such perspectives, these welfare components generate moral complaints, even if they are 
good for the people who live these lives. Either way, the value these perspectives impart to the 
lives in each population is such that no amount of welfare has a value that can give us more reason 
to choose the larger population at the lower welfare level. This may be because we do not actually 
value the total quantity of welfare at all, because the maximum value of the total quantity of 
welfare is bounded, or because the maximum value of all values, including that of goods such as 
the best things in life and bad things, is bounded. Whatever the case may be, the reduction in 
value from near-perfection to very little value in respect of the enjoyment of the best things in life 
cannot be weighed against any increase in the quantity of welfare alone. However, it is only in 
terms of their total quantity of welfare that the lives at a lower welfare level are better than the 
lives at a high welfare level. 
Whilst, in most cases the value of goods such as the best things in life are not solely determined by 
their effect upon people’s welfare levels, in the case of the Repugnant Conclusion they are 
determined to a sufficient extent to substantially affect our moral judgements. We know enough 
about the composition of these lives, and the perspectives they contain, to imply that the 
contributory value of these lives is not determined solely by the welfare they contain, even ceteris 
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paribus. In other cases, we can still make reasonable assumptions about the composition of the 
lives involved and thus produce ceteris paribus evaluations of these lives considering only the 
welfare that they contain. For instance, we reasonably assume that a population at a lower welfare 
level will not only be worse for all the people living in it than one at a higher welfare level, but that 
it will be no better from all other perspectives as well. Similarly, we make assumptions which 
imply that a population with more equality will have no less of the egalitarian good than another 
population of the same size, but with less equality. However, these are only assumptions – 
sometimes they lead us astray. For instance, we might assume, ceteris paribus, that a life at a 
slightly lower welfare level might have no more bad things and no fewer of the best things in life 
than another life at a slightly higher welfare level, but merely fewer of life’s ordinary goods. This is 
a fair assumption, however, if it is applies to many pairs of lives across a wide spectrum of welfare 
levels it would imply that a barely worth living life might have no fewer of the best things in life 
and no more bad things than a very happy life, something which I believe to be impossible. 
This non-simple explanation of the Repugnant Conclusion can explain why it is that this 
conclusion only holds between lives at very different welfare levels, a feature that as I pointed out 
in chapter 1 seems to imply a degree of inconsistency in our reaction towards this conclusion if we 
interpret it using a simple population axiology. As I argued above, it is perfectly plausible to 
imagine that when comparing lives at a very high welfare level with those at a very low welfare 
level we conclude that these lives belong to people with very different psychological compositions. 
However, for many other pairs of welfare levels, whether or not lives at these welfare levels belong 
to people who are composed the same or differently is underdetermined. The Repugnant 
Conclusion is not only meant to capture the belief that some high welfare level population is better 
than a much larger low welfare level population, but also that it is necessarily so for all such 
populations. A non-simple population axiology can explain this necessity. A simple population 
axiology, on the other hand, can only explain it as reflecting the depth of our moral conviction that 
a certain kind of judgement must be correct. 
The view that the best things in life have a value that is greater than the equivalent amount of 
welfare derived from other goods suggests that it is something about the goods that make up the 
best things in life that has this value, rather than the improvement they actually make to people’s 
lives. If it is combined with the view that this value is superior in some way to that of welfare then 
this claim becomes hard to motivate. One objection to this view is that it is elitist, that it 
arbitrarily makes the good enjoyed by some people more important than that enjoyed by others. 
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Another is that it is impersonal or inhuman, that it gives certain goods a value greater than the 
people who enjoy them. I have argued that it is neither these goods nor their effect on people as a 
whole that makes this difference, but rather their effects on the composition of these people and 
the perspectives from which their life may be evaluated. In this way, my explanation of the 
repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion is able to avoid both objections. It seems that both 
standard perfectionism and my theory imply that a relatively minor difference in people’s quality 
of life can make a significant difference to the value of their lives. However, my theory implies that 
there is a further reason for this. A small difference in quality of life can imply an important shift 
in the possible composition of this life, and the nature of the people who could live it.  
Such a difference could ultimately make some lives superior in value to others. This difference 
might be, in some way, equivalent to the difference between an animal, which lacks personhood, 
and a person. It may be that the lives of some people and some animals are very similar, and there 
may indeed be types of life that could be lived by either. It is even conceivable that during certain 
parts of a person’s life, such as prior to birth or following neurological and psychological 
degeneration, their life is lived by a non-person animal, albeit one with a potential for 
personhood. However, some people regard the difference in the psychological nature of the entity 
living these different kinds of life as very significant in terms of the value of these lives. Others, of 
course, do not. 
The non-simple axiological explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion can 
explain other features often associated with the Repugnant Conclusion as well. It explains why we 
do not accept the Archimedean Principle applied to value. This is because a sufficient quantity of 
some goods (such as the best things in life) is more valuable, all things considered, than any 
amount of welfare but a certain level of welfare implies the presence in a life of such goods. This 
axiology allows for a pluralism of values that can also explain mere addition, the best things in life 
and other goods that matter to our intuitive judgements as I explained in chapter 3. It can explain 
why some lives with positive welfare make a population worse, because welfare is not the only 
feature of these lives that determines the value they give to a population. Therefore, insofar as we 
find any of these other explanations attractive we can also find the appeal to a non-simple 
population axiology attractive, since all these features are compatible with such a theory. 
However, as I have noted above, these theories may be hard to explain without adopting a non-
simple population axiology. 
Finally, a non-simple population axiology gives, as I have already argued, the right kind of 
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response to the conflict between the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion and our other 
intuitions about the value of populations. By claiming that the effect of non-person perspectives 
on the value of a population is determined in the Repugnant Conclusion but remains 
underdetermined in many other cases, a non-simple axiology explains the inconsistency between 
these intuitions in non-moral terms. It reflects our incompatible assumptions about the nature of 
the lives in these populations and the composition of the people who live them and it does not 
imply anything further about the nature of value or our all things considered evaluation of 
populations. In this way, we can hope to achieve Huemer’s requirement of a satisfactory 
theoretical explanation for the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion and for our other 
intuitions. In this way and, I believe, only in this way, we can produce a strong response to the 
sceptical solution, since this is the only way in which we can defend the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion and our other intuitions in population axiology at the same time. 
For all these reasons, I conclude that the only adequate explanation for the repugnance of the 
Repugnant Conclusion is to accept a non-simple population axiology, and that this gives us 
further reason to accept such an axiology above and beyond the other arguments presented in this 
thesis. 
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5.5 Conclusion of chapter 5 
The aim of this chapter has been to give further support to the use of a non-simple population 
axiology by demonstrating how such an axiology is necessary to explain why theories that imply 
the Repugnant and More Repugnant Conclusions are very hard to accept. On the basis that we do 
in fact find these conclusions very hard to accept, I have argued against the possible response that 
there is no further explanation for this fact (the sceptical solution) on the grounds that this too 
easily undermines the repugnance of these conclusions. On the basis that other explanations of 
the repugnance of the Repugnant Conclusion that involve a simple population axiology, such as 
the simple and sophisticated solutions, all imply either that conclusions that are clearly not 
repugnant should be very hard to accept or that conclusions that are very hard to accept should be 
acceptable, I reject any of these explanations. I therefore conclude that an explanation that 
appeals to a non-simple population axiology is the best response for anyone, like me, who wishes 
to accept and explain the repugnance of the Repugnance Conclusion. If this is the case, then it is 
another argument in favour of a non-simple population axiology. If, however, my reader is not 
convinced and chooses instead to accept an alternative explanation, which only appeals to a 
simple population axiology or to no axiology at all, then this still leaves open the possibility that 
whilst such an axiology might explain our intuitions, it is still not the correct axiology for use in 
population ethics. 
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Concluding Remarks 
When discussing the Repugnant Conclusion people often talk about it in terms of policy choices 
for the future. This is a mistake. Insofar as the Repugnant Conclusion carries implications for 
people’s choices, they are in the past. Consider the following account of the Agricultural 
Revolution: 
― Since we enjoy affluence and security, and since our affluence and security are built on 
foundations laid by the Agricultural Revolution, we assume that the Agricultural Revolution 
was a wonderful improvement. Yet it is wrong to judge thousands of years of history from the 
perspective of today. A much more representative viewpoint is that of a three-year-old girl 
dying from malnutrition in first century China because her father’s crops have failed. Would she 
say ‘I am dying of malnutrition, but in 2,000 years people will have plenty to eat and life in big 
air-conditioned houses so my suffering is a worthwhile sacrifice’? 
What then did [agriculture] offer agriculturalists, including that malnourished Chinese girl? It 
offered nothing for people as individuals. Yet it did … provide much more food per unit of 
territory, and thereby enabled Homo sapiens to multiply exponentially. Around 13,000 BC, 
when people fed themselves by gathering wild plants and hunting wild animals, the area around 
the oasis of Jericho, in Palestine, could support at most one roaming band of about a hundred 
relatively healthy and well-nourished people. Around 8500 BC, when wild plants gave way to 
wheat fields, the oasis supported a large but cramped village of 1,000 people, who suffered far 
more from disease and malnourishment. (Harari (2014) 82–83) 
The development of agriculture represents one of the most interesting case studies for examining 
the implications of theories of population axiology. Before the spread of agriculture, around 
10,000 years ago, roughly 5–10 million human beings lived nomadic lives. Archaeological 
evidence suggests that their lives were long and healthy. Societies were small and egalitarian, and 
violence uncommon. Humans enjoyed extensive amounts of leisure time and mastered a wide 
range of skills. It is easy to romanticise their situation, and surely our lives and theirs would seem 
utterly alien to one another. However, the evidence is that they enjoyed many good things and 
that their lives contained little that was bad. 
The advent of agriculture dramatically changed the lives of human beings. Disease and 
malnutrition shortened lifespans by as much as 50% and increased their quantity of pain and 
suffering. Settled and rooted communities became increasingly violent and unequal. People spent 
more of their lives working and less varied and more menial tasks. The only substantial way in 
which humans seem to have benefited from agriculture was a substantial increase in population 
size. 
For the first 5,000 years after the Agricultural Revolution, the size of the world’s population may 
have increased by as much as 1,000%, almost entirely consisting in a growth in the number of 
 
 
195 
 
 
settled farming communities. Surpluses in good years together with increasing levels of inequality 
may have freed some of these people from the drudgery of agriculture. However, for the most part 
they were liberated only in order to spend their time ensuring the subjugation of others. The only 
good things these people might have got from their free time and social position were the same as 
might have been enjoyed by their ancestors. The first sophisticated societies began to emerge 
around 5,000 years ago, and with them came some new kinds of benefit for humanity: writing and 
literature, money and trade, politics and religion. However, once again, these were for the few and 
were predominantly used to ensure the preservation of an existing hierarchy and the subjugation 
of the many. 
Around 500 BC, 2,500 years later, the world’s population may have increased by a further 300% 
and some new kinds of benefit began to emerge. Some empires started claiming to serve the 
interests of their citizens and some cities began to support artists and philosophers that provided 
a varied culture and deep insights. Those who benefited most from the organisation of humankind 
started to receive something other than just more of the same and we can start to imagine the 
emergence of the goods that one might call ‘the best things in life’. 
However, most of the people who have ever lived have surely had what we would consider to be 
lives that are ‘barely worth living’ if not bad. For one thing, very many of these people lived lives 
that were very short. Perhaps 50% of all humans since the Agricultural Revolution died in 
childhood, usually of disease or malnutrition. For another thing, people’s lives had few pleasures 
and much suffering, whilst their desires and intentions would often have been frustrated by 
disease, famine, war or the deaths of others. Let us also not forget the misery of the many people 
currently living in radical poverty in our unequal world. 
If we believe in the moral priority of suffering, it is hard not to conclude that the trajectory of 
human history since the Agricultural Revolution has been negative. Suffering and inequality seem 
to have increased whilst average welfare levels have gone down. Nor do I think that these bad 
things could be outweighed by the benefits that some have received from human advancement 
that were merely of the same form as those experienced by pre-agricultural humans. I believe that 
if we are to take the view that human history has improved the lot of humanity then it must be 
because, for all its bad effects, it has brought about some qualitative positive change in the nature 
of human experience. It has enhanced the extent of our psychological connectedness and its effect 
upon the value of our lives. For me it is the construction of rich and thriving societies and the 
realisation that individuals can pursue goals that they recognise as objectively valuable that 
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redeems us. Human history has been good and worthwhile, but this has been a result of changes it 
has brought about in human beings, not simply change it has brought about in our lives.  
*** 
In this work, I have defended five key claims: (1) That no satisfactory simple population axiology 
is possible; (2) that there is no further reason to believe that this is due to any fundamental 
incoherence in our evaluation of populations; (3) that a non-simple population axiology is 
defensible; (4) that a non-simple axiology can be a satisfactory population axiology and (5) that a 
non-simple axiology is the best explanation for our intuitions about the Repugnant Conclusion. 
The axiology I have developed has further advantages. As I have suggested above it can tell a story 
about the value of human history that I think picks out what we intuitively value about ourselves. 
It is not our belief that human lives are much more joyous, or free from suffering, than those of 
other animals that makes us believe that our lives count for more. Nor is it, for most people, the 
case that one can simply exclude the lives of animals from our moral considerations. What makes 
humans special are our psychological sophistication and the interaction between this and the lives 
that we lead. I have identified three plausible ways effect might occur. As psychologically 
sophisticated beings, we can view our lives and our actions as objectively valuable, rendering 
those parts of our lives in which we pursue this value far more important in our moral 
considerations than the mere sum of our welfare as a whole. As psychologically sophisticated 
beings we can be a source of moral complaints, not only against the badness of our lives as a 
whole, but also against parts of these lives where we experience bad things such as suffering or 
frustration. Finally, as psychologically sophisticated beings we can form intentional communities, 
sharing our memories and experiences, and building perspectives that extend beyond the 
boundaries of ourselves and from which our lives can take on new kinds of value. I suspect that 
the arguments I have provided so far do not go far enough in justifying these grand claims, but my 
feeling is that they point us in the right direction. 
There is, however, one key objection to my view, which I have not addressed thus far. Could we 
not formulate impossibility results similar to those from chapter 1 that would cover non-simple 
axiologies as well? I do not wish to rule this out. In order to escape Tyler Cowen’s result I have had 
to make claims about the value of welfare that some may believe render my approach 
unsatisfactory. I have also had to defend my approach from the objection that it implies the 
Ridiculous Conclusion. I believe that my view is able to respond to these objections well because 
the psychological status of people and the variety of perspectives from which their lives can be 
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valued gives a strong motivation for the views that I have advanced, but I make no claims to have 
solved all the problems of population axiology. 
However, I hope that my view will be better at avoiding impossibility results than standard, 
simple, population axiologies. One of the key features of the conditions that are set for the 
impossibility results of chapter 1 is the breadth of their scope. These results ask us simply to 
accept that ‘for every population … there is some other population.…’ I think that our ability to 
imagine any kind of population we like in the second part of these conditions that makes them so 
attractive. Anything that forces axiologists to define populations more precisely will naturally 
reduce the scope of these conditions, and thus their attractiveness. For instance, when we try to 
redefine the Repugnant Conclusion in ways that do not make claims about the composition of the 
lives involved, for instance ones that try to hold the quantity of the best things in life and bad 
things constant, we will find that these conditions become much less attractive and easier to 
reject. 
Another issue with this thesis that requires much more work is how underdeveloped its theory of 
personal identity is. I have focused in this work on the moral implications of personal identity and 
the relation between people and their lives from the third-person perspective. I believe that this 
topic is underexplored in the literature. Much of the work on the moral implications of personal 
identity focuses on the first-person perspective. However, I feel there is so much more I can and 
should do to bring my work more into line with existing theories and to defend my assumption of 
a reductionist view about personal identity against the claims of animalists who would oppose 
such a view. 
I also wish to work on developing the connections between the kind of goods I have considered in 
this essay and other impersonal values such as the distribution of goods across a population and 
the value of the relationships between different possible lives. Removing the assumption that we 
are working with discrete populations would greatly enhance the power and scope of this work, 
but I suspect that it would also raise many challenges. For instance, I have suggested that one 
person enjoying one of the best things in life may be a change for the better, even if it implies 
many others forgoing some of life’s ordinary good things. This is a view that is consistent with 
Larry Temkin’s ‘Disbursed Additional Burdens View’ (Temkin (2012) 67–68). However, it is one 
that I find very troubling. I feel I have much work to do. I very much look forward to it. 
*** 
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It so happened that I first read Gustaf Arrhenius’ account of the impossibility of producing a 
satisfactory population axiology at the same time that my bedtime reading was John Dickson 
Carr’s The Hollow Man. This is a book famous for presenting one of the most impossible crimes 
ever conceived. Pierre Fley, a professional illusionist, is seen to enter the study of Charles 
Grimaud and shoot him before disappearing without a trace. A few minutes later Fley is shot dead 
in a snow-covered alleyway on the other side of London that is watched at both ends. The gun is 
lying a few feet from his body but not a footprint can be seen. The solution is so simple that there 
are only three real clues in the entire book and I am afraid that I missed them all. Apart from its 
sheer deviousness, the book is famous for its ‘locked room lecture’ in which the detective, Dr 
Gideon Fell, expounds the many ways in which a person may be murdered inside a locked room. 
Amongst his many observations are the following: 
― But this point must be made, because a few people who do not like the slightly lurid insist on 
treating their preferences as rules. They use, as a stamp of condemnation, the word 
‘improbable.’ And thereby they gull the unweary into their own belief that ‘improbable’ simply 
means ‘bad.’ 
Now it seems reasonable to point out that the word ‘improbable’ is the very last that should ever 
be used to curse detective fiction in any case. A great part of our liking for detective fiction is 
based on a liking for improbability. When A is murdered and B and C are under strong 
suspicion, it is improbable that the innocent looking D can be guilty. But he is. If G has a perfect 
alibi, sworn at every point by every other letter in the alphabet, it is improbable that G can have 
committed the crime. But he has. (Carr (1935) 152–153) 
I hope that it was not simply this coincidence of reading material that led me to draw the 
conclusions that I have. However, in the spirit of its memory I cannot help but pose the following 
drawing room scene here at the end of my thesis – it shall not be repeated, after all! 
The innocent-looking D in this case is that little condition Arrhenius wields in all of his 
impossibility results (and that I have deliberately edited out of my own renderings of them): 
The Egalitarian Dominance Condition: If population A is a perfectly equal population of the same 
size as population B, and every person in A has higher welfare than every person in B, then A is 
better than B, other things being equal. (Arrhenius (Forthcoming) 61) 
It turns out this condition has no alibi sworn at every point: it has only one defence – namely that, 
as Arrhenius puts it, it “is, I believe, as uncontroversial as it gets in population axiology” (ibid.). 
What could be more suspicious? The question, however, remains: how could such an axiom be 
violated? Arrhenius wields the most fearsome ceteris paribus clause to protect his conditions from 
the charge that there are values other than welfare at play. He argues that “people’s welfare is the 
only axiologically relevant aspect which may be different in the compared populations” (Arrhenius 
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(Forthcoming) 54). However, people’s welfare cannot be the only aspect that is different in the 
compared populations. That welfare has to be composed of something, and whatever it is 
composed of must change alongside the welfare itself. As Arrhenius acknowledges therefor, 
“people might have a different mix of good and bad parts [to their lives]”. Might it be possible, I 
wondered, that the mixture of good and bad parts in a person’s life could have a value such that if 
a higher welfare life was of one composition and a lower value life was of another composition the 
lower welfare life would be better, all things considered? To my delight, I have concluded that it 
just might!  
Admittedly, such a situation would be highly improbable, but the alternative, Arrhenius had 
proven, was impossible, and, to quote the most famous man ever to put logic to the service of 
morality, “Once you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, 
must be the truth” (Doyle (1890) 111). 
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Appendix A – Presentation of Result 6 
Result 6 proves the impossibility of satisfying the following four conditions: 
The Weak Quality Addition Condition: For any population X, the addition of a sufficiently large 
group with very high positive welfare to X would be better than the addition of any group of 
people at a very low positive welfare level and some people at a negative welfare level. 
The Non-Elitism Condition: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a is higher than b 
and b higher than c, and for any population A at welfare level a, there is some, sufficiently larger, 
population C at welfare level c, and a population B of the same size as A∪C at welfare level b, such 
that for any population X, B∪X is at least as good as A∪C∪X. 
The Non-Extreme Priority Condition: There is a number of lives, n, such that for any population 
X, a population consisting of the X-lives, n lives at a very high welfare level and a single life at a 
slightly negative welfare level is at least as good as a population consisting of the X-lives and n+1 
lives at a very low positive welfare level. 
The Non-Sadism Condition: An addition of any number of people with positive welfare is at least 
as good as an addition of any number of people with negative welfare. 
This can be demonstrated by considering the following five populations: 
Population A: a large number of lives (n1) at welfare level a, a very high welfare level, and the 
same number of lives at welfare level z, a very low positive welfare level. 
Population B: A population of the same size as population A, in which 1 life is at a slightly negative 
welfare level and the rest (2n1-1 lives) are at welfare level a. 
Population C: A population with 2n1-1 lives at welfare level a and a very large number of lives (n2) 
at z*, a very low positive welfare level that is even lower than z. 
Population D: A population of the same size as population C with 2n-1 lives at welfare level a, an 
additional large number of lives (n3) at welfare level a, some lives (n4) at a slightly negative 
welfare level and the rest (n2-(n3+n4) lives) at welfare level z* 
Population E: n1 lives at welfare level z, many more lives ((n1-1)+(n2-n4)) also at welfare level z 
and n4 lives at a slightly negative welfare level. 
These populations are illustrated in figure 19 below: 
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Figure 19: Result 6 
The Weak Quality Addition Condition implies that if two populations are the same with regard to 
one group of lives, but differ with regard to the other lives that they contain, and if in the first 
population all of these lives are at a very high positive welfare level whilst in the second some of 
these lives are at a very low positive welfare level and the rest are at a negative welfare level, then 
the first population is better than the second. In this case both population A and population E 
contain a group of n1 lives at welfare level z, a very low positive welfare level. However, population 
A also contains a group of n1 lives at welfare level a, a very high welfare level, whilst population E 
contains a very large additional group of lives ((n1-1)+(n2-n4)) at welfare level z and also some 
lives (n4) at a negative welfare level. The Weak Quality Addition Condition therefore implies that 
population A is better than population E, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 20: The Weak Quality Addition Condition 
The Non-Extreme Priority Condition implies that if two populations are the same with regard to 
one group of lives, but differ with regard to the other lives that they contain, and if in the first 
population there are a sufficient number of these additional lives and they are all at a low welfare 
level whilst in the second population there are just as many lives but with one of these lives at a 
slightly negative welfare level whilst the rest are all at a very high welfare level, then the first 
population will be no better than the second. In this case both populations A and B contain a 
group of n1 lives at welfare level a. However, population A contains n1 additional lives at welfare 
level z, a low positive welfare level, whilst population B contains 1 life at a negative welfare level 
whilst the rest (n1-1 lives) are at welfare level a, a very high welfare level. So long as n1 is a 
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sufficiently large number of lives then the Non-Extreme Priority Condition implies that 
population B will be no better than population A, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 21: The Non-Extreme Priority Condition 
The Non-Sadism Condition implies that if two populations are the same with regard to one group 
of lives, but differ with regard to the other lives that they contain, and if in the first population 
these additional lives are all at a negative welfare level whilst in the second they are all at a 
positive welfare level then the first population is no better than the second. In this case, both 
populations B and C contain a group of n1 lives at welfare level a and a group of n1-1 lives at 
welfare level a (making 2n1-1 lives at welfare level a in total). However, population B also contains 
an additional life at a negative welfare level whilst population C contains n2 additional lives that 
are all at a positive welfare level z*, a very low welfare level that is even lower than z. The Non-
Sadism Condition therefore implies that population C is no better than population B, as illustrated 
below: 
 
Figure 22: The Non-Sadism Condition 
As previously noted, The Non-Extreme Priority Condition implies that, so long as there are a 
sufficient number of lives at a low positive welfare level in the first of two populations, the same 
number of lives with one at a negative welfare level and the rest at a very high welfare level in the 
second population and no other differences between the two populations then the first of these 
populations will be no better than the second. It follows that if one population contains a very 
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large number of lives at a low positive welfare level then this condition implies that this 
population can be no better than a population in which numerous lives are at a negative welfare 
level. This can be proven by applying that Non-Extreme Priority Condition to a sequence of 
similar populations, each with a successively larger proportion of their at very high and negative 
welfare levels, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 23: The Non-Extreme Priority Condition 2 
 
In this case both populations C and D contain 2n1-1 lives at welfare level a. Population C also 
contains n2 lives (a very large number) at welfare level z*. Population D also contains n2 
additional lives, with a large number (n3) at welfare level a, a smaller number (n4) at a negative 
welfare level and the rest (n2-(n3+n4)) at welfare level z*. Since there is no limit to how large n2 
can be, it will certainly be possible to create a sequence of populations between C and D such that 
for every population in this sequence the Non-Extreme Priority Condition would imply that the 
second population is no better than the first. The Non-Extreme Priority Condition therefore 
implies, via transitivity, that C is no better than D, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 24: The Non-Extreme Priority Condition 3 
Finally, the Non-Elitism Condition implies that if two populations are the same with regard to one 
group of lives, but differ with regard to the other lives that they contain, and if in the first 
population some of these lives are at a higher welfare level, a, and the rest are at a lower welfare 
level, c, whilst in the second population there are just as many of these additional lives, all at an 
intermediate welfare level, b, then the first population will be no better than the second, 
regardless of how high or low any of the welfare levels a, b and c might be, so long as the number 
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of lives at welfare level c in the first population is sufficiently large relative to the number of lives 
at welfare level a. In this case, both populations D and E contain a number of lives (n4) at a 
negative welfare level. However, population D also contains a large number of lives (2n1-1 + n3 
lives) at welfare level a and a very large number of lives (n2–(n3+n4) lives) at welfare level z*. 
Population E contains exactly the same number of additional lives ((2n1-1) + (n2-n4)) all at 
welfare level z, a low positive welfare level that is nevertheless intermediate between welfare levels 
a and z*. Since there is no limit to how large n2 can be, n2-(n3+n4) can be very much larger than 
the sum of 2n1-1 and n3. It follows that, even though welfare level z is not much higher than 
welfare level z*, and much lower than welfare level a, the Non-Elitism Condition will imply that 
population D is no better than population E, as illustrated below: 
 
Figure 25: The Non-Elitism Condition 
Hence, population A is no better than population B, which is no better than population C, which is 
no better than any of the members of a sequence of populations that are no better than population 
D, which is no better than population E. It follows via transitivity that population A is no better 
than population E. However, this contradicts the implication of the Weak Quality Addition 
Condition that population A is better than population E.  
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Appendix B – On fairness 
In the introduction to this thesis I argued that I would restrict my consideration to axiologies for 
entirely distinct populations, except where I attempted to disprove the arguments of those who 
did not observe such a restriction. I believe that this is a useful exercise, but that it could never be 
sufficient for producing a truly satisfactory population axiology. In this appendix I wish to briefly 
consider the concept of fairness as it might apply to populations that were not distinct from one 
another. 
In section 2.1.2 I briefly set out a kind of paradox for egalitarians. It seems that we cannot accept 
the following three conditions 
1. Levelling down is not good 
2. Mere addition is not bad 
3. Equality has a positive value 
This is a strange sort of paradox since many egalitarians are, in fact, willing to reject either 1 or 2. 
However, the force of the paradox becomes clearer if we are asked to chose between an 
impersonal value for equality and a person effecting value for equality. 
On a person affecting value for equality, equality is not in itself bad, but if we can chose between 
two outcomes, A and B, where some people are more equally well off in A than in B, , then this 
gives us a reson to prefer A to B.As Larry Temkin has argued this view gives us a good reason to 
accept axiom 2, that mere addition is not bad, because in mere addition we choose between 
outcomes in which either some people exist with lives worth living, or they do not. In neither 
outcome are any actual people more or less equally well off. Unfrotunately, as I argued in section 
2.1.2, the person affecting count of equality not only violates the second axiom, but does so in a 
very troubling way. Since it implies that it is always good to make people more equally well off 
then it is good to make the best off people in a population worse off, without making the worst off 
people in that population any better off. How can this be a benefit for anyone? It is not a benefit 
for the best off in a population, since they have been made worse off, but it is also not a benefit for 
the worst off in the population, because their lives have not been affected. It is not different for 
these people if the best off people in that population are made worse off, or if they are removed 
from the population and replaced by other people with lives that are worse. 
The standard response to the levelling down objection is to argue that equality has an impersonal 
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value. It is not better for anyone that the better off are made worse off, but it is still good because 
it produces a more equal population overall. This allows us to reject axiom 2 and deal with the 
levelling down objection. However, on this account it no longer matters if equality is produced by 
making people more equal or not. Therefore it no longer seems true to say that mere addition is 
not bad, since it involves replacing a perfectly equal population with a population that is unequal, 
and therefore worse with respect to the impersonal value of equality. 
I suggested in section 3.4.3 that my account of the value of equality as resting on the presence or 
absence of ‘egalitarian goods’ could deal with this dilemma. However, it would be wrong to say 
that it is the only way in which an egalitarian might respond to it. In this section I wish to briefly 
point out two other ways in which an egalitarian might respond to this dilemma, both of which I 
believe have some merit. 
One response is to reject the dichotomy between person affecting and impersonal values for 
equality. This dichotomy equivocates across two very different kinds of distinction. Firstly, 
whether a good is personal or impersonal, and secondly whether it is ‘affecting’ or ‘non affecting’.  
By affecting I mean whether it is a good that depends how our decision affects an outcome, or 
whether it is present or absent in that outcome independently of what we decide to do. 
The distinction between personal and impersonal goods that I shall focus on is that between goods 
that attach to the value of people’s lives (personal good) and goods that attach to the relationships 
between lives. There are many different kinds of potentially morally significant relationship 
between lives that may form the basis of an impersonal good and these include the relationship 
between the lives that belong to the members of the same population, the lives that belong to the 
same person across different populations, and the relationship between a person’s actual life and 
they life that they deserve, be that in respect of their moral dignity, their virtue or their prudence. 
Person non-affecting goods are the value of lives themselves. Some people believe that 
egalitarianism can be grounded on person non-affecting goods in the form of priority weighting. 
Personally, I do not believe that this is a correct usage of the term ‘egalitarian’, although I am not 
opposed to it as a moral theory. 
Impersonal non-affecting goods are the value of the relationships between lives. The standard 
impersonal value of equality is the value of lives being at the same welfare level, or not being at 
different welfare levels. 
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Person affecting goods are the value of people being in one outcome rather than another outcome. 
The standard person affecting value of equality is the value of people being ‘more equal’ rather 
than ‘less equal’. 
Impersonal affecting goods are the value of the relationships between individuals ‘being’ in one 
outcome rather than another outcome. An impersonal affecting value of equality is the value of the 
relationship between two people being made more egalitarian rather than less egalitarian. If we 
make person 1 worse off but person 2 no better off, then we do not benefit person 1 and we do not 
affect person 2, this is why person affecting accounts of equality are not able to respond to the 
levelling down objection. However, we still might be said to ‘improve’ the relationship between 
person 1 and person 2 by making the relationship between these two people more equal. Since the 
actual relationship between these two people, 1 and 2, is better in one outcome than in another we 
have reason to prefer that outcome and therefore to reject the levelling down objection. 
However, impersonal affecting values do not have the same difficulties as impersonal non-
affecting values in handling cases of mere addition. The impersonal non-affecting value merely 
notes that the mere addition of people to a population increases the number and proportion of 
unequal to equal relationships in a population it will be bad. However, the impersonal affecting 
value of equality only requires us to believe that it is bad to make actual relationships between 
people less equal. However, in mere addition cases no actual relationships between people are 
altered. The mere addition of people to a population makes it less equal merely by adding 
additional relationsips between people who exist in both outcomes and people who only exist in 
one of these outcomes, and the impersonal affecting value of equality does not view such 
relationships as bad, even if they are unequal. 
Nevertheless, I am sceptical about the plausibility of impersonal affecting values such as this. Why 
should it make an outcome better if the relationship between to lives improves where this is not to 
the benefit of anyone? For instance, consider the following possible outcomes 
 Outcome A Outcome B 
Person 1 10 9 
Person 2 9 9 
Person 3 10  
Person 4  1 
An impersonal affecting value of equality would imply in this case that Outcome B is better with 
respect to equality than Outcome A, because the actual relationship between Person 1 and Person 
2 is more egalitarian in outcome 2 than in outcome 1, even though outcome B involves a less equal 
distribution of welfare overall. 
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Another response that the egalitarian might make to this dilemma would be to abandon the value 
of equality, in favour of a richer notion of ‘fairness’. Fairness can be used to encapsulate the value 
of a number of relational goods that can be the source of individual complaints, even though they 
do not directly affect the value of individual lives. 
In-fact, egalitarianism is seldom associated with a positive value for equality on its own. The 
classic egalitarian view that ‘it is bad for some to be worse off than others through no fault or 
choice of their own’ (Temkin (1993) 13) is not just a view about the value of equality, but the 
relationship between this and the value of desert. This forms a kind of unified concept of fairness 
that encapsulates more than one kind of value. 
Another unified concept of fairness that could help us to deal with the dilemma I have described 
would unifie the values of equality with personal affecting values. In particular, a view about the 
value of equality that also expressed its relationship with the value of being worse off than one 
might have been. In the case of levelling down we find it hard to accept that levelling down is good 
because somebody is being made worse off than they might have been and nobody is being made 
better off. In the spirit of the classic egalitarian view, we might capture this exception in the view 
that ‘it is bad for some to be worse off than others through being worse off than they might have 
been”. Combining these two views together would produce the reasonably attractive view that “It 
is bad for some to be worse off than others through being undeservedly worse off than they might 
have been”. On this view it could be unfair to be worse off than one might have been, more unfair 
to be worse off than one deserves through being worse off than one might have been and still more 
unfair to be worse off than others through being undeservedly worse off than one might have 
been, but not unfair to be worse off than others if one could not have been better off or did not 
deserve to be so. 
In both the levelling down objection and the case of mere addition, one of the challenges to 
applying the principles of egalitarianism is that the worst off people in either case could not have 
been better off than they are in the most unequal outcome that is available, a problem that is not 
unique to these cases. Many sollutions to this challenge have been offered, including MaxiMin and 
prioritarianism. However, the simplest way of responding to this difficulty is surely just to argue 
that in such cases the inequality in these outcomes is no longer unfair, and so not bad. This would 
require us to give up the idea that any kind of inequality is always bad, but by replacing this with a 
richer concept of fairness we can maintain, and I believe improve upon, our egalitarian intuitions.   
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Appendix C – Other world views 
The kind of non-simple population axiology I have discussed in this work stresses the important 
of diverse perspectives from which lives can be evaluated. I have argued for the existence of these 
perspectives solely on the grounds that the perspective of the person who lives a life represents 
merely one point on a continuum of possible perspectives (according to certain views about the 
nature of personal identity), and it is not necessarily the case that these other perspectives are not 
morally significant as well. It is possible however that these alternative perspectives already play 
significant roles in moral philosophies from outside the Ango-American tradition. 
Firstly, let us consider the case of Buddhist ethics. The relationship between the kind of 
reductionist view of personal identity that I have assumed throughout this work to be true, or at 
least to represent the way in which personal identity matters morally, has long been connected 
with Buddhist ways of viewing the self (Parfit (1984) 273).  
According to the reductionist criterion of personal identity there is something that corresponds to 
our conventional view of the self, but it is merely a pattern of psychological continuity over time, 
has no special metaphysical significance and does not ‘matter’ morally. The fact that A and B are 
psychologically connected in a certain way does matter to us, the fact that this makes them the 
same person does not. 
According to the Buddhist conception of the self there is a conventional truth to the way in which 
we talk about the self and about persons as continuous through time, but this reflects no ultimate 
truth. What matters to us at a particular point in time is merely what matters to us at that point in 
time, and whilst we might care about what happens in our past and future this is, in reality, a 
grave mistake (Gowans (2015) 71). 
This metaphysical view, combined with other views Buddhists hold about human psychology and 
our place in the universe, leads them to advance a sophisticated view about the value of lives. Note 
that since Buddhists do not believe in the ultimate truth of personhood there is no concept in 
Buddhist philosophy that is synonymous with our concept of wellbeing, and indeed no real 
philosophy of wellbeing at all (Gowens (2015) 78-80). Nevertheless Buddhists do hold a variety of 
views about the things that make lives go better in worse. In sum Buddhists tend to distinguish 
between three kinds of goods: 
1. ordinary goods, such as health, long life, peace of mind, good reputation, wealth and 
beauty – which are rewards for morally virtuous actions according to the theory of Karma 
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2. suffering, or unsatisfactoryness – which stems from being confined to the cycle of rebirth 
and the illusion of selfhood 
3. the goods that stem from achieving enlightenment - contentment, wisdom and virtue, 
which are the result of obtaining selflessness, and thus escaping the cycle of rebirth. 
Due to their metaphysical beliefs Buddhists believe that there are fundamentally two states 
humans can be in. An unenlightened state that lacks any of the goods of enlightenment and is 
pervaded by suffering and an enlightened state in which sufferinc is absent and the goods of 
enlightenment are chieved to a perfect degree. For Buddhists the second of these states is 
infinitely preferable to the first. Since we are not committed to these beliefs however we can ask 
the question of how these goods might be valued in more marginal situations. 
One question is how the value or ordinary goods and the goods of enlightenment should be 
compared. Since Buddhists believe that those who have achieved enlightenment still live and 
experience these others goods this is a question that can be asked within the Buddhist tradition. 
The answer seems to be that Buddhists view ordinary goods as always valuable, but that the goods 
of enlightenment are incommensurably more important in that no amount of ordinary goods 
could ever be as valuable as being in a state of enlightenment (Gowens (2015) 74). 
Another question is how the value of suffering compares with that of positive goods. Since 
Buddhists believe that suffering is innately connected to the achievement of enlightenment this is 
far harder to evaluate. However it is worth noting that Buddhists do not believe that any amount 
of ordinary goods can constitute sufficient compensation for suffering, but that suffering is the 
fundamental flaw of all unenlightened lives. It seems likely then that, viewing the temporal self, 
and hence the possibility for temporal compensation, as an illusion, Buddhists view suffering as 
being much worse than most western thinkers do, and the extinguishment of suffering as being a 
far greater moral concern than the promotion of other goods, except for the goods of 
enlightenment. 
Buddhist conceptions of what the goods of enlightenment are cannot be easily captured on any of 
the theories of wellbeing that I have discussed in chapter 3 (Gowens (2015) 74 – 76). However, 
one key aspect of these goods seems to be the unification of ones judgements about the world with 
one’s present experiences. An enlightened individual continues to experience the world in the 
same way as an unenlightened individual, but no longer makes negative judgements about these 
experiences, ‘non-dissatisfaction’, and no longer seeks to avoid them, ‘tranquillity’ (Gowens (2015) 
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73), this is why they cease to constitute suffering. My feeling is that this state of being does not 
necessarily require a complete abandonment of the self, as Buddhists believe. Rather it may be 
achievable by adjusting ones judgements about one’s present state to reflect its objective worth 
rather than how one feels about it, and to react according to what one has most reason to do, 
rather than what one wants. This alignment of judgement and experience that I believe can bring 
these goods into line with other kinds of perfectionist value, and, as I have argued, the value of 
this kind of alignment is not properly reflected in the value of our lives to the people who live 
them. 
Another worldview I would like to briefly consider is the concept of Ubuntu, and its cognates, that 
play an important role in moral theories of the Bantu speaking peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Ubuntu, literally ‘humanity’, is often summarised as the idea that human value is achieved 
through collective action, rather than personal development. This is not a claim about the nature 
of the person, but it is a claim about how we ought to live. In particular, it is the view that one 
should not promote individual wellbeing, either of oneself or of others, but rather the collective 
wellbeing of the community as a whole. As one recent analysis of both the concept of Ubuntu and 
the moral intuitions of native Africans who live by it concluded, Ubuntu requires us to promote 
“shared identity among people grounded in goodwill” (Metz (2007) 338). Both shared identity 
and goodwill are crucial parts of what has final moral value according to Ubuntu. Shared identity 
is required in order for groups to possess common interests, rather than merely a collection of 
individual goods, whilst goodwill is necessary to make these valuable to their members (Metz 
(2007) 335-337). 
This kind of collective value has parallels with the egalitarian goods I described in section 3.4.3. 
Both values emerge when individuals come to share identity relations and to promote goods that 
depend on these relations. In my account, the extra value of these goods comes from the fact that 
they may increase the value of lives that do not contain them, because of the connections between 
the persons these lives, and the goods they contain, belong to. For Ubuntu however there seems to 
be a richer concept of a collective good created by the establishment of strong communities. It is 
possible that some of this distinction stems from the metaphysical aspects of Ubuntu that I have 
not discussed here, relating to the importance of common ancestry in establishing and 
maintaining group identities. However, the concept of collective values, like those described by 
the philosophy of Ubuntu, are much easier to interpret within the kind of non-simple axiology 
that I have described here than if we restrict ourselves to conventional western views about 
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wellbeing. 
Similar concepts about value are also present in Confucian theories of ethics. For Confucians, as 
for Buddhists, the concept of the self that we are so familiar with in Western Philosophy is an 
illusion. However, for Confucians, the truth if that my personhood consists of the overlapping 
social roles that I inhabit. My identity is established by the fact that I am a ruler or a subject, a 
parent or a child, a teacher or a student, an elder or a youngster and a husband or a wife. Human 
value consists in gaining an awareness of these relationships and living well according to them 
and personal flourishing is achieved, not by having a life that is valuable for oneself but, only as 
part of a flourishing society (Bockover (2010) 310-11). Note however that whilst I have suggested 
that collective goods are created by patterns of psychological extension that relate to an equal 
distribution of wellbeing, Confucians tend to dismiss the value of equality or sameness (tong) and 
instead value harmony (he) across a maximal degree of diversity and difference. Confucians 
therefore tend to value stable and enlightened hierarchies over egalitarian societies, although this 
does not mean that they would value an unequal distribution of flourishing.  Nevertheless 
Confucianism, like the philosophy of Ubuntu and the egalitarian goods I discussed in section 
3.4.3, affirms the value of pursuing shared interests rather than personal wellbeing. 
In describing these world views I do not wish to appropriate cultural concepts with which I am not 
intimate. My main aim has rather been to consider how different world views might reflect the 
diverse kinds of value that I believe should be incorporated into our all things considered axiology 
of lives, alongside the conventional western value of personal wellbeing. In doing so I hope that 
such views might begin to appear to represent more of a spectrum of different ways of evaluating 
lives and their contents, which could potentially be reconciled into an all things considered view, 
rather than being seen as totally different and irreconcilable views about right and wrong.  
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Appendix D – List of conditions and axioms 
The Quantity Condition: For any population of n1 people at welfare level a (where a is both 
positive and not the lowest positive welfare level), there exists a population size n2 (where n2>n1) 
and a positive welfare level b (where b<a) such that a population of n2 people at welfare level b is 
at least as good. 
The General Quantity Condition: For any group of lives X, if a and b are both positive welfare 
levels that are greater than the average welfare level of X, then for any population consisting of the 
X lives and some lives at a there will be a population consisting of the X lives and some lives at b 
that will be at least as good. 
The Quality Condition: For some population of n1 people all at a very high positive welfare level a, 
there is a very low positive welfare level z such that no population of any number of people at z 
would be at least as good. 
The Weak Quality Condition: For some population of n1 people all at a very high welfare level a, 
there is a negative welfare level z and a very low positive welfare level p such that there is no 
population consisting of some people with lives at z and other people at p that is at least as good. 
The Weak Quality Addition Condition: For any population X, the addition of a sufficiently large 
group with very high positive welfare to X would be better than the addition of any group of 
people at a very low positive welfare level and some people at a negative welfare level. 
The Non-Sadism Condition: An addition of any number of people with positive welfare is at least 
as good as an addition of any number of people with negative welfare, other things being equal. 
The Non-Anti-Egalitarian Condition: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a > b and 
b > c, and for any group of (n1) people, there is a larger number n2 such that a population of 
n1+n2 people all at welfare level b would be at least as good as a population consisting of n1 
people at a and n2 people at welfare level c.  
The Non-Elitism Condition: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a is higher than b 
and b higher than c, and for any population A at welfare level a, there is some, sufficiently larger, 
population C at welfare level c, and a population B of the same size as A∪C at welfare level b, such 
that for any population X, B∪X is at least as good as A∪C∪X. 
The Non-Extreme Priority Condition: There is a number of lives, n, such that for any population 
X, a population consisting of the X-lives, n lives at a very high welfare level and a single life at a 
slightly negative welfare level is at least as good as a population consisting of the X-lives and n+1 
lives at a very low positive welfare level. 
The Non-Extreme Priority Addition Condition: For any population of n1 people at welfare level a 
there is another population with more people at a higher welfare level and one single person at a 
negative welfare level that is at least as good.  
The Dominance Addition Condition: An addition of lives with positive welfare and an increase in 
the welfare in the rest of the population doesn’t make a population worse, other things being 
equal. 
The Egalitarian Dominance Condition: If population A is a perfectly equal population of the same 
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size as population B, and every person in A has higher welfare than every person in B, then A is 
better than B, other things being equal. 
Universal Domain: We can rank all possible populations according to their relative betterness. 
The value of Total Utility: The total quantity of welfare is at least one value that matters in our 
evaluation of populations. 
Value Pluralism: More than one value should matter in our evaluation of populations. 
The Non-Vanishing Value Axiom: No value that matters in our evaluation of populations should 
become infinitely small in importance at the margin. 
The Narrow Person-Affecting View: In assessing possible outcomes, one should (1) focus on the 
status of independently existing people, with the aim of wanting them to be as well off as possible, 
and (2) ignore the status of dependently existing people, except that one wants to avoid harming 
them as much as possible. 
The Separate Satisfiability Condition: For any agent and any situation, there is an action such that 
if the agent were to perform this action, then her action would not be morally wrong. 
The Normative Quality Condition: There is at least one population A of n people all at welfare 
level a (where a is a very high welfare level) such that for any population Z at a very low positive 
welfare level z, in cases involving A and Z it would be wrong to choose Z. 
The Normative Quantity Condition: For any population, A, of n1 people all at welfare level a 
(where a is both positive and not the lowest positive welfare level), there exists a population size 
n2 (where n2>n1) and a positive welfare level b (where b<a) such that if it is wrong to choose a 
population, B, of n2 people at b, then it is wrong to choose A. 
Condition 1: An addition of lives with positive welfare and an increase in the welfare of the rest of 
a population does not make a population worse, so long as it adds more brunettes and no more 
blondes. 
Condition 2: For any triplet of welfare levels a, b and c, where a > b and b > c, and for any group of 
(n1) people, there is a larger number n2 such that a population of n1+n2 people all at welfare level 
b would be at least as good as a population consisting of n1 people at a and n2 people at welfare 
level c, so long as it had more brunettes and no more blondes. 
Condition 3: For some population of n1 people all at a very high welfare level a, there is a very low 
positive welfare level z such that no population of any number of people at z would be at least as 
good, so long as it had more brunettes and no more blondes. 
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